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7Foreword
The Western Balkans is among the regions with the most worrisome labour market indica-
tors worldwide. While low job creation and high unemployment remain the problems of 
major concern for the public and policymakers in the countries of the region, some key 
structural labour market issues remain relatively marginalized. This is certainly the case 
with the two key gender gaps – gender employment gap and gender pay gap. 
To fully understand how a concrete labour market really functions, it is necessary to analyze 
men and women in their societal and familial contexts, rather than to look at the isolated 
and sexless individuals. The research effort presented in this book deals dominantly with the 
gender pay gap, but it sheds some light on gender employment gap as well. Furthermore, 
it provides hints on how gender imbalances in the labour market impact the overall labour 
market performance in the three analyzed countries – Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia 
(FYROM).
The specific motivation for studying the gender pay gap in these countries can be found 
in the hypothesis that low employment rates of women (that spill over into low overall 
employment rates) might be due to the large gender pay gap, which itself could be a con-
sequence of various forms of discrimination or gender inequalities. However, the findings 
of our research are quite complex, nuanced and often country-specific. Still, some synthetic 
hints and cautious generalizations could be found in introductory and concluding chapters 
of this book. 
The research project was carried out throughout 2012 as a partnership between the 
Foundation for the Advancement of Economics (FREN) from Belgrade, Serbia, and the 
University American College (UACS), from Skopje, Macedonia, within the framework 
of the Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), run 
by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation, SDC, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. It has been, under my 
oversight, a collaborative effort of MSc. Sonja Avlijaš (doctoral candidate at the London 
School of Economics), Dr. Sunčica Vujić (Assistant Professor at the University of Bath), 
MSc. Marko Vladisavljević (FREN) and Nevena Ivanović (UN Women Serbia), with the 
support of Biljana Apostolova (external researcher with the UACS). Administrative coor-
dination was provided by Mr. Aleksandar Radivojević of FREN. We are grateful for the 
support of Dr. Marjan Petreski (Associate Professor at the UACS) throughout the project. 
This research could not be possible without the invaluable assistance we got from the 
three national statistical offices. In Serbia, the Labour Force Survey data have been kindly 
provided by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, and our gratitude goes to the 
director Dragan Vukmirović and Mr. Vladan Božanić, head of the Department for LFS, as 
well as to their capable staff. In Montenegro, our gratitude goes to Mr. Gojko Dragaš and 
Ms. Ana Vasiljević, whose assistance went beyond the highest standards of professionalism. 
In Macedonia, we would like to thank Ms. Violeta Krsteva and Ms. Daneila Avramovska 
for their invaluable assistance.
Our research results, either in preliminary or in final form, were presented and discussed 
on three occasions – in Podgorica on 18 December 2012, in Skopje on 21 December 
2012, and in Belgrade, at the final conference of the project, on 22 February 2013. We are 
grateful to all participants who provided their comments, shared their views and insights 
and helped us sharpen or refine our arguments. We are very thankful to Professor Miriam 
Beblo from Universität Hamburg, who served as an external mentor for the project and 
provided us with the timely and valuable comments; and to Dr. Nikica Mojsoska-Blaževski 
(Associate Professor at UACS) and Ms. Ana Krsmanović (Assistant Minister of Finance, 
Montenegro) for their insights and comments. 
Professor Mihail Arandarenko,
Chairman of the Board,
Foundation for the Advancement of Economics, Belgrade
9Executive Summary
The research project “Gender pay gap in the Western Balkan countries: Evidence from 
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia”1 sought to contribute to the understanding of gender 
wage disparities in three Western Balkan countries: Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
In particular, the aim was to measure the scope and characteristics of the gender wage 
gap and to analyse the observed trends in the larger context of women’s labour market 
participation. 
The gender pay gap, which refers to the difference between the wages earned by women 
and by men, is one of the key indicators of women’s access to economic opportunities and 
undoubtedly one of the most persistent labour market characteristics globally. 
This study provides the most comprehensive, robust and precise up-to-date analysis of 
the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans. We use the most extensive data set avail-
able to analyse the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans, which covers seven2 waves of 
the Labour Force Survey (2008-2011) across the three countries. The analysis therefore 
captures both cross-country comparisons as well as changes in the gender pay gap during 
the economic crisis. The methodology applied and the period of analysis are the same for 
all three countries.
Apart from controlling for individual labour market characteristics, we provide a detailed 
disaggregation of the gender wage gap across sectors, occupations, types of ownership (public 
vs. private), as well as status in employment (wage employment vs. self-employment). The 
study looks beyond the simple difference in female and male average wages, to determine 
how different characteristics of women workers, sectoral and occupational segregation, 
workers’ location within the public or private sector, and their wage- vs. self-employment 
status influence the wage gap. It is also an attempt to show how and why the sources of 
the gender pay gap may differ across the wage distribution and test for the “sticky floor” 
and “glass ceiling” effects. Finally, we use the Heckman selection model to account for 
self-selection into the labour force.
While we found some similarities in the distribution of male and female employment and 
wage gaps, a number of diverging trends were also observed. Given these differences, the 
countries of the Western Balkans cannot be treated as a homogenous group when it comes 
to attempting to understand gender inequalities in the labour market. Country-specific 
institutional frameworks as well as their historical path dependencies have played a great 
role in the shaping of gender relations in the economic sphere in this region.
1 The project was carried out in partnership between the Belgrade-based Foundation for the Advancement of Economics 
(FREN) and the Skopje-based University American College Skopje (UACS), within the framework of the Regional Research 
Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), run by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. It has been a collaborative effort 
of MSc. Sonja Avlijaš (doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics), Dr. Sunčica Vujić (Assistant Professor at the 
University of Bath), and MSc. Marko Vladisavljević (FREN), with the support of Biljana Apostolova (external researcher with 
the UACS) and Nevena Ivanović (UN Women Serbia).
2 One wave is missing for Serbia (April 2010). 
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Analysis of Serbian Labour Force Survey data found that employed women in Serbia are 
better qualified yet earn less than men. A woman with the same labour characteristics 
as a man earns 11% less. In other words, a woman would need to work 40 extra days 
every year to make the same annual wages as a man with the same characteristics. This 
so-called true (adjusted) gender wage gap has been calculated using econometric methods 
which make possible a comparison between women and men with the same characteristics 
in terms of level of education and work experience, as well as women and men within the 
same occupation (e.g. Clerks) and within the same sector of activity (e.g. Industry). 
At the same time, the simple difference in the average female vs. male wage in Serbia, i.e. 
the so-called raw (unadjusted) wage gap, amounts to only 3.3%. This simple arithmetic 
difference is lower than the true (adjusted) wage gap, i.e. it hides the true magnitude of the 
gap, because women who work are better qualified as a group than men who work. Women 
in Serbia (as well as in Macedonia and Montenegro) face high barriers at the point of 
entry into the labour market, so they need to be better qualified than men on average to 
be able to access employment in the first place. In other words, while both low-skilled and 
high-skilled men work, a disproportionate number of high-skilled women work, since low-
skilled women are often inactive. Moreover, high-skill women, in terms of education and 
work experience, are able to access the better-paid occupations and sectors of the economy 
in Serbia (as well as in Macedonia, but not in Montenegro). Therefore, their average wages 
at the level of the entire economy are “only” 3.3% lower than male. However, if there were 
no discrimination, women would earn more than men because they are better qualified. 
When the results are adjusted for this fact, women are shown to earn 11% less than men. 
In other words, the low unadjusted/raw wage gap is the result of low female labour market 
participation, and as such, it is not ‘good news’.
This trend is the opposite of that observed in Western economies, where working women 
are on average less qualified than working men, so that the unadjusted wage gap that 
exists in every country (the EU average is 16.2%) is partially explained by the female 
disadvantage in labour market characteristics. In other words, after controlling for men’s 
and women’s differences in characteristics, it is usually significantly narrowed.
The true gender wage gap, which in Serbia stands at 11%, is interpreted in economic 
literature as the effect of discrimination. Econometric decomposition of this gap offers 
more information on the sources of this discrimination. Curiously, the results show that in 
Serbia, unlike in Macedonia and Montenegro, women do not have smaller returns on the 
same labour market characteristics than men. For example, they are not paid less than men 
for each additional year of education or for their choice of occupation. The true gap mainly 
exists due to the different returns between men and women on unobserved character-
istics (unobserved due to data limitations and beyond the scope of this analysis). These 
could include differences in female and male labour market behaviour which employers 
reward or punish within the same occupations and sectors of the economy, e.g. that 
women may be less flexible in terms of working hours or business trips, due to home and 
reproductive responsibilities; other non-measurable effort- and ability-related variables, as 
well as labour market frictions. Due to constraints in data availability, these unobserved 
characteristics are beyond the scope of this analysis.
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Separate analyses of wage gaps in the public vs. the private sector reveal that the unadjusted 
gap is higher in the private sector than in the public: in the private sector, an average 
woman earns 9.4% lower wages than an average man, while in the public, the difference in 
wages at 1.6% is not statistically significant. Once we adjust for different personal labour 
market characteristics, the gap in the public sector widens to 7.5%, while it grows only 
slightly in the private – to 11%. This is due to the fact that women in the public sector on 
average have significantly better labour market characteristics than men (higher levels of 
education, better occupations), while in the private sector this difference in characteristics 
is small, albeit again in favour of women. In other words, the wage gap in the public 
sector is much more hidden than the gender gap in the private sector, because women 
working in the public sector on average have more education and work in better jobs. 
Once we adjust for these better female characteristics in the public sector, the difference 
between the respective gaps shrinks from almost 8pp (insignificant 1.6% in the public 
sector vs. 9.4% in the private) to 3.5pp (7.5% in the public sector vs. 11% in the private). 
Therefore, if there were no discrimination in the public sector or if men were not better 
awarded for their unobservable characteristics, the average female wage in the public 
sector would be above male. 
Unadjusted gap is the lowest in the first (bottom) and the fifth (top) quintile of the wage 
distribution, where it is statistically insignificant; while the adjusted gap in the top 20% 
of all wages amounts to 4.4%. The highest unadjusted and adjusted gaps are found in the 
second and third quintile of the wage distribution, where they stand at 5.8% and 5.4% 
respectively. Due to the duality of the labour market, the differences at different parts 
of the wage distribution become clearer if we analyse the private and the public sector 
separately. In the public sector, the adjusted gap is relatively steady across different parts 
of the wage distribution, and it stands at 4.6% for the highest wages, while in the private 
sector, it rises along the wage distribution (from 5.5% at the bottom end) and reaches its 
peak (14%) at the top 20% of the distribution, suggesting the so-called “glass ceiling” 
effect: it is more difficult for women to access the best paid jobs in the private sector.
Analysed over time, our results suggest that both unadjusted and adjusted gaps dropped 
significantly, between October 2008 and October 2009 (unadjusted by 3.9 percentage 
points: from 6.2% to the statistically insignificant 2.3%, and the adjusted by 4.9 pp: from 
15.5% to 10.6%), due to the higher growth of female wages in this period (female wages 
grew by 5.6%, while male grew by 1.8%) and a more negative impact of the economic crisis 
on masculinised sectors and occupations, such as construction and industrial production, 
than on the feminised ones. 
Further, we found that between October 2010 and April 2011, both the initial unadjusted 
gap and the rise in it were not statistically significant, while the adjusted gap rose from 
8.7% to 9.5% (a statistically insignificant rise). This gap growth, while statistically insignifi-
cant, may indicate a shift in the trend of the gender gap decline observed in the previous 
period, especially since over the next period (October 2011), the unadjusted gap rises to 
the statistically significant 4%. The rise in the unadjusted gaps in last two periods may 
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suggest3 the slow returning of the gap to its pre-crisis level. This could indicate that the 
narrowing of the gap was only a temporary outcome of the stronger negative impact of the 
crisis on male vs. female wages. 
Analysis of the Macedonian Labour Force Survey data found that employed women in 
Macedonia are better qualified yet earn less than men. A woman with the same labour 
characteristics as a man earns 17.9% less. In other words, a woman would need to work 
65 extra days every year to make the same annual wages as a man with the same charac-
teristics. 
At the same time, the simple difference in the average female vs. male wage in Macedonia, 
i.e. the so-called raw (unadjusted) wage gap, amounts to 13.4%. This simple arithmetic 
difference is lower than the true (adjusted) wage gap, i.e. it hides the true magnitude of 
the gap, because women who work are better qualified as a group than men who work. 
Women in Macedonia (as well as in Serbia and Montenegro) face high barriers at the point 
of entry into the labour market, so they need to be better qualified than men on average 
to be able to access employment in the first place. In other words, while both low-skilled 
and high-skilled men work, a disproportionate number of high- skilled women work, since 
low-skilled women are often inactive. Namely, female employment rate at the primary level 
of education stands at 16.7%, while male is 40%. In other words, if a higher number of 
low-skilled women were employed, the number of women with low wages would be higher. 
Consequently, the overall average of female wages would be lower, and the gap between 
men’s and women’s wages higher. Moreover, high-skilled women, in terms of education and 
work experience, are able to access the better-paid occupations and sectors of the economy 
in Macedonia (as well as in Serbia, but not in Montenegro). Therefore, the gender wage gap 
at the level of the entire economy is lower than the gap between men and women with the 
same characteristics (13.4% vs. 17.9%). Yet, if there were no discrimination, women would 
earn more than men because they are better qualified. 
The gender wage gap in Macedonia follows the trend observed in Serbia, but is much 
larger in magnitude. Similarly to Serbia, it is opposite to the trend observed in Western 
economies, where working women are on average less qualified than working men.
The true gender wage gap, which in Macedonia stands at 17.9%, is interpreted in 
economic literature as the effect of discrimination. Econometric decomposition of this 
gap offers more information on the sources of this discrimination. The adjusted gap can 
only partially (approximately 31% of it) be explained with women being paid less while 
having the same labour market characteristics as men. Differences in returns are most 
prominent among Plant and machine operators, when working in Industry and Public 
Services (such as Public Administration, Education, Health, Social Service Activities, ET 
Organisations) and in Public sector. However, the largest part of the adjusted gap (69% 
of it) is due to differences between men and women which cannot be observed from 
the data, i.e. “unobservable” differences (such as other labour market characteristics, 
psychological factors influencing behaviour, etc.). 
3 With the caveat that changes throughout the period are not fully methodologically comparable. 
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Separate analyses of wage gaps in the public vs. the private sector reveal that the unad-
justed gap is higher in the private sector than in the public, by almost 14 percentage 
points (17.7% in the private sector, 4% in the public). However, the difference in the 
adjusted gap is significantly smaller – only 7 pp (18.6% in the private sector, 11.4% in the 
public), since women in the public sector have better labour market characteristics than 
men (mainly better education and higher participation in better paid occupations), while 
this is not the case in the private sector. 
Unadjusted gap is the lowest in the first and fifth (highest) quintile of the wage distribution 
(11.5% and 10.3% respectively), while it is the highest at the midpoint of the distribution 
(19.5%). The pattern of the adjusted part of the gap follows the pattern of the unadjusted 
gap very closely, since the differences in the labour market characteristics (explained part) 
are relatively low at all quintiles. However, separate analysis for public and private sector 
suggest different conclusions. Namely, in both sectors the gap is low at lower parts of the 
wage distribution (i.e. among lower wages) and it rises as one moves up the wage distribu-
tion and reaches its peak at the highest levels of the distribution. This indicates a so-called 
“glass ceiling” effect: that women do not work in jobs that are most highly paid.4
Analysed over time, our results suggest that both unadjusted and adjusted gaps dropped 
significantly between Q4 2008 and Q4 2009 (unadjusted by 12.6 percentage points, from 
19.2% to 6.6%; adjusted by 9.5 percentage points: from 22% to 12.5%), due to faster growth 
of female real wages. It seems that this drop was a consequence of women benefiting more 
from the new law on income tax (introduced in 2008), since the changes of the law led 
to more progressive taxation and thus increased female lower wages to a greater extent. 
However, in the period between Q4 2009 and Q4 2011 the gender wage gap increased 
and levelled out, albeit at the lower level than the one before the crisis (13.4% unadjusted 
and 16.9% adjusted gap in Q4 2011).
Due to availability of wages for the self-employed in the Macedonian Labour Force Survey, 
we also compare wage gaps among wage employees vs. the self-employed. The unadjusted 
gap in self-employment is considerably lower than in wage-employment: it amounts 
to 5.9%. Similarly to wage-employed, self-employed women have better labour market 
characteristics than self-employed men, the main ones being higher education and better 
position in occupations. This ‘advantage’ of women is even higher in self-employment and 
thus the adjusted gap is 2.3 percentage points lower than the gap for wage-employment, 
and it amounts to 15.6%. 
In Montenegro, on average, gender pay gap between men and women is 16% over the 
analysed period, in favour of men. This is the so-called unadjusted wage gap. As is the 
case in the other two Western Balkan countries, and unlike the trends we typically observe 
in developed economies, the differences in labour market characteristics between men and 
women (e.g. education, tenure, job characteristics) cannot explain the unadjusted gap in 
Montenegro. When labour market characteristics of men and women are taken into 
4 The glass ceiling may be present due to a number of factors spanning from employers’ unwillingness to promote women 
due to personal prejudice, differences in unobservable characteristics of women and men, such as attitudes towards risk 
taking and competition, and/or self-selection of women away from positions of greater responsibility, due to their respon-
sibilities at home.
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account, the estimated gender pay gap does not decrease but it actually stays at the same 
level of 16%. This 16% is the so-called adjusted wage gap and it implies that differences in 
labour market characteristics between men and women cannot explain the gender pay gap. 
In other words, women with the same labour market characteristics as men have 16% 
lower wages, i.e. a woman would need to work 58 extra days every year to make the same 
annual wages as a man with the same characteristics. 
The adjusted gender wage gap is usually interpreted as an effect of labour market discrimi-
nation. Looking at differences in labour market characteristics between men and women 
in greater detail, some labour market characteristics of employed women in Montenegro 
are better and others worse than those of employed men. For example, although there are 
some variations in trends across occupations and sectors, on average education and region 
contribute to the lowering of the gender pay gap (women work more frequently in jobs 
which require better education and in regions which have higher wages), while occupation 
and sector of activity widen (overestimate) the pay gap (women work more frequently in 
occupations and sectors which are less paid). However, on average, the individual impacts 
of these characteristics cancel each other out, so the average wage gap stays at the same 
level.
The analysis at different segments of the wage distribution suggests that both adjusted 
and unadjusted wage gaps are higher at the higher percentiles of the wage distribution. The 
larger gap at the top of the wage distribution indicates the presence of the so-called “glass 
ceiling” effect: women do not work in jobs that are most highly paid.
Our results suggest that over the analysed period, both adjusted and unadjusted wage gaps 
were reduced, from around 18% in 2008 to around 12% in 2011. Since male employment 
rate fell substantially during the crisis, while the female employment rate was stable, the 
shrinking of the wage gap most likely occurred due to the changing gender structure of 
labour market participants.
Separate estimations for private and public sector show that for both women and men 
in Montenegro, wages are higher in the public than in the private sector. For men, this 
difference is 2%, while for women it is 17%, in favour of public sector wages. Both the 
unadjusted and adjusted gender pay gaps are higher in the private than in the public 
sector, which is expected, since the wage distribution is always more compressed in the 
public than in the private sector (i.e. there are stricter rules on minimum and maximum 
earnings, due to stronger trade unions and budgetary limitations). 
While the unadjusted wage gap in the private sector is 24%, the adjusted pay gap is 
18%, i.e. worse labour market characteristics of women in comparison to men can 
explain a part of the unadjusted gap. The opposite is true in the public sector. While the 
unadjusted pay gap in favour of men is 9%, the adjusted is 12%, which means that women 
working in the public sector have better labour market characteristics than men (mainly 
better education and higher participation in better paid occupations).
The glass ceiling effect is present in both the public and the private sector in Montenegro. 
Analysis at the different segments of the wage distribution shows that in both sectors the 
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adjusted wage gap is higher at the top of the wage distribution. However, the gap at the 
bottom of the wage distribution in the private sector is still higher than the gap at the top 
of the wage distribution in the public sector, implying that gender-based discrimination in 
the private sector is stronger. 
Comparing the three countries, we see that the raw (unadjusted) gender wage gap is 
the most pronounced in Montenegro. The highest raw gap in Montenegro may be due 
to the strong tourism sector and the consequentially higher female employment in the 
private sector (both employment and inactivity gender gaps are the lowest in Montenegro 
of the tree countries). The low raw (unadjusted) gender wage gaps in the Western Balkan 
countries in comparison to Western countries are the consequence of low female labour 
market participation. As more women with worse labour market characteristics enter 
the labour market, we can expect the raw wage gap to widen. Therefore, it is intuitive to 
observe the largest raw wage gap in the country with the lowest employment gap. 
On the other hand, the true (adjusted) gap is the most pronounced in Macedonia. As the 
true gap refers to differences in wages between individuals with the same labour market 
characteristics (men and women with the same educational attainment and work experi-
ence and those working in the same occupation/sector of the economy), as such it can 
be ascribed to labour market discrimination. In other words, while the high wage gap in 
Montenegro exists due to greater diversification of women across occupations and sectors 
of activity, and possibly their “ghettoisation” into female occupations and sectors, in Mace-
donia, discrimination within occupations and sectors of activity is very dominant. This may 
be due to the fact that female unemployment is a lot more pronounced in Macedonia than 
in the other two countries, while female employment is lower than in the other two. This 
excessive female labour supply in Macedonia may be lowering female wages vis-à-vis male 
within the same occupations/sectors to a greater extent than this is the case in the other 
two countries. Furthermore, while we have observed higher female wages in the public 
than in the private sector in all three countries, women’s access to the Macedonian public 
sector may be more limited than in the other two countries, so they may be willing to ac-
cept lower wages. This is possibly due to affirmative action towards equal representation of 
ethnic minorities in the public sector, i.e. the gender structure of the new minority entrants. 
16
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Rezime
Cilj istraživačkog projekta „Rodni jaz u zaradama u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana: nalazi iz 
Srbije, Crne Gore i Makedonije“5 bio je da doprinese boljem razumevanju razlika između 
zarada muškaraca i zarada žena u tri zemlje Zapadnog Balkana: Srbiji, Makedoniji i Crnoj 
Gori. Specifično, projekat se bavi merenjem obima i osobina rodnog jaza u platama i anal-
izom uočenih trendova u širem kontekstu učešća žena na tržištu rada.
Rodni jaz u zaradama – razlika između zarade žena i zarade muškaraca – jedan je od 
ključnih pokazatelja pristupa žena ekonomskim mogućnostima i nesumnjivo jedna od 
najpostojanijih osobina tržišta rada na globalnom nivou.
Ova studija predstavlja najobuhvatniju, najrobusniju i najprecizniju analizu postojećeg 
stanja kada je reč o rodnom jazu u platama u Srbiji, Crnoj Gori i Makedoniji. Za analizu 
rodnog jaza u zaradama u zemljama ovog regiona koristili smo najobuhvatniji dostupan 
izvor podataka o trendovima na tržištu rada: Anketu o radnoj snazi i to sedam6 talasa (u 
periodu od 2008 do 2011) za sve tri zemlje. Analiza obuhvata poređenje visine rodnog 
jaza u zaradama između zemalja, a takođe i promene u rodnom jazu u zaradama tokom 
ekonomske krize. Metodologija i period analize isti su za sve tri zemlje.
Pored  analize ukupnih trendova u rodnom jazu, detaljno smo analizirali rodni jaz u zaradama 
po sektorima delatnosti, zanimanjima, oblicima vlasništva (javno i privatno) i statusu u zapo-
slenosti (zaposlenost i samozaposlenost). U okviru studije razmatrano je više od proste razlike 
između prosečnih plata muškaraca i žena kako bi se utvrdilo na koji način različite osobine 
zaposlenih žena, obrazovanje, rad u određenom sektoru, obavljanje određenog zanimanja, 
zaposlenost u javnom ili privatnom sektoru i status (zaposlenost odnosno samozaposlenost) 
utiču na jaz u zaradama. Ova studija takođe predstavlja pokušaj da se pokaže kako i zašto se 
izvori ovog jaza mogu razlikovati u različitim tačkama distribucije zarada, kao i da se testiraju 
efekti „lepljivog poda“ i „staklenog plafona“.  Korišćen je i Hekmanov (Heckman) model 
selekcije, da bi se uzeli u obzir efekti samo-selekcije na rodni jaz u zaradama.
Iako smo otkrili da postoje određene sličnosti u trendovima jaza u zaposlenosti i jaza u 
zaradama muškaraca i žena, analiza ukazuje i na trendove koji govore da postoje razlike 
između tri analizirane zemlje. Uzevši u obzir ove razlike, smatramo da se zemlje Zapadnog 
Balkana ne mogu posmatrati kao homogena grupa pri nastojanjima da se razumeju rodne 
nejednakosti na tržištu rada. Posebni institucionalni okviri u svakoj državi, kao i njihove 
različite istorijske okolnosti, odigrali su značajnu ulogu u određivanju odnosa između 
rodova u sferi ekonomije u ovom regionu.
5  Ovaj projekat su sprovodili, kao partneri, Fondacija za razvoj ekonomske nauke (FREN) iz Beograda i American University 
College iz Skoplja (UACS) u okviru Regionalnog programa za promovisanje istraživačkog rada na Zapadnom Balkanu (RRPP), 
koji sprovodi Univerzitet u Friburgu u skladu sa mandatom koji mu je poverila Švajcarska agencija za razvoj i saradnju (SDC), 
deo Federalnog ministarstva spoljnih poslova. Analiza rodnog jaza u platama plod je saradnje Sonje Avlijaš (doktorska 
kandidatkinja na Londonskoj školi za ekonomiju), Nevene Ivanović (UN Women, Srbija), dr Sunčice Vujić (docentkinja na 
Univerzitetu u Batu, Engleska) i Marka Vladisavljevića (FREN), uz podršku Marjana Petreskog (profesor na UACS) i Biljane 
Apostolove (spoljna istraživačica pri UACS).
6  Za Srbiju nedostaje jedan talas (april 2010).
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Analiza podataka iz Ankete o radnoj snazi za Srbiju pokazala je da zaposlene žene u Srbiji 
zarađuju manje od muškaraca iako imaju bolje kvalifikacije od njih. Upoređivanjem 
zarada žena i muškaraca sa istim karakteristikama na tržištu rada (isto obrazovanje, 
radno iskustvo, zanimanje itd.), pokazalo se da žene zarađuju 11% manje. Drugim 
rečima, žena bi morala da radi dodatnih 40 dana godišnje da bi zaradila istu godišnju 
platu kao muškarac sa istim karakteristikama na tržištu rada. Ovaj takozvani „pravi“, 
to jest korigovani jaz u zaradama izračunat je korišćenjem ekonometrijskih metoda koje 
omogućuju poređenje zarada muškaraca i žena sa istim obrazovanjem i radnim iskustvom, 
kao i između žena i muškaraca istog zanimanja (npr. Službenici) u istoj privrednoj grani 
(npr. Industrija).
Istovremeno, prosta razlika između prosečne plate žene i muškarca u Srbiji, takozvani 
nekorigovani jaz u zaradama, iznosi „tek“ 3,3%. Iza ove proste aritmetičke razlike skriva 
se istinska širina jaza, jer su zaposlene žene u Srbiji bolje kvalifikovane nego muškarci. 
Žene se u Srbiji (kao i u Makedoniji i Crnoj Gori) suočavaju sa visokim preprekama pri 
ulasku na tržište rada, te moraju da budu u proseku bolje kvalifikovane od muškaraca 
da bi uopšte mogle da imaju pristup radnim mestima. Drugim rečima, dok i niže i više 
kvalifikovani muškarci imaju posao, među zaposlenim ženama nesrazmerno je veliki broj 
visokokvalifikovanih jer su niskokvalifikovane žene često neaktivne. Štaviše, u Srbiji (kao i 
u Makedoniji, ali ne i u Crnoj Gori) žene sa boljim kvalifikacijama u pogledu obrazovanja 
i radnog iskustva imaju i pristup bolje plaćenim zanimanjima i privrednim granama. 
Stoga su njihove prosečne zarade na nivou celokupne privrede „samo“ 3,3% niže od zarada 
muškaraca. Međutim, da nema diskriminacije, žene bi zarađivale više od muškaraca jer su, 
kao što je već rečeno, u proseku kvalifikovanije. Kada se rezultati koriguju, to jest kada se 
uzme u obzir i taj podatak, vidi se da žene zarađuju 11% manje od muškaraca. Drugim 
rečima, mali jaz u zaradama posledica je niskog učešća žena na tržištu rada, i samim tim 
nije „dobra vest“.
Ovaj trend je suprotan onom koji se opaža u privredama zapadnih zemalja, gde su zaposlene 
žene u proseku niže kvalifikovane od zaposlenih muškaraca, tako da se nekorigovani jaz 
u zaradama koji postoji u svakoj zemlji članici EU (prosečni jaz, prema Eurostatu, iznosi 
16,2%) može delimično objasniti prednostima muškaraca u pogledu obrazovanja i iskustva. 
Drugim rečima, posle korigovanja kojim se u obzir uzimaju karakteristike muškaraca i 
žena, jaz u zaradama se obično značajno smanjuje.
Stvarni rodni jaz u zaradama, koji u Srbiji iznosi 11%, u ekonomskoj literaturi tumači 
se kao posledica diskriminacije. Više informacija o izvorima ove diskriminacije može se 
dobiti posredstvom ekonometrijske dekompozicije ovog jaza. Iznenađenje predstavlja na-
laz po kome u Srbiji, za razliku od Makedonije i Crne Gore, žene nisu manje „nagrađene“ 
od muškaraca za iste karakteristike na tržištu rada. Na primer, one nemaju niže plate od 
muškaraca zbog svog izbora zanimanja ili po godini obrazovanja. Stvarni jaz se u najvećoj 
meri javlja usled različitih karakteristika muškaraca i žena koje nisu registrovane u 
istraživanju korišćenom za analizu (i koje su samim tim van domašaja ove analize). Te 
karakteristike mogu uključiti razlike u ponašanju muškaraca i žena na tržištu rada, 
odnosno percepcije ili očekivanja poslodavaca u vezi sa njihovim ponašanjem, koje onda 
poslodavci u istim zanimanjima ili delatnostima „nagrađuju“ odnosno „kažnjavaju“ (npr. 
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žene mogu biti percipirane kao manje fleksibilne u pogledu radnog vremena ili službenih 
putovanja zbog obaveza u domaćinstvu ili prema deci, ili kao one koje ulažu manje truda 
u radu ili su manje dorasle određenim pozicijama); ali i frikcije na tržištu rada (npr. kada 
je žena prisiljena da prihvati lošije plaćen posao jer je druge obaveze onemogućuju da 
provodi mnogo vremena u prevozu do bolje plaćenog posla). Usled ograničenja u pogledu 
dostupnosti podataka, te neopažene karakteristike nisu analizirane u okviru ove studije.
Iz odvojene analize jaza u zaradama u javnom i u privatnom sektoru može se videti da je 
nekorigovani jaz veći u privatnom nego u javnom sektoru: u privatnom sektoru, prosečna 
žena zarađuje 9,4% manje od prosečnog muškarca, dok u javnom sektoru ova razlika iznosi 
1,6% i nije statistički značajna. Pošto unesemo korekcije vezane za različite lične osobine 
pojedinaca na tržištu rada, jaz u javnom sektoru povećava se na 7,5%, dok u privatnom 
raste veoma malo, na 11%. To je posledica činjenice da žene u javnom sektoru imaju znatno 
bolje karakteristike na tržištu rada od muškaraca, dok je u privatnom sektoru razlika u ovim 
karakteristikama mala, mada opet u korist žena. Drugim rečima, rodni jaz u zaradama u 
javnom sektoru mnogo je skriveniji nego u privatnom jer su žene koje rade u javnom 
sektoru u proseku obrazovanije i imaju bolja radna mesta. Kada se rezultati koriguju tako 
da se u obzir uzmu bolje osobine žena u javnom sektoru, razlika između ova dva jaza sman-
juje se sa skoro 8 procentnih poena (1,6% u javnom sektoru i 9,4% u privatnom) na samo 
3,5 procentna poena (7,5% u javnom sektoru i 11% u privatnom). Da nema diskriminacije 
u javnom sektoru ili da muškarci nisu bolje nagrađeni za svoje „neopažene“ osobine, 
prosečna zarada žene u javnom sektoru bila bi veća od prosečne zarade muškarca.
Nekorigovani jaz je najniži u prvom (najnižem) i petom (najvišem) kvintilu distribucije 
zarada, gde nije statistički značajan. Korigovanjem za karakteristike na tržištu rada, rodni 
jaz u platama među najnižim zaradama ostaje statistički neznačajan, dok korigovani jaz 
u 20% najviših zarada iznosi 4,4%. Najviši nekorigovani i korigovani jaz može se naći 
u drugom i trećem kvintilu distribucije zarada, gde iznosi 5,8%, odnosno 5,4%. Usled 
podvojenosti tržišta rada, rodne razlike u različitim segmentima distribucije zarada 
postaju jasnije kada odvojeno analiziramo privatni i javni sektor. U javnom sektoru, 
korigovani jaz relativno je stabilan u različitim delovima distribucije zarada (kod najviših 
zarada iznosi 4,6%), dok je u privatnom sektoru jaz najniži kod 20% najnižih zarada (5,5%) 
i dostiže vrh (14%) kod najviših 20% distribucije, što navodi na zaključak da postoji tzv. 
„efekat staklenog plafona“: ženama je teže da dopru do najbolje plaćenih radnih mesta u 
privatnom sektoru.
Kada se analiziraju promene sa protokom vremena, naši nalazi pokazuju da su i nekorigo-
vani i korigovani jaz značajno opali između oktobra 2008. i oktobra 2009. godine (i to 
nekorigovani za 3,9 procentnih poena, sa 6,2% na statistički neznačajnih 2,3%, a korigovani 
za 4,9 procentnih poena, sa 15,5% na 10,6%). Trend u jazu duguje se većem rastu zarada 
žena tokom ovog perioda (zarade žena porasle su za 5,6%, dok su zarade muškaraca porasle 
za 1,8%), kao i činjenici da je kriza negativnije uticala na „maskulinizovane“ privredne 
grane i zanimanja, kao što su građevinarstvo i industrija, nego na „feminizovane“ sektore.
U narednom periodu, nekorigovani jaz ostaje statistički neznačajan sve do oktobra 2011. 
kada se penje na statistički značajnih 4%. Povećanje nekorigovanog jaza tokom poslednja 
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dva perioda može navesti na zaključak7 da se jaz polako vraća na nivo koji je postojao pre 
krize. Ovo možda ukazuje na činjenicu da je sužavanje jaza bilo samo privremeni ishod 
snažnijeg negativnog uticaja krize na zarade muškaraca. Sa druge strane, korigovani jaz se 
u periodu oktobar 2010. – oktobar 2011. godine stabilizuje na oko 9% u proseku. 
Analizom podataka iz makedonske Ankete o radnoj snazi otkriveno je da zaposlene žene 
u Makedoniji zarađuju manje od muškaraca, iako su bolje kvalifikovane od njih. Žena 
sa istim obrazovanjem kao muškarac zarađuje 17,9% manje od njega. Drugim rečima, 
žena bi morala da radi dodatnih 65 dana godišnje da bi zaradila istu godišnju platu kao 
muškarac sa istim osobinama.
Istovremeno, prosta razlika u prosečnoj zaradi žena i muškaraca u Makedoniji, takozvani 
nekorigovani jaz u platama, iznosi 13,4%. Ta prosta aritmetička razlika niža je od stvarnog 
(korigovanog) jaza u zaradama, odnosno ona skriva istinsku veličinu tog jaza jer su zaposlene 
žene, kao grupa, kvalifikovanije od zaposlenih muškaraca. Žene se u Makedoniji (kao i u 
Srbiji i Crnoj Gori) suočavaju sa visokim preprekama pri ulasku na tržište rada, te moraju 
da budu u proseku bolje kvalifikovane od muškaraca da bi uopšte mogle da imaju pristup 
radnim mestima. Drugim rečima, dok i niže i više kvalifikovani muškarci imaju posao, za-
poslen je nesrazmerno veliki broj visokokvalifikovanih žena jer su niskokvalifikovane žene 
često neaktivne. Naime, stopa zaposlenosti žena sa samo osnovnim obrazovanjem iznosi 
16,7%, dok je za muškarce ova stopa 40%. Drugim rečima, da je zaposleno više žena sa nižim 
kvalifikacijama, bio bi veći i broj slabije plaćenih žena. Samim tim bi ukupan prosek zarada 
žena bio niži, a razlika između zarada žena i zarada muškaraca veća. Štaviše, u Makedoniji 
(kao i u Srbiji, ali ne i u Crnoj Gori) žene sa boljim kvalifikacijama u pogledu obrazovanja 
i radnog iskustva imaju pristup bolje plaćenim zanimanjima i privrednim granama. Stoga 
je jaz u zaradama na nivou celokupne privrede manji od jaza između muškaraca i žena sa 
istim osobinama (13,4% u odnosu na 17,9%). Međutim, da nema diskriminacije, žene bi 
zarađivale više od muškaraca jer su kvalifikovanije.
Rodni jaz u zaradama u Makedoniji sledi trend opažen u Srbiji, ali u mnogo većem obimu. 
Slično kao u Srbiji, ovaj trend je suprotan onome koji se može videti u privredama zapadnih 
zemalja, gde su zaposlene žene u proseku manje kvalifikovane od zaposlenih muškaraca.
Stvarni rodni jaz u zaradama, koji u Makedoniji iznosi 17,9%, u ekonomskoj literaturi 
tumači se kao posledica diskriminacije. Više informacija o izvorima ove diskriminacije 
može se dobiti posredstvom ekonometrijske dekompozicije ovog jaza. Korigovani jaz se 
tek delimično (u iznosu od nekih 31%) može objasniti time što su žene plaćene manje 
iako imaju iste osobine na tržištu rada kao muškarci. Muškarci bivaju više „nagrađeni“ za 
svoj rad kada rade kao rukovaoci mašinama i uređajima i monteri, kada rade u industriji i 
javnim uslugama (kao što su državna uprava, obrazovanje, zdravstvena i socijalna zaštita i 
delatnost ekstrateritorijalnih organizacija i tela), kao i u javnom sektoru. Međutim, najveći 
deo (69%) korigovanog jaza posledica je razlika između muškaraca i žena koje se ne 
mogu primetiti na osnovu podataka, odnosno „neopaženih“ razlika u karakteristikama 
na tržištu rada. 
7  Uz napomenu da promene tokom ovog perioda nisu u potpunosti metodološki uporedive.
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Odvojena analiza jaza u zaradama u javnom i privatnom sektoru ukazuje na to da je 
nekorigovani jaz veći u privatnom nego u javnom sektoru, i to za skoro 14 procentnih 
poena (17,7% u privatnom, a 4% u javnom sektoru). Međutim, razlika u korigovanom 
jazu značajno je manja – tek 7 procentnih poena (18,6% u privatnom, a 11,4% u javnom 
sektoru), budući da žene u javnom sektoru imaju znatno bolje karakteristike na tržištu rada 
od muškaraca (uglavnom su bolje obrazovane i zastupljenije su u bolje plaćenim zaniman-
jima), što nije slučaj u privatnom sektoru.
Nekorigovani jaz je najmanji u prvom i petom (najvišem) kvintilu distribucije zarada (11,5% 
odnosno 10,3%), dok je najviši u središnjoj tački distribucije (19,5%). Obrazac korigovanog 
dela jaza veoma blisko sledi obrazac nekorigovanog jaza, jer su razlike u karakteristikama na 
tržištu rada relativno male u svim kvintilima. Međutim, odvojena analiza javnog i privatnog 
sektora navodi na drugačije zaključke. Naime, jaz je u oba sektora mali u nižim delovima 
distribucije zarada (odnosno, kod nižih zarada), i povećava se sa visinom zarade i dostiže 
vrh na njenom najvišem nivou. Ovo ukazuje na postojanje tzv. efekta „staklenog plafona“, 
odnosno na to da žene ne rade na najbolje plaćenim radnim mestima, kako u privatnom 
tako i u javnom sektoru.8
Kada se analiziraju promene sa protokom vremena, naši nalazi pokazuju da su i nekorigo-
vani i korigovani jaz značajno opali između IV kvartala 2008. i IV kvartala 2009. (i to 
nekorigovani za 12,6 procentnih poena, sa 19,2% na 6,6%, a korigovani za 9,5 procentnih 
poena, sa 22% na 12,5%) usled bržeg rasta realnih zarada žena. Čini se da je ovaj pad 
izazvan povoljnijim uticajem novog zakona o porezu na dohodak (usvojenog 2008.) na 
žene, budući da su izmene tog zakona dovele do progresivnijeg oporezivanja i time  po-
voljnije uticale na niže zarade. Kako žene u proseku imaju niže zarade, promene u ovom 
zakonu su povoljnije uticale na njihove plate nego na plate muškaraca. U narednom periodu 
(između IV kvartala 2009. i IV kvartala 2011. godine) rodni jaz se povećao i stabilizovao 
na nižem nivou nego pre početka krize (u IV kvartalu 2011. nekorigovani jaz iznosio je 
13,4%, a korigovani 16,9%).
Kako su u makedonskoj Anketi o radnoj snazi dostupni podaci o zaradama samozaposlenih, 
uporedili smo i rodni jaz u zaradama zaposlenih za platu sa rodnim jazom u zaradama 
samozaposlenih lica. Nekorigovani rodni jaz u kategoriji samozaposlenih iznosi 5,9% i 
značajno je niži nego u kategoriji zaposlenih za platu (za 12 procentnih poena), i. Kao 
i žene zaposlene za platu, i samozaposlene žene imaju bolje karakteristike na tržištu rada 
od samozaposlenih muškaraca, a najznačajnije su bolje obrazovanje i bolje plaćena zani-
manja. Ova prednost žena još je izraženija u kategoriji samozaposlenih te korigovani jaz 
iznosi 15,6%, pa je razlika između korigovanih rodnih jazova u platama samozaposlenih i 
zaposlenih za platu značajno manja (2,3 procentna poena) nego razlika u nekorigovanim 
jazovima.
Tokom posmatranog perioda u Crnoj Gori je, u proseku, nekorigovani jaz između zara-
da muškaraca i zarada žena iznosio 16% u korist muškaraca. Kao i u druge dve zemlje 
8  „Stakleni plafon“ može se javiti kao posledica velikog broja činilaca, počevši od nespremnosti poslodavaca da unaprede 
žene zbog ličnih predrasuda i razlika u „neopažljivim“ osobinama žena i muškaraca (kao što su stavovi prema preuzimanju 
rizika i konkurenciji i/ili dobrovoljno propuštanje odgovornijih pozicija prisutno kod žena zbog obaveza kod kuće).
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Zapadnog Balkana obuhvaćene istraživanjem, i u suprotnosti sa trendovima koje najčešće 
opažamo u razvijenim privredama, nekorigovani jaz u Crnoj Gori ne može se objasniti 
razlikama između karakteristika muškaraca i žena na tržištu rada (npr. obrazovanje, radno 
iskustvo, karakteristike radnog mesta). Kada se u obzir uzmu osobine muškaraca i žena 
na tržištu rada, procenjeni korigovani rodni jaz u platama se ne smanjuje, već ostaje na 
istom nivou od 16%. Drugim rečima, žene koje imaju iste karakteristike na tržištu rada 
kao muškarci zarađuju 16% manje, odnosno, jedna žena bi morala da radi dodatnih 58 
dana godišnje da bi zaradila istu godišnju platu kao muškarac sa istim karakteristikama.
Korigovani rodni jaz u platama obično se tumači kao posledica diskriminacije na tržištu 
rada. Kada detaljnije razmotrimo razlike između karakteristika žena i muškaraca vezanih 
za tržište rada, vidimo da su pojedine karakteristike zaposlenih žena na tržištu rada u Crnoj 
Gori bolje, a pojedine gore od karakteristika zaposlenih muškaraca. Sa jedne strane, žene 
češće obavljaju poslove koji zahtevaju bolje obrazovanje i u regionima u kojima su plate 
veće (što, ceteris paribus, smanjuje nivo nekorigovanog jaza). Sa druge strane, žene češće 
obavljaju poslove u lošije plaćenim zanimanjima i rade u privrednim granama u kojima su 
plate niže (što, ceteris paribus, povećava nivo nekorigovanog jaza). Pojedinačni uticaji ovih 
osobina međusobno se u proseku potiru, tako da korigovani jaz u zaradama ostaje na istom 
nivou kao i nekorigovani.
Analiza različitih segmenata distribucije zarada navodi na zaključak da su i korigovani i 
nekorigovani jaz u zaradama viši u višim delovima distribucije zarada. Širi jaz na gornjem 
kraju distribucije zarada (20% najviših zarada) ukazuje na prisustvo takozvanog efekta 
„staklenog plafona“, odnosno da žene ne obavljaju najbolje plaćene poslove.
Naši rezultati pokazuju da su se tokom analiziranog perioda i korigovani i nekorigovani jaz 
u zaradama smanjili, i to sa približno 18% u 2008. godini na oko 12% u 2011. Budući da je 
stopa zaposlenosti muškaraca značajno opala tokom krize, dok je zaposlenost žena ostala 
stabilna, smanjenje jaza u zaradama najverovatnije je posledica izmenjene rodne strukture 
učesnika na tržištu rada.
Odvojena analiza za privatni i javni sektor, pokazuje da su i zarade muškaraca i zarade 
žena više u javnom nego u privatnom sektoru.. Sa druge strane, i nekorigovani i korigo-
vani jaz u zaradama širi su u privatnom nego u javnom sektoru, što je i očekivano pošto 
je, po pravilu, distribucija zarada uža u javnom nego u privatnom sektoru (tj. postoje stroža 
pravila o minimalnim i maksimalnim zaradama zbog snažnije uloge sindikata i budžetskih 
ograničenja).
Nekorigovani jaz u zaradama u privatnom sektoru iznosi 24%, a korigovani 18%, te se 
nekorigovani delimično može objasniti lošijim karakteristikama žena na tržištu rada u 
odnosu na muškarce (pre svega, time što muškarci rade u bolje plaćenim zanimanjima). 
U javnom sektoru je situacija obrnuta. Dok je nekorigovani jaz u zaradama u korist 
muškaraca 9%, korigovani jaz iznosi 12%, što znači da žene koje rade u javnom sektoru 
imaju bolje karakteristike na tržište rada nego muškarci (uglavnom je reč o višem obra-
zovanju i većoj zastupljenosti u bolje plaćenim zanimanjima).
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Efekat „staklenog plafona“ prisutan je i u javnom i u privatnom sektoru u Crnoj Gori, jer 
analiza različitih segmenata distribucije zarada pokazuje da je korigovani jaz u zaradama u 
oba sektora širi na vrhu distribucije zarada. Takođe, jaz na dnu distribucije zarada u privat-
nom sektoru veći je od jaza na vrhu distribucije zarada u javnom sektoru, što je dodatni 
argument u prilog zaključku da je diskriminacija prisutnija u privatnom sektoru.
Činjenica da je nekorigovani rodni jaz u zaradama u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana niži 
nego u zapadnim zemljama posledica je niske zastupljenosti žena (posebno onih sa niskim 
kvalifikacijama) na tržištu rada ovih zemalja. Drugim rečima, viši jaz u zaposlenosti znači 
i niži nekorigovani jaz u platama i obrnuto, jer po pravilu najveći jaz u zaposlenosti javlja 
se među onima sa najnižim kvalifikacijama. Kako na tržište rada bude ulazilo više žena 
sa lošijim karakteristikama na tržištu rada, možemo očekivati da će se nekorigovani jaz 
u zaradama proširivati. Ako uporedimo tri zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, videćemo da je 
nekorigovani rodni jaz u zaradama najizraženiji u Crnoj Gori. Najširi nekorigovani jaz 
u Crnoj Gori može biti posledica snažnog sektora turizma i posledično veće zaposlenosti 
žena u privatnom sektoru i na poslovima sa nižim platama (od sve tri zemlje, rodni jaz u 
pogledu zaposlenosti i neaktivnosti najniži je u Crnoj Gori, što je u skladu sa argumentom 
vezanim za trade-off između rodnog jaza u zaposlenosti i rodnog jaza u zaradama). 
Sa druge strane, stvarni (korigovani) rodni jaz najizraženiji je u Makedoniji. Pošto se 
stvarni jaz odnosi na razlike u zaradama između pojedinaca sa istim karakteristikama na 
tržištu rada (muškaraca i žena istog nivoa obrazovanja, radnog iskustva i zanimanja, odnosno 
iz iste privredne grane), možemo ga pripisati diskriminaciji na tržištu rada. Drugim rečima, 
dok je visok rodni jaz u zaradama u Crnoj Gori posledica veće diversifikacije žena u pogledu 
zanimanja i delatnosti, a možda i njihove „getoizacije“ u ženska zanimanja i sektore, u 
Makedoniji je dominantna diskriminacija unutar zanimanja i delatnosti. Ovo može biti 
uzrokovano činjenicom da je nezaposlenost među ženama daleko naglašenija u Makedoniji, 
dok je zaposlenost žena niža nego u druge dve zemlje obuhvaćene istraživanjem. Možda 
upravo prekomerna ponuda ženske radne snage u Makedoniji rezultira većim snižavanjem 
zarada žena u odnosu na zarade muškaraca u istim zanimanjima/delatnostima nego što je 
to slučaj u druge dve navedene zemlje. Uz to, iako smo opazili da su u sve tri zemlje plate 
žena veće u javnom nego u privatnom sektoru, pristup žena javnom sektoru u Makedoniji 
možda je ograničeniji nego u druge dve zemlje, te su žene u Makedoniji možda spremnije 
da prihvate niže zarade u privatnom sektoru. Niža dostupnost poslova u javnom sektoru 
ženama, može biti posledica pozitivne diskriminacije radi jednake zastupljenosti etničkih 
manjina u javnom sektoru, odnosno rodne strukture novozaposlenih pripadnika manjina.
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1. Introduction
The research project “Gender pay gap in the Western Balkan countries: Evidence from 
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia”9 sought to contribute to the understanding of gender 
wage disparities in three Western Balkan countries: Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
In particular, the aim was to measure the scope and characteristics of the gender wage 
gap and to analyse the observed trends in the larger context of women’s labour market 
participation. 
The gender pay gap, which refers to the difference between the wages earned by women 
and by men, is one of the key indicators of women’s access to economic opportunities. It is 
undoubtedly one of the most persistent labour market characteristics globally, including in 
the European Union, where it remains at 16.2% on average. Probing the nature and factors 
behind wage disparities can shed light on measures that can be taken to address inequali-
ties and improve women’s access to economic opportunity, thus tapping their potential and 
creating conditions for economic growth. 
Usually, in developed economies, one part of the gender pay gap can be explained by objec-
tive differences in personal labour market characteristics between men and women (such as 
different levels of education, work experience or choice of occupation) due to the historical 
female disadvantage in access to education and economic opportunities. The gap which 
remains after these different endowments of women and men are taken into account – the 
adjusted (true) wage gap – is often interpreted in economic literature as labour market dis-
crimination. Such discrimination can occur due to gender differences in returns to the same 
characteristics (e.g. men being paid more than women for each additional year of education) 
or due to returns to unobservable differences between workers (those that may be hard to 
measure). These unobservable differences could include differences in female and male labour 
market behaviour which employers reward/punish, e.g. that women may be less flexible in 
terms of working hours or business trips, due to home and reproductive responsibilities; other 
non-measurable effort- and ability-related variables; as well as labour market frictions. 
Literature on the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans amounts to only around a dozen 
papers. Among those, the gender pay gap in Serbia is substantially more covered in litera-
ture than the gender pay gap in Macedonia and Montenegro. Further, there is only one 
paper which focuses on cross-country comparisons of the gender pay gap that covers the 
countries of the Western Balkans (Blunch, 2010).
Given the existing data limitations, this study provides the most comprehensive, robust and 
precise up-to-date analysis of the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans. We use the most 
9 The project was carried out in partnership between the Belgrade-based Foundation for the Advancement of Economics 
(FREN) and the Skopje-based University American College Skopje (UACS), within the framework of the Regional Research 
Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), run by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. It has been a collaborative effort 
of MSc. Sonja Avlijaš (doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics), Dr. Sunčica Vujić (Assistant Professor at the 
University of Bath), and MSc. Marko Vladisavljević (FREN), with the support of Biljana Apostolova (external researcher with 
the UACS) and Nevena Ivanović (UN Women Serbia).
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extensive data set available to analyse the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans, which 
covers seven10 waves of the Labour Force Survey (2008-2011) across the three countries. 
The analysis therefore captures both cross-country comparisons as well as changes in the 
gender pay gap during the economic crisis. The methodology applied and the period of 
analysis are the same for all three countries.
Apart from controlling for individual labour market characteristics, we provide a detailed 
disaggregation of the gender wage gap across sectors, occupations, types of ownership (public 
vs. private), as well as status in employment (wage employment vs. self-employment). The 
study looks beyond the simple difference in female and male average wages, to determine 
how different characteristics of women workers, sectoral and occupational segregation, 
workers’ location within the public or private sector, and their wage- vs. self-employment 
status, influence the wage gap. It is also an attempt to show how and why the sources of 
the gender pay gap may differ across the wage distribution and test for the “sticky floor” 
and “glass ceiling” effects. Finally, we use the Heckman selection model to account for 
self-selection into the labour force.
Our findings show that the mean unadjusted wage gap is 3.3% (in favour of men) in 
Serbia, 13.4% in Macedonia and 16.1% in Montenegro. However, unlike the trends we 
observe in developed economies, the differences in labour market characteristics between 
men and women (e.g. education, work experience, job characteristics) cannot explain the 
unadjusted wage gap in the three Western Balkan countries at all. In fact, employed women 
in these countries have better labour market characteristics than employed men, because 
of the low levels of employment among low-skilled women. Therefore, when the gender 
differences in labour market characteristics are taken into account, the gaps widen from 
3.3% to 11% (by 7.7pp) in Serbia, from 13.4% to 17.9% (by 4.5pp) in Macedonia while 
the gap stays at the same level in Montenegro (this is because women in Montenegro, 
although they have better personal characteristics, in terms of levels of education, are not 
able to access the better paid occupations and sectors of the economy to “cash in” on those 
better characteristics).
This study consists of eight chapters. The next chapter reviews both theoretical and em-
pirical academic literature on the gender pay gap. The empirical work presented there cov-
ers consolidated market economies of Western Europe and the United States, transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), as well as the Western Balkans. Chapter three presents the concepts and 
methodology used in our research. Chapter four presents a detailed analysis of the gender 
pay gap in Serbia, including the reasons behind its persistence. Chapter five focuses on 
the gender pay gap in Macedonia, while chapter six presents the findings on Montenegro. 
Chapter seven offers a comparative perspective on the gender pay gap in all three coun-
tries. Finally, chapter eight discusses some policy implications stemming from the report’s 
findings and concludes.
10 One wave is missing for Serbia (April 2010). 
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2. Literature Review: Theoretical Perspectives on the 
  Gender Pay Gap and Empirical Findings From Consolidated
     Market Economies And Transition Countries
Consolidated market economies
Sources of the gap between male and female earnings have been an important topic of 
academic research ever since the 1970s. A large body of research has attempted to throw 
light on the factors that have the power to explain why women earn less then men. Two 
topics have been of particular interest to the academic community: (i) differences in human 
capital accumulation or other qualifications which can reduce female earnings, and (ii) la-
bour market discrimination, where women with the same characteristics as men are treated 
differently (Altonji & Blank, 1999). Blau and Kahn (2000) remind that these two sources 
of the gender pay gap do not have to be mutually exclusive. In fact, they can reinforce one 
another, because if women are discriminated against in the labour market, they may be less 
willing to invest in their human capital. In turn, their lower labour markets characteristics 
can lead to discrimination against them. 
Therefore, the gender pay gap can persist due to objective differences in personal endow-
ments between men and women (such as different levels of education) but also due to 
labour market discrimination, which reduces earnings for women with the same human 
capital endowments as men. 
In this chapter, we survey the literature analysing the factors which constitute the explained 
part of the gender pay gap (such as differences in observed labour market characteristics of 
employed women and men), as well as those factors that might cause the unexplained part 
of the gap (such as unobserved characteristics, e.g. attitudes towards risk or non-pecuniary 
aspects of employment; labour market discrimination). We also move beyond surveying 
the literature on the differences between the “average” female and “average” male earnings, 
and consider which factors discussed in the literature may be more or less relevant at the 
different parts of the wage distribution. Furthermore, we also present the literature that 
examines how childbearing may particularly affect women’s labour market choices. Finally, 
we discuss literature on the changing impact through time of general macroeconomic 
conditions on the gender pay gap. 
Explained part of the gender pay gap
Echrenberg and Smith (2003) summarise sources of the explained part of the gender wage 
gap, which are typically encountered in the labour economics literature.11 Different levels 
of educational attainment between men and women have historically been considered as 
11 We do not discuss race and immigration, because they are irrelevant for the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans, while 
the sample sizes do not allow us to analyse data by ethnicity, except for the Roma population in Serbia. Moreover, data on 
ethnicity are not available for Macedonia. 
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one of the most obvious ‘culprits’ for differences in earnings between the genders. However, 
with economic development over time, education has lost much of its relevance in explain-
ing the earnings gap. 
Women working fewer hours and acquiring less experience due to career interruptions over 
their lifetime, most often due to childcare and unpaid housework, is also typically consid-
ered as a significant factor that reduces female earnings. Several recent studies show that 
women are more likely than men to interrupt their careers with spells of non-employment, 
primarily to look after young children, and that these interruptions can explain a sizeable 
portion of the gender pay gap (Bertrand et al., 2009 in Manning, 2011). Yet, the main 
question of interest is whether the labour market penalties for career interruptions are 
larger than the loss of human capital women experience as the result of these interruptions 
(Manning, 2011, p.1027). 
Differences in occupational choices between women and men are still relevant sources of 
the wage gap in consolidated market economies, but they have also started losing their 
power over time (Echrenberg and Smith, 2003). Overrepresentation of women in the 
traditionally female occupations and sectors of the economy, which are characterised by 
lower wages than the traditionally male occupations and sectors, can persist due to both 
workers’ preferences and labour market discrimination. Path dependency (reflected in social 
norms and cultural constraints) reproduces new generations of women who, by choosing 
the type of education they pursue, self-select into lower wage occupations and sectors of 
the economy, even in the absence of tangible barriers to their entry into the traditionally 
male-dominated sectors. At the same time, these choices and preferences may exist due to 
labour market discrimination, so the supply and the demand side mechanisms are mutu-
ally reinforcing. We therefore return to occupational (vertical) and sectoral (horizontal) 
segregation in the following sub-section of this chapter, which addresses the different types 
of labour market discrimination. 
Unexplained part of the gender pay gap
The unexplained differences, i.e. the ones that remain when one controls for all of the 
following variables: education, work experience, occupation, could either persist due to: 
•	 Personal characteristics which affect a worker’s productivity but cannot be observed or 
adequately measured, such as attitudes towards risk-taking, competition, etc., which 
have been systematically observed to differ between the two genders12; 
•	 Discriminatory treatment of women in the labour market13, which is reflected in the 
different returns for men and women to labour market characteristics such as educa-
tion and experience.
12 For example, ability is not listed here, since it cannot be argued that the average ability of individuals systematically 
differs by gender.
13 Usually by employers, but the taste for discrimination could also come from company’s customers or other employees.
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Unexplained part of the gender pay gap: unobserved personal 
characteristics
When it comes to unobserved personal characteristics, the more recent labour economics 
research focuses on behavioural factors such as greater flexibility and mobility of men, 
which may bring them higher pecuniary benefits. Women may also prefer non-pecuniary 
rewards, such as a larger number of days off, due to family responsibilities, or proximity 
of work to home, which would also reflect on their lower earnings growth as they may be 
more willing than men to forgo a portion of earnings in order to obtain such benefits. Felfe 
(2012) shows that young mothers in Germany are willing to forgo significant portions of 
their income from employment if the non-pecuniary aspects of their jobs are satisfactory, 
i.e. if their working environment is family-friendly. 
Furthermore, recent labour market research which discusses the prevalence of wage bar-
gaining vs. wage posting when it comes to wage determination between employers and 
employees shows that high-skilled individuals are more likely to determine their wages 
through bargaining, while ex-ante wage posting by employers is more characteristic for 
low-skilled individuals (Manning, 2011). At the same time, Babcock and Laschever (2003) 
show that women are less likely than men to negotiate wages and more likely to accept 
the first wage on offer, which implies that women with high skills may not be as effective 
as men in pushing their wages up through bargaining. A more complex perspective on 
the issue emerges in Leibbrandt and List (2012), who find that when the possibility of 
negotiating wages is made explicit rather than left ambiguous, women are more likely to 
negotiate. 
Research on gender in the labour market has also increasingly begun to consider female 
attitudes and psychological traits, such as less interest in competition and risk averseness, as 
explanations for their lower labour market performance and in particular the glass ceiling 
effect (see Bertrand, 2011, for overview). However, this stream of literature goes beyond 
the scope of our research in the Western Balkans due to the data limitations.
Unexplained part of the gender pay gap: labour market 
discrimination
Motivation for discrimination can be both taste-based and statistical. Taste-based dis-
crimination occurs when employers indulge in their subjective prejudice against women. 
Statistical discrimination occurs when employers, due to imperfect information about po-
tential workers, decide on a worker’s characteristics not only because of their personal traits 
but also based on the traits of the group the worker belongs to. Since average performance 
of women in the labour market is lower than male, when using group data, employers 
would tend to discriminate against women even when they appear to be using ‘objective’ 
selection criteria (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
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There are several mechanisms through which discrimination of women in the labour market 
can take place. Discrimination leads to generally lower returns to the same labour market 
characteristics for women in comparison to men, as well as to occupational and sectoral 
segregation, when women are segregated into lower-paying occupations and sectors of 
the economy. Importantly, lower-paying occupations do not necessarily equal occupations 
requiring less skill. This is why the principle of “equal pay for work of equal value” is a key 
one for advancing gender equality.
Lower returns to the same labour market characteristics for women than for men can be 
the result of direct discrimination, where a woman is, for example, paid less for exactly the 
same position as a man (within an establishment), or the result of more covert practices, 
such as reduced opportunities for job promotion among women equally qualified as their 
male counterparts. 
Due to a number of anti-discrimination and equal pay conventions and laws which have 
been adopted over the past couple of decades, within-job discrimination, where women are 
explicitly paid less than men at the same level of job responsibility, has become less relevant 
and has therefore fallen out of the focus of the Western gender pay gap literature (Petersen 
and Saporta, 2004). Yet, Wolf and Heinze (2010) show a remarkably high adjusted gender 
pay gap even within establishments in Germany, while Gartner and Hinz (2009, 2005), in 
Ludsteck (2010), show its significance even within narrow job cells in Germany.
Allocative discrimination, on the other hand, occurs when employers treat women differently 
from men at the point of hire, promotion and firing. According to Petersen and Saporta 
(2004), allocative discrimination is a very significant source of labour market discrimination 
against women nowadays. In our research, we are particularly interested in discrimination 
of women at the point of promotion or appointment/selection for managerial positions. In 
literature, this is referred to as the glass ceiling effect, i.e. unofficial barriers to advancement 
in a profession, and it results in larger wage differentials between the two genders at the 
top end of the wage distribution.
Empirical evidence on the glass ceiling effect shows that the gender pay gap in Sweden 
is a lot higher at the top end of the wage distribution than at the bottom (Albrecht et 
al, 2003). Arulampalam et al. (2007) analysed the earnings distribution for the old EU 
member states for the period 1994-2001. They found that the gender wage gap widened 
at the top end of the wage distribution in all countries (which indicates the glass ceiling 
effect). Furthermore, they also found increases in the wage gap at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution in some countries (the “sticky floor” effect), which they explain by differ-
ences in wage setting institutions across the countries (e.g. absence of the minimum wage). 
They estimate separate models for private and public sector workers because institutions 
differ greatly across the two sectors. While the public sector is less exposed to competitive 
pressures, it should be able to better indulge in taste-based discrimination (this literature is 
discussed in greater detail in the section below). At the same time, the public sector is more 
pressured to conform to government regulations and objectives, which promote gender 
equality. Which of the two factors is more dominant therefore becomes an empirical ques-
tion. Arulampalam et al. (2007) find evidence of the glass ceiling effect in both sectors, but 
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its intensity as well as relative presence in the public vs. the private sector varies across the 
analysed countries.
Employers can also be prejudiced and perceive women with children as less productive or 
less ‘devoted’ to work than men and women without children, which can also influence 
their decisions to promote women. Women may also self-select into jobs which offer better 
non-pecuniary benefits, such as greater flexibility, and away from the more demanding jobs 
which are often better paid, due to different preferences or other responsibilities, such as 
more housework than their spouses. 
It has been very challenging to empirically analyse many aspects of allocative discrimina-
tion, both because of the scarcity of relevant data and the difficulty of its observation 
due to the often-informal ways in which such discrimination takes place. The most recent 
literature on the gender pay gap attempts to address this gap by drawing on the rich em-
ployer-employee datasets from the U.S. and Scandinavia. This type of discrimination also 
includes harassment and mobbing at work, which can affect an employee’s performance, 
and consequently carrier opportunities and earnings. However, these studies go beyond the 
scope of our analysis for the Western Balkans, due to data availability limitations, so we do 
not discuss this literature in much detail. 
Within their analytical framework, Petersen and Saporta (2004) also identify valuative 
discrimination, which refers to the phenomenon that female-dominated occupations are 
paid less, although skill requirements and other wage-relevant factors are the same across 
both female- and male-dominated occupations. Therefore, once occupation and industry 
are controlled for when analysing the gender pay gap, it is substantially reduced. 
As Boraas and Rodgers (2003) show, both men and women are paid less in female-dom-
inated sectors than in male-dominated sectors. They show the same effect at the level of 
job-cells (departments) within establishments. One of the more extensive studies based on 
a large U.S. panel dataset has been conducted by Bayard et al. (2003), who also show that 
wages are lower in establishments which are predominantly female, and also in occupations 
within establishments where more females work. Cueto and Sanchez-Sanchez (2010) 
analyse how occupational wage gaps differ across sectors of the Spanish economy. They 
differentiate between feminised (a predominant share of female workers), masculinised (a 
predominant share of male workers) and gender-neutral sectors and find that the gender 
wage gaps vary systematically across the three types of sectors. The gap in wages between 
men and women in feminised sectors is narrower than in the other two, and it is mostly 
explainable by different characteristics of the women and men working there. Therefore, 
wage discrimination between the genders is not universal across all sectors, as it seems to 
be much more pronounced in the masculinised ones.
With advancement of the equal remuneration for the work of equal value agenda, much 
has been written about the connection between occupational segregation and the gender 
wage gap. The particular focus of this stream of research has been to attempt to answer why, 
controlling for education and skill, occupations with a greater share of females pay less than 
those with a lower share. The challenge of this stream of literature has been to disentangle 
the effect of labour market discrimination against women from differences in unobservable 
32
personal characteristics of the individuals working in jobs which are more or less valued 
by the market, or employers, but also to determine the causal direction between the share 
of females in an occupation and the occupation’s wage rates (Petersen and Saporta, 2004). 
Levanon et al (2009) use longitudinal, U.S. Census Data (from 1950-2000), to test the 
two major views of the causal dynamics of the relationship between gender composition 
of an occupation and its wage rates, devaluation and queuing. ‘Devaluation view’ holds 
that gender composition affects pay, due to cultural belief in women’s lesser competence 
and worth; ‘queuing view’ sees pay levels as affecting gender composition of an occupation, 
due to gender bias by employers who make higher paying jobs more available to men14. 
While the authors, as well as the proponents of each of these theories, recognise that both 
mechanisms could be at work simultaneously (and also allow for supply side effects such 
as socialised differences in preferences), their analysis of data finds “substantial support for 
the view that increased feminisation of occupations diminishes their relative pay” (p. 886). 
However, this finding, they stress, shows that devaluation of predominantly female jobs is 
an important, but not the most significant explanatory factor of wage inequality. 15 
Two facts which stem from the above overview and which are important to consider 
when analysing the gender pay gap are the following: i) women are a heterogeneous 
group of individuals, and ii) the same individuals can have different incentives and 
preferences in different stages of their life cycle. Measuring the gender wage gap at the 
mean of each distribution (that is, comparing an “average” woman with an “average” man) 
can produce a misleadingly simple picture of how male and female wages differ. It is there-
fore essential to gain better insight into how factors influencing the gender pay gap differ 
across the wage distribution as well as to understand preferences of women in different 
stages of their life cycle (e.g. whether women are of the child bearing age or whether young 
children are present in household). Otherwise, we may wrongly assign responsibility for 
some wage differentials to discriminatory behaviour of employers.
Macroeconomic influences on the gender pay gap
Apart from the effect of personal characteristics of workers on the gender pay gap, there 
are also general equilibrium effects, stemming from economy-wide changes in the wage 
structure and sectoral reallocations that have occurred due to opening up of the economies 
and globalisation over the past four decades, which have influenced the ratio of female to 
male earnings.
14 These two views correspond with a broad distinction that gender studies scholarship makes between different ways of 
producing gender inequalities historically, one being an exclusion of women from positions of power and privilege, and the 
other being the devaluing of work done and roles predominantly held by women. Levanon, England and Allison (2009), p. 865. 
15 Sociologists from the former Yugoslavia have also written about the ‘feminisation of professions’ and its link with their 
valuation, e.g. Šporer, Ž. (1983). “Feminizacija profesija kao indikator položaja žena u različitim društvima”. Sociologija, (4), 
1985; Blagojević, M. (1991). Žene izvan kruga. Profesija i porodica. Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog 
fakulteta. For a discussion in English, see Blagojević, M. (2009). Knowledge Production at the Semi-Periphery: A Gender 
Perspective. Belgrade: Institut za sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja, pp. 170-174 and passim. 
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Blau and Kahn (1997) analyse the impact of changes through time of the overall wage 
structure on the gender pay gap during the 1980’s. Rising wage inequality disproportionately 
impacted women, but women on average managed to offset its negative impact on their 
earnings through increasing their experience levels as well as widening their occupational 
distribution. This was further ‘aided’ by the greater negative impact of de-unionisation16 on 
men than women. This discussion is complemented by comparative findings between the 
United States and Sweden by Blau (1996), who argues that the gap in the United States 
would have been at the level of Sweden or lower had it not been for the higher wage 
inequality in the United States.
The rising supply of female labour could have also restrained additional female wage 
growth, but this did not occur in reality, since labour markets are not perfectly competitive, 
and non-market forces, such as improved legislation, have prevented this drop in female 
earnings.
Furthermore, the unexplained part of the gap narrowed significantly during this period 
(Blau and Kahn, 2000). This could be explained by the diminishing effect of taste-based 
discrimination as markets opened up. The Nobel-winning economist Gary Becker was the 
first one to show, in 1971, that as competition opens up, it will theoretically become costlier 
for employers to indulge in discrimination, due to the loss of profits this entails (Altonji 
and Blank, 1999). Black and Brainerd (2004) analyse the impact of increasing competition 
between 1977 and 1994 on the reduction of taste-based discrimination. Essentially, they 
empirically test Becker’s hypothesis at the level of industry and region. Their findings show 
that the residual gender wage gap increased in concentrated industries relative to competitive 
industries, or in other words, that in the absence of import penetration, the gender wage gap 
declined more in competitive industries than in concentrated industries. Other studies also 
confirm that the opening up of the Western economies since the 1970’s has reduced taste-
based discrimination as employers became increasingly less willing to forgo profits in order 
to indulge in their prejudice. These findings are also supported by Hirsch et al. (2009), who 
analyse local labour markets in Germany. Their research shows that regions that are exposed 
to more labour market competition are characterised by lower gender pay gaps. 
Furthermore, the gap may be influenced by economy level changes to the specific returns 
to factors that determine the level of earnings, such as experience. Since women on aver-
age have fewer years of experience than men, an increase in returns to experience could 
adversely impact the gender pay gap. In that sense, changes to skill prices have been shown 
to impact the two genders differently (Blau and Kahn, 2000). 
Although the negative influences reclaimed between one third and two fifths of women’s 
potential gains in earnings during the 1970’s and 1980’s in the United States, women’s 
wages grew enough to narrow the gap between the genders (Blau and Kahn, 2000). 
Yet, despite these improvements in the position of women in the labour market over the 
past decades, the gender gap in earnings remains one of the most persistent labour market 
characteristics today. In spite of all efforts of the EU to achieve the goal of equal pay, the 
unadjusted gender pay gap in 2011 amounted to 16.2% on average for the 27 EU Member 
16 The trend of increasingly diminishing power of labour unions as markets open up due to globalisation. 
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States (Eurostat, 2011). In the United States, the gender pay gap is even more significant. 
In 2010, female full-time workers made only 77 cents for every dollar earned by men, 
which amounted to a gender wage gap of 23 percent17.
The effect of the global economic crisis on the gender pay gap
Since our analysis covers the period of the economic crisis, we also observe the effect of 
the economic crisis on the gender wage gap in interaction with the process of transition.
A negative economic shock can impact the two genders very differently. The impact of a 
crisis on gender gaps in employment and wages depends on the specific gender structure 
of employment in an economy, due to the frequently uneven sectoral distribution of male 
vs. female employment, as well as on the different impact the crisis may have on different 
sectors of the economy. In case a crisis impacts predominantly male sectors rather than 
female, the narrowing of the employment and wage gaps would occur, albeit due to the 
more negative impact of the crisis on men. 
Furthermore, since female labour market behaviour is influenced by their partner’s labour 
market status much more than it is the case the other way around, it is evident that change 
of labour market status of a male partner would affect the woman’s labour supply decision 
much more than it would be the case the other way around. This decision could become 
to enter into employment in order to replace a man as breadwinner or to increase her 
hours worked, but it could also be to exit from employment or become discouraged from 
searching for a job because the male situation sends a signal that it is difficult to find a 
job. One of the factors which influences these choices is the design of the tax and benefit 
system and the types of incentives it creates for women to exit or enter the labour market 
once their partner exits. In that sense, the impact of the crisis on the gender pay gap 
is very country-specific, as it depends on institutional design, as well as on a myriad of 
cultural factors which influence female behaviour (such as presence or absence of a stigma 
when a man fails to fulfil the expected role of breadwinner and woman becomes the only 
breadwinner in the house). 
Therefore, there are both direct and indirect ways in which the average gender pay gap can 
be affected by a crisis, so it is essentially an empirical question. 
Studies of earlier economic crises have demonstrated their disproportionate impact on 
women (e.g. Floro, 2000, Kim and Voos, 2007). However, during the latest economic 
crisis a different trend has been observed. In the United States the current recession has 
been labelled a “Man-cession” and there is some evidence for this in the United Kingdom 
as well (Harkness, 2011). Fears that women would be disproportionately affected by job 
loss, particularly in the later part of the recession, have not been borne out. But, men tend 
to be employed in jobs which are more subject to the business cycle – while they have 
suffered more during the recession they may also fare better during the recovery.
17 Data from Institute for Women’s Policy Research, http://www.iwpr.org/initiatives/pay-equity-and-discrimination, 
accessed on December 3rd, 2012. 
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When it comes to the indirect impact of the crisis on the gender wage gap, i.e. on how 
male exit from employment affects their spouse’s decision to supply labour, some evidence 
has emerged from the United Kingdom. Harkness and Evans (2011) analyse the indirect 
impact of male job loss on their female partner’s behaviour in the labour market. They show 
that as women have started playing an increasingly important role as breadwinners, the 
impact of male job loss on female labour market exit or disinterest in obtaining a job has 
been reduced. However, there has been some path dependency, since those women who 
had jobs when their husbands lost theirs remained in work and even increased their hours 
worked, while those who did not work before never entered into the labour force. In that 
sense, a very weak to non-existent additional worker effect during this crisis was observed 
(i.e. households did not re-allocate labour supply to cope with negative income shocks).
 
Existing research on transition economies
Most research on the gender pay gap in transition economies has followed the above-
discussed theoretical frameworks developed for consolidated market economies and tested 
their empirical relevance in the transition context, subject to data availability.
What is different about transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union, and therefore particularly interesting for empirical analysis, is that the communist 
era was characterised by (nearly) full employment and professed equal treatment of men 
and women in the labour market, as well as high levels of female labour market participa-
tion. On the other hand, protective measures were in place that acted as signals that women 
were ‘secondary’ employees, treated them as less ambitious, with motherhood as priority, 
and protected them from harmful conditions and extra hard manual labour (Łobodzińska 
1995, p. 23). Following the demise of communist regimes, market forces have impacted the 
two genders differently, both in terms of their reservation wages18 and their employment 
levels. 
During transition, we have seen significant wage decompression and increase of returns to 
both secondary and tertiary education, as well as experience (although findings on returns 
to experience seem to be more mixed). This effect of growing returns to education seems 
to have been equally strong for men and women (see Orazem and Vodopivec, 1994 for 
evidence on Slovenia, Jones and Ilayperuma, 1994 for Bulgaria, and Chase, 1998 for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Another important impact of transition on female labour market performance is that many 
women, especially those with low skills, exited the labour market because of diminishing 
returns to their lack of skill and smaller opportunity cost of home production. Due to 
labour market exit of low-skilled women, i.e. the increased average skill level of those 
women who remained in employment (coupled by increasing returns to skill and educa-
tion), the gender wage gap in transition economies has mostly remained below its level 
in the Western economies. 
18 For example, due to price liberalisation, cost of childcare grew which in turn increased the female reservation wage (the 
minimum wage for which they are willing to work) more than male (see Chase, 1995, for discussion).
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Grajek (2003) shows, based on the Polish data set, that working women have been “swim-
ming upstream” but that this has mostly been due to disproportionate exits from employ-
ment among the low-skilled women, rather than due to improved overall labour market 
characteristics of women.
Hunt (2002) makes an even more explicit point by titling her paper “When is a ten point 
fall in the gender gap bad news?” She concludes that almost half of the relative wage 
growth among females in East Germany is the consequence of disproportionate exits from 
employment of low-paid (especially less-educated) women. The rest of the closing of the 
gap remains largely unexplained by her specification.
Orazem and Vodopivec (2000) find evidence for women’s relative wage gains in Estonia 
and Slovenia. According to them, women benefited from shifts in the composition of labour 
demand toward more educated labour and away from the least skilled. The improvement in 
women’s relative wages was mainly due to i) an increase in returns to human capital, which 
was especially beneficial for women as working women are on average more educated than 
working men; ii) a shift in the labour demand toward predominantly female sectors; iii) the 
exit from the labour market of low-skilled women, especially in Estonia, while women who 
remained employed had on average higher levels of education. 
Due to this negative correlation between the gender employment gap and the gender 
pay gap (the higher the employment gap, the lower the pay gap and vice versa), a crucial 
determinant for concluding whether women have benefited in terms of earnings during 
transition is whether we want to consider those in non-employment. Selection correc-
tion by imputing wages for the non-employed based on their labour market characteristics 
explains nearly half of the observed negative correlation between wage and employment gaps 
(Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). Their results thus show that, while the raw wage gap is much 
higher in Anglo-Saxon countries than in Southern Europe, the reason is probably not to be 
found in more equal pay treatment for women in the latter group of countries, but mainly 
in a different process of selection into employment. Female labour market participation in 
Catholic countries and Greece is low and it is primarily associated with high-skilled and 
high-wage women. Having corrected for lower participation rates, the wage gap there widens 
to levels similar to those of other European countries and the United States. Therefore, very 
different conclusions on the gender pay gap can emerge depending on how we approach the 
bias of non-random selection into employment, which explains the disagreement of authors 
analysing impact of transition on female earnings. This is an issue we tackle in great detail in 
our analysis because of its high pertinence for the Western Balkans.
When it comes to the distribution of wages across sector and occupation, evidence from 
transition countries is also mixed. Jurajda (2003) differentiates between public and private 
sector, including public enterprises, and finds that occupational segregation cannot be 
blamed for most of the gender wage gap in transition countries. Rather, the gap is mostly 
a within-occupation, within-establishment phenomenon, which seems to be a trend op-
posite from the one typically encountered in the Western economies. Jurajda and Paligrova 
(2009) find evidence of glass ceiling for female managers in the Czech Republic but they 
do not differentiate between the different trends in the public and private sector. At the 
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same time, OECD (2011) evidence implies absence of glass ceilings in Southern European 
countries and Poland. Nestić (2007) shows that in Croatia a large part of the gender wage 
gap remains unexplained by the observed individual, job, and employer characteristics. The 
gender wage gap is relatively low at the lower part of the wage distribution and gets larger 
at the top of the distribution. 
Literature on the effect of wage decompression and growing income inequality during 
transition shows growing disadvantages for women in the labour market. Brainerd (2000) 
analyses the impact of transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union on the 
gender wage gap. She finds that the overall widening of the lower tail of the wage distribu-
tion and low minimum wages, not discrimination, are responsible for the increased wage 
inequality for women in the early years of transition. She concludes that introduction of 
market reforms in formerly socialist countries is not a gender-neutral policy. Decline in the 
female/male wage ratio is largely due to changes in the overall wage structure in Russia and 
Ukraine. In contrast, the mean and median female wages in all Eastern European countries 
rose substantially in the years following introduction of market reforms. Countries with less 
unequal wage distributions are those with effective incomes policies, collective bargaining 
arrangements, and relatively high minimum wage.
Rokicka and Ruzik (2009) acknowledge the significant presence of the informal economy 
in transition countries and analyse the gender pay gap in the informal sector. Just like we 
would expect, informal labour market indicates that specific characteristics of this type of 
employment, especially the lack of a minimum wage scheme, and regulations of condi-
tions and hours of work, could partially explain the unfavourable situation of women in 
the ‘lower tier’. The inequality of earnings between unregistered women and men is more 
pronounced at the bottom of the earnings distribution. 
Overall, literature on the gender pay gap in transition countries provides mixed em-
pirical insights, mostly based around the theoretical frameworks built for Western 
economies, and it is rather inconclusive. The fact that empirical evidence points in 
all directions emphasises the benefits of more detailed analyses of the sources of the 
gender pay gap. In that light, it is important to treat women as a heterogeneous group 
and understand that women with different income and skill levels have responded very 
differently to the new incentives in the labour markets during transition. Furthermore, 
some of the disagreement over evidence stems from the fact that transition countries are 
not a uniform group and that they have adopted very different transition strategies (as well 
as speeds), which have produced very different labour market institutions. For example, 
some countries have tackled reform of the public sector more seriously, i.e. they embarked 
on a faster transition, so women may have been impacted more adversely due to their 
overrepresentation in the public sector, while in some, like the countries of the Western 
Balkans, women’s jobs in the public sector remained untouched due to non-market forces, 
i.e. the unreformed public sector.19
19 Central and Eastern European countries were able to do that because there was a lot more political consensus regarding 
market oriented reforms, since they saw no alternative to joining the EU. On the other hand, countries of the Western 
Balkans faced complicated legacies of the 1990’s and politically unstable environments, which created a lot of resistance 
to market reforms.
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Existing research on the Western Balkans
Literature on the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans amounts to only around a dozen 
papers. Among those, the gender pay gap in Serbia is substantially more covered in litera-
ture than the gender pay gap in Macedonia and Montenegro. Further, there is only one 
paper which focuses on cross-country comparisons of the gender pay gap which covers the 
countries of the Western Balkans (Blunch, 2010).
One of the earliest papers on the gender pay gap in the Western Balkans was published 
by Krstić and Reilly (2000). They analyse the gender pay gap in the period 1995-1998 
in the Former Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro at the time), using the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) data and applying the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. They 
show that the unadjusted hourly gap increased from 10.1% in 1995 to 14.8% in 1998, but 
this rise was not statistically significant. The unexplained part of the gap was positive and 
increased over the years from 10.7 to 16.1 percent, mostly due to relative changes in returns 
to observed labour market characteristics between men and women. The explained part was 
found to be negative and decreasing during the period from -0.6 pp in 1995 to -1.2 pp 
in 1998, meaning that those women who worked had better labour market characteristics 
than men who worked. This is consistent with the trends in other transition economies, 
which we presented in the previous section, and could be explained by disproportionate 
exit of low-skilled women from the labour market.
Kecmanović and Barrett (2011) use the LFS data from 2001 to 2005 to examine the gender 
pay gap in Serbia. Their analysis at the mean included a “basic” (including only education, 
work experience and region as predictors) and a “comprehensive” model (adding sector 
of employment and type of ownership). They also applied a standard Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition and additionally used a quantile regression. The mean unadjusted gap they 
observed decreased from 14.4% in 2001 to 5.4% in 2005 and it was lower in comparison 
to the ones observed in other, both Western and Eastern, economies. The explained part of 
the gap decreased between 2001 and 2005 (from -2.8 to –5.1 percentage points), partially 
accounting for the decrease in the overall pay gap. The unexplained part also decreased 
(from 17.2 to 10.5 percent), showing a reduced “discrimination” effect over the years. 
Furthermore, the observed gap decreased in each quantile of the wage distribution over 
the years (both the explained and the unexplained part). The explained part of the gap was 
smaller, while the unexplained one was larger at the top end of the wage distribution in all 
the observed years. This shows that women at the top end of the wage distribution are on 
average even more qualified than men while the “discrimination” effect grows. This finding 
points to presence of a glass ceiling effect. 
When it comes to the unexplained wage gap, we see the opposite trend in place during 
the period covering the second half of the 1990’s and the first half of the 2000’s. While 
discrimination seems to have been reduced over time during the first period, it seems to 
have grown during the 2000’s.
However, due to the dubious quality of LFS data in Serbia before 2008, and especially 
before 2004 (changes to the definition of employment which served to align the survey 
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with international standards), the analyses covering later periods may be substantially more 
reliable in their gender pay gap estimates. 
Analysing the impact of the financial crisis in Serbia on labour market and gender (cover-
ing 2008 and 2009), Blunch and Sulla (2010) find that females were disadvantaged in the 
Serbian labour market in terms of moving out of unemployment and economic inactivity, 
while males were harder hit than females in terms of exit from employment during the first 
year of the financial crisis.20 When it came to earnings, women were worse off in terms of 
their earnings levels, while they experienced somewhat smaller decreases in earnings than 
men did between 2008 and 2009.
Reva (2012) uses the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from April 2008 and October 2009 
to analyse the position of women in the Serbian labour market (focusing on employment, 
unemployment, activity and the pay gap). It is a descriptive analysis with application of the 
Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition on monthly wages. According to her, women’s monthly 
wages were 4.6% lower than men’s in 2009. The gap halved in 2009 in comparison to its 2008 
level (9.2%), as the crisis predominantly hit male-dominated sectors of the economy. The gap 
was found to be higher among skilled workers and managers, as well as in the private sector 
(8 percentage points difference in comparison to the public sector), among those aged 55-64 
(caused by low female activity), and among those with lower education levels. The explained 
part of the gap was shown to be negative for both years, which indicated that the wage gap 
would be higher if employed women on average did not have better job characteristics and 
individuals’ labour market characteristics than men. A detailed decomposition shows that the 
most important factors among skills were education and occupation. Additionally, the halving 
of the wage gap between the two years was mainly due to a decrease in the unexplained part 
of the gap (i.e. that attributed to “discrimination”, from 15.6% to 11.7%), since the explained 
part did not change significantly during the analysed period (from – 6.4 pp to –7.1 pp).
Evidence from Macedonia (Angel-Urdinola, 2008; Angel-Urdinola and Macias-Essedin, 
2008) suggests that female labour force participation in Macedonia (at 49%) is one of 
the lowest in the European and Central Asia (ECA) region, and significantly lower than 
male, which stands at 75%. The authors also find that the large wage gap between men 
and women is not necessarily explained by labour market segmentation (whereby women 
enter lower paying sectors) nor by differences in returns to education by gender, but more 
likely by discrimination (whereby men in similar sectors, with similar education, and doing 
similar jobs earn higher wages than their female counterparts).
The gender pay gap in Montenegro has been the focus of a project of the European move-
ment in Montenegro, which found that women mostly occupy low positions, low-paid 
jobs with few opportunities for advancement and that too many are represented among 
part-time and workers in the informal economy, with such inequality affecting the gender 
differences in personal income and earnings (making single mothers especially vulner-
able). However, no rigorous empirical work on the gender pay gap has been conducted for 
Montenegro (excluding the Krstić and Reilly, 2000, analysis, when Montenegro used to be 
in a federal union with Serbia).
20 Overall, unemployment levels are still higher for females than males, albeit not by much.
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Using data from the UNDP Social Exclusion Survey conducted in 2010, Blunch (2010) 
compares the gender earnings gap between Serbia and five other countries in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine). The applied 
methodology estimates standard Mincer wage regressions, followed by the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition. Descriptive statistics show that in all the countries there is a substantial 
unadjusted wage gap ranging from 12.4% for Serbia to 27.2% for Ukraine. For Macedonia 
the unadjusted wage gap is 17.5%. The econometric analysis, which accounts for the differ-
ences in labour market characteristics between working men and working women, shows that 
the true (adjusted) wage gap stands at 20% in Serbia and at 22.7% in Macedonia. Results 
of the Mincer equation also show that higher earnings are associated with more years of 
education (higher for females than males, which is consistent with previous results), being 
employed full-time and having a written contract. The explained part of the wage gap is 
negative for Kazakhstan, Macedonia and Serbia, and positive for Tajikistan; the unexplained 
part is positive for all the countries and all the applied methods. Therefore for Kazakhstan, 
Macedonia and Serbia, the wage gap would be even larger if the women did not have better 
characteristics (most importantly better education) than men. Most important contributor 
in detailed decomposition is education, which works to narrow the gap between male and 
female wages in all the countries except for Moldova and Tajikistan. 
Based on the above overview of the gender pay gap literature on the Western Balkans, we 
can conclude that a more systematic approach to analysing the gender pay gap across the 
Western Balkan countries is still lacking. While most of the above cited papers acknowl-
edge the fact that the unadjusted pay gap hides the real gap, because women who work 
have better labour market characteristics than men who work (which is consistent with 
other transition literature), only one of them (Kecmanović and Barrett, 2011) uses the 
Heckman selection correction model to correct the estimated wage returns for the fac-
tors of self-selection into employment, which may systematically vary across the genders. 
However, this paper relies on the LFS data between 2001 and 2005 for Serbia, which is of 
questionable reliability, and it applies the method of analysis to one country only. 
Kecmanović and Barrett (2011) are also the only ones who test for the presence of the glass 
ceiling effect by applying a quantile regression. 
None of the reviewed studies analyse sectoral and occupational segregation and the gender 
pay gaps stemming from it in great detail, and no particular attention is given to the dif-
ferent institutions present in the public and the private sector, which may affect the gender 
wage gap differently. 
Furthermore, all of the above cited papers focus exclusively on wage employment and do 
not analyse the different wage returns of men and women in self-employment. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, although transition is essentially about increasing 
competition, no paper on transition or the Western Balkan countries addresses the effect 
of growing competition on the gender pay gap.
In Table 2.1 below we summarise the main findings of the studies on the gender pay gap 
in the Western Balkans surveyed above. 
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3. Gender Pay Gap: Concepts and Methodology
As mentioned in the previous section, the most important methodological concepts of the 
gender pay gap analysis are the unadjusted and the adjusted pay gaps. In this chapter, we 
explain the theoretical concept and the methodology used in this study to calculate these 
indicators. We also describe other methodological concepts that we have used in order to 
analyse the wage gap in further detail.
The unadjusted pay gap is a simple difference between the wages of an “average” employed 
woman and an “average” employed man. The unadjusted pay gap is defined by Eurostat 
(Eurostat, 2010) as a percentage difference between average gross hourly wages of male 
and female employees, expressed as a percentage of male gross earnings. The unadjusted 
pay gap can also be calculated as a difference between log hourly wages of men and women 
and it is equivalent to the regression coefficient in the Mincer wage equation when only 
gender is included as an explanatory variable (see the section on Mincer wage regression 
below). 
For each of the three analysed countries in this study we calculate the unadjusted gap as 
both the difference in log hourly wages (in the Labour market trends section of each country 
chapter) and as the regression coefficient (in Understanding the gap section of each country 
chapter). We then decompose the unadjusted pay gap into two parts: the explained and the 
unexplained part. The terms explained and unexplained part of the wage gap stem from 
the methodology used for the decomposition of the gender pay gap – the Blinder-Oaxaca 
(BO) decomposition. The decomposition is based on the separate Mincer earnings equa-
tions for men and women and thus the results from this decomposition are equal to the 
results of the Mincer equation, but are here presented in a different fashion and in greater 
detail (for details see the section on the BO decomposition below).
The explained part of the gender pay gap is the difference in earnings that can be ascribed 
to different labour market characteristics (education, work experience, etc.) of the aver-
age employed man and the average employed woman. As can be seen in the literature 
review, in the Western economies employed women on average have worse labour market 
characteristics than employed men. Thus, in these economies, the part of the unadjusted 
pay gap is explained by the fact that men have characteristics that are on average of higher 
value to employers. 
Once we, by the means of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, “take away” the part of the 
unadjusted pay gap that is due to the differences in the labour market characteristics, what 
remains is the unexplained part of the gap. Since this part of the gap has been “stripped” 
from the differences in the above-mentioned labour market characteristics, it represents 
the mathematical equivalent to the comparison of wages between men and women with 
the same labour market characteristics (such as education, work experience, etc). This part 
of the gap, which is also called the adjusted pay gap, represents the “true” magnitude of the 
gender wage gap, “stripped” from the differences in labour market characteristics between 
employed men and women. Thus, the adjusted pay gap is often interpreted in the economic 
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literature as the effect of discrimination. Since in order to calculate the adjusted gap we 
need to hold labour market characteristics constant, this indicator can only be calculated 
in the Mincer earnings equation (as the regression coefficient for gender, when all labour 
market characteristics are included) or the Mincer equation based Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position (for details see sections below). 
Since in the Western economies men have better characteristics than women, the ad-
justed pay gap (i.e. the unexplained part of the unadjusted gap) is usually lower than the 
unadjusted. However, as we have seen from the literature review, a different trend can 
be observed in the Western Balkans: women who work on average have better labour 
market characteristics than men. In other words, we cannot explain the differences in 
wages between men and women by the means of better male characteristics. In fact, exactly 
the opposite takes place – once we correct for the fact that women who work have better 
characteristics than men who work, the gender wage gap becomes even larger. Thus in the 
Western Balkans, the adjusted gap is higher than the unadjusted gap, i.e. the differences 
in labour market characteristics in fact hide the true magnitude of the gender wage gap.
Due to this, the terms explained and unexplained part of the gap (from the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition) are misleading. Namely, since the sign of the coefficient of the “explained 
part of the gap” is negative, it means that the explained part does not really explain any 
part of the unadjusted gap. On the contrary, it increases it to a higher-level adjusted gap. 
The more correct term to be used in this case is therefore a more general one: differences in 
characteristics, for which we adjust the unadjusted gender pay gap. Additionally, the term 
‘unexplained part’ of the unadjusted gap is also misleading, since the unexplained ‘part’ is 
actually greater than the whole. Thus, in the case of the Western Balkans, referring to the 
methodological concept of the unexplained part as adjusted gap only makes the analysis 
more understandable.
We further utilize the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to split the adjusted pay gap into i) 
differences in returns and ii) unobservable differences (see section Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition bellow). Differences in returns represent direct discrimination of employers 
(pure prejudice or statistical discrimination, see literature review for details), i.e. the fact 
that employers award men and women differently for the same characteristic (e.g. they pay 
women less per additional year of education or work experience). Unobservable differ-
ences are differences in unobservable characteristics that systematically differ between the 
genders, which employers observe and reward (e.g. that men may be able to devote more 
time to work because they have more free time than women, who are expected to perform 
more reproductive labour; see literature review for a detailed discussion).
We further apply the above-described methodology in order to analyse the gender wage 
gap through time, as well as by the public and the private sector. Additionally, we analyse 
the gap at different points of the wage distribution, using both the above described Blinder-
Oaxaca methodology on the separate quintiles of the female and male wage distribution, 
and the quantile regression analysis (see section Quantile Regressions below). We further 
account for selection effects on the gap by including the Heckman selection procedure into 
the above-described decomposition (see section Heckman selection model below). 
45
3.1 Mincer wage regression
The Mincer’s (Mincer, 1974) human capital earnings function relates the log of individual 
earnings or wages to gender, observed measures of schooling, years of work experience, 
and other labour market characteristics, with a specification that is linear in education and 
quadratic in work experience:
 ,   3.1)
where
individual earnings (worker’s hourly wage rate);   = log transformation.
gender dummy variable (= 1 if female; 0 otherwise).
dummy variables for completed education, categorized into three levels 
(primary, secondary and tertiary education); primary education is omitted 
category.
years of work experience (learning-by-doing, on-the-job training).
years of work experience squared (captures the concavity of the age-earnings 
profile).
vector of other labour market characteristics, such as occupation, industry 
sector, whether a person works in a public or a private sector, having a perma-
nent contract or not, region and time fixed effects.
the average difference in log hourly wage between females and males, 
given the same labour market characteristics (and the same error term ); 
measures the change in wages when comparing, ceteris paribus, an average 
female to an average male; if , then for the same level of other factors, 
women earn less than men on average; expressed in percentages, women earn 
 less than men.
  
the movement of  from 0 to 1 produces . 
 percent change in  ; rate of return to schooling.
 
estimates the rate of growth in earnings resulting from one additional year of 
labour market experience; rate of return to experience.
 measures the effect of other labour market characteristics in the model.
 is index for a sample size ( );  is index for a total number of 
explanatory variables included in the Mincer regression model.
Next to gender, education and work experience, a complete list of socio-demographic and 
work-related explanatory variables contained in a vector  is as follows: dummy variables for occupation, divided into eight categories according to the International Standard 
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Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (senior officials and managers; professionals; techni-
cians and associate professionals; clerks; service and sales workers; craft and trade workers; 
plant and machine operators; and elementary occupations);21 dummy variables for industry 
sector, divided into 5 categories from original 21 categories of the NACE Statistical Clas-
sification of Economic Activities (revision 1) classification; these five categories are (1) 
agriculture; (2) manufacturing; (3) trade, HORECA and transport; (4) modern services 
such as communication, financial intermediation, and real estate; (5) public administration, 
education, health, social service activities and activities of extraterritorial (ET) organisa-
tions and bodies; dummy variable for whether a person works in a public or a private 
sector (private = 0); dummy variable for a temporary or a permanent contract (temporary 
contract = 0); dummy variable for whether a person works full- or part-time (part-time = 
0);22 region and time fixed effects. Full description of explanatory variables is presented in 
Table 1.
Table 1. List of explanatory variables
Mincer Wage Equation
Name of variable Description Coding
Gender
1 = Female
0 = Male
Highest education: Primary 
Without a degree or with pri-
mary education only 
(base category)
1 = Primary education
0 = Otherwise
Highest education: Secondary High or secondary school
1 = Secondary education
0 = Otherwise
Highest education: Tertiary
Higher school or university 
degree (BA, BSc, MA, MSc, PhD)
1 = Tertiary education
0 = Otherwise
Years or work experience
Tenure in Montenegro and 
Macedonia
Years or work experience
Years or work experience squared
Years or work experience  
squared
Public or private sector
1 = Public sector
0 = Private sector
Permanent or temporary contract
1 = Permanent contract
0 = Temporary contract
21  Due to a very small ssample size, skilled agricultural workers are categorized as technicians and associate professionals, 
whiled armed forces are grouped together with professionals.
22  This variable is only included in the sample robustness estimation results.
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Occ (1): Senior officials and manag-
ers
Dummy variables for oc-
cupation, divided into eight 
categories according to the 
International Standard Clas-
sification of Occupations (ISCO). 
Due to a very small sample size, 
skilled Agricultural workers are 
categorized as Technicians and 
associate professionals, while 
Armed forces are grouped 
together with Professionals. 
Senior officials and managers is 
a base category.
1 = Senior officials and managers 
0 = Otherwise
Occ (2): Professionals
1 = Professionals 
0 = Otherwise
Occ (3): Technicians & associate 
professionals
1 = Technicians & associate 
professionals 
0 = Otherwise
Occ (4): Clerks
1 = Clerks 
0 = Otherwise
Occ (5): Service and sales workers
1 = Service and sales workers
0 = Otherwise
Occ (6): Craft and trade workers
1 = Craft and trade workers
0 = Otherwise
Occ (7): Plant and machine opera-
tors
1 = Plant and machine operators 
0 = Otherwise
Occ (8): Elementary occupations
1 = Elementary occupations 
0 = Otherwise
Sec (1): Agriculture
Dummy variables for industry 
sector, divided into 5 categories 
from original 21 categories of 
the NACE Statistical Classifica-
tion of Economic Activities (revi-
sion 1) classification. Agriculture 
is a base category.
1 = Agriculture
0 = Otherwise
Sec (2): Manufacturing
1 = Manufacturing
0 = Otherwise
Sec (3): Trade, HORECA & transpor-
tation
1 = Trade, HORECA & transpor-
tation
0 = Otherwise
Sec (4): Communication & financial 
intermediation
1 = Communication & financial 
intermediation
0 = Otherwise
Sec (5): Public administration, edu-
cation & health
1 = Public administration, edu-
cation & health 
0 = Otherwise
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Region
In Montenegro, we have three 
regional dummies: (1) North, (2) 
Central, and (3) Coastal. North is 
a base category.
In Serbia, we have four regions: 
(1) Belgrade, (2) Vojvodina, 
(3) West Serbia and Šumadija, 
and (4) East and South Serbia. 
Belgrade is a base category.
In Macedonia, we do not have 
a variable which measures 
regional effects.
Montenegro
Region (1): North
1 = North 
0 = Otherwise
Region (2): Central
1 = Central
0 = Otherwise
Region (3): Coastal
1 = Coastal
0 = Otherwise
Serbia
Region (1): Belgrade
1 = Belgrade
0 = Otherwise
Region (2): Vojvodina
1 = Vojvodina
0 = Otherwise
Region (3): West Serbia and 
Šumadija
1 = West Serbia and Šumadija
0 = Otherwise
Region (4): East and South 
Serbia
1 = East and South Serbia
0 = Otherwise
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Time fixed effects
Dummy variables for time fixed 
effects. October 2008 is a base 
category. For Serbia, we do not 
have data for April 2010.
For Macedonia and Montene-
gro, the time variables represent 
the years’ quarters.
1 = October 2008/4th quarter of 
2008
0 = Otherwise
1 = April 2009/2nd quarter of 
2009
0 = Otherwise
1 = October 2009/4th quarter of 
2009
0 = Otherwise
1 = April 2010/2nd quarter of 
2010
0 = Otherwise
1 = October 2010/4th quarter of 
2010
0 = Otherwise
1 = April 2011/2nd quarter of 
2011
0 = Otherwise
1 = October 2011/4th quarter of 
2011
0 = Otherwise
Heckman Selection Equation
Age
Age
Age in years
Age squared Age in years, squared
Highest education: Primary 
Without a degree or with pri-
mary education only 
(base category)
1 = Primary education
0 = Otherwise
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Highest education: Secondary High or secondary school
1 = Secondary education
0 = Otherwise
Highest education: Tertiary
Higher school or university 
degree (BA, BSc, MA, MSc, PhD)
1 = Tertiary education
0 = Otherwise
Has partner (yes/no)
Information about the partner
1 = Has partner
0 = Otherwise
Partner works (yes/no)
1 = Partner works
0 = Otherwise
Has a child (age < 1 year)
Dummy variables for whether 
a person has children younger 
than 1 year, between 1 and 3 
years, between 3 and 7 years, 
and between 7 and 14 years.
1 = Has a child younger than 1 
year
0 = Otherwise
Has a child  (age 1 to < 3 years)
1 = Has a child between 1 and 
younger than 3 years
0 = Otherwise
Has a child  (age 3 to < 7 years)
1 = Has a child between 3 and 
younger than 7 years
0 = Otherwise
Has a child (age 7 to < 14 years)
1 = Has a child between 7 and 
younger than 14 years
0 = Otherwise
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Region
In Montenegro, we have three 
regional dummies: North, Cen-
tral and Coastal. North is a base 
category.
In Serbia, we have four regions: 
Belgrade, Vojvodina, West Ser-
bia and East Serbia. Belgrade is 
a base category.
In Macedonia, we do not have 
a variable measuring regional 
effects.
Montenegro
1 = North 
0 = Otherwise
1 = Central
0 = Otherwise
1 = Coastal
0 = Otherwise
Serbia
1 = Belgrade
0 = Otherwise
1 = Vojvodina
0 = Otherwise
1 = West Serbia
0 = Otherwise
1 = East Serbia
0 = Otherwise
Time fixed effects
Dummy variables for time fixed 
effects. October 2008 is a base 
category. For Serbia, we do not 
have data for April 2010.
1 = October 2008
0 = Otherwise
1 = April 2009
0 = Otherwise
1 = October 2009
0 = Otherwise
1 = April 2010
0 = Otherwise
1 = October 2010
0 = Otherwise
1 = April 2011
0 = Otherwise
1 = October 2011
0 = Otherwise
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The  coefficient that we are interested in measures the average difference in hourly wage 
between females and males, given the same labour market characteristics (and the same 
error term ). In other words, it measures the change in wages when comparing, ceteris 
paribus, an average female to an average male. If , then, for the same level of other 
factors, women earn less than men on average. Expressed in percentages, women earn 
 less than men. This can be labelled as wage discrimination against 
women. 
Our estimation strategy for investigating the wage gap between men and women is to esti-
mate a sequence of nested regression models for the hourly wage. In the first specification, 
only gender is included as an explanatory variable. In this specification,  is interpreted as 
the unadjusted gender pay gap. The second specification is extended with variables account-
ing for level of education and work experience (in levels and squared). In the third specifi-
cation, time fixed effects are added.  The fourth specification is extended with work-related 
variables (occupation and sector dummies, dummies for written and permanent contracts, 
dummy for working in public or private sector). In the fifth specification, regional dummy 
variables are added to the regression.23 Once labour market characteristics are accounted 
for in the regression,  is interpreted as the adjusted gender pay gap.
3.1.1 Robustness checks
Baseline Mincer wage equation is estimated on the working age population sample (15-64 
years), in the period from the 4th quarter of 2008 to the 4th quarter of 2011 (bi-quarterly 
data),24 excluding workers with missing or zero wages. Robustness checks of the baseline 
Mincer estimation results include the following: (1) Age robustness (population aged 
19-59 years and population aged 19-64 years); (2) Sample robustness (with part-timers 
and with self-employed); and (3) Wage robustness (wages without extreme values, and 
including those workers with zero wages). 
3.2 Heckman selection model
When estimating the Mincer’s wage equation, we want to know how different factors, 
such as education, work experience, occupation, sector of activity, etc., affect the wage an 
individual could earn in the labour force. For people who are in the labour force, we observe 
the wage offer as the current wage. For those currently out of the workforce, we do not 
observe the wage offer. Because being employed may be systematically correlated with 
the unobservables that affect the offered wage, using only the sample of workers might 
produce biased estimates of the parameters in the Mincer’s wage equation. The situation is 
also called incidental truncation. That is, we do not observe the dependent variable (wage) 
because of the outcome of another variable (namely, labour force participation).
23  We do not have regional effects in the specifications for Macedonia.
24  In Serbia we do not have the data for April 2010.
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The key problem when estimating the wage equation (3.1) is that when regressing wages 
on work characteristics for those in employment, we are not observing the equation for the 
population as a whole. Those in employment may have higher wages than those who are out 
of the labour force, had they been employed (that might be the reason why they are not in 
the labour force in the first place). Hence the estimation results of the wage regression will 
tend to be biased (sample selection bias) and we are likely to get biased results when estimating 
parameter next to gender, returns to education or returns to other variables in model (3.1).
Heckman (Heckman, 1976; 1979) selection model allows for the situation that selec-
tion into the labour force is not random and that the unobservables which determine 
the observed wage are not independent from the decision to work or not (for example, 
offered wage influences the decision to work or not). Therefore, the model consists of two 
equations, the wage equation and the selection equation, described in the following way:
1. Wage equation (linear regression model). Dependent variable in this model is log hourly 
wage, regressed on labour market characteristics which determine wages (education, work 
experience, occupation, sector of activity, etc.). We can estimate coefficients in the wage 
regression consistently, providing we include the inverse Mills ratio ( ), calculated 
using the first stage probit coefficient estimates, as an additional regressor in the wage 
equation, in order to correct for any selectivity (endogeneity) in the sample of workers.
2. Selection equation (probit model). Since wages are unobserved for those who are not 
working (inactive and unemployed), in order to account for the selection effects we need 
to we need to estimate a probit model determining labour force participation (i.e., the 
probability of being employed). In addition to education and offered job characteristics, 
labour force participation also depends on demographic and family indicators, such as age, 
marital status, whether a person has a partner who works, whether the children are small 
or in their teenage years, etc.
If selection into the labour force was random, we could estimate the wage equation un-
biasedly, without taking into account the selection model. However, in the presence of 
endogenous sample selection (i.e., the sample of working men and women is not a random 
sample of the whole population of men and women), estimated wage equation needs to be 
“corrected” by an additional term which depends on the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) evalu-
ated on the set of explanatory variables included in the probit equation. Otherwise, we have 
effectively omitted a variable (the inverse Mills ratio), which is generally correlated with 
other explanatory variables included in the wage equation and biases the estimation results.
More formally, in order to define a regression in the model of selection, let us define two 
equations which represent the wage and selection equation. The wage equation in (3.1) 
can be written as follows:
  ,                                                  (3.2)
where  denotes a vector of labour market characteristics (gender, education, prior work 
experience, etc.) and an intercept;  is a vector of parameters which measure the effect of 
each labour market characteristics included in the wage regression (3.2);  is the log of 
hourly wage and it is not observed for people who are not working (hence the *);  is the 
error term.
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In order to describe whether a person is working or not (binary choice), a second equation 
is specified (the selection equation):
 ,                                                 (3.3)
where  denotes a vector of offered job characteristics, as well as demographic and family 
indicators, such as age, marital status, whether a person has a partner who works, whether 
the children are small or in their teenage years, etc.;  is a vector of parameters which 
measure the effect of each job characteristic, as well as demographic and family indicators 
included in the selection equation (3.3);  denotes the number of working hours and it is 
not observed for people who are not working (hence the *);  is the error term.
Exclusion restrictions require that the number of explanatory variables included in the 
wage regression must be a strict subset of the number of explanatory variables included in 
the probit regression ( ). That is, any variable that appears as an explanatory variable 
in the wage regression should also be an explanatory variable in the selection equation and 
we must have at least one element in the selection equation that does not appear in the 
wage equation (Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter 17).
 We then have the following observation rule:
where  is person’s  actual wage. 
If we assume that  and  have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
correlation coefficient r  , with the identifying assumption that , then we can 
insert these error terms into the expectation definition in order to obtain the model that 
can be applied to the observations in the sample:
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     (3.4)
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where we used the identifying assumption that  and that for two normal random 
variables we have .
We therefore conclude that the expected value of  given  and the observability of 
 is equal to , plus an additional term which depends on the inverse Mills ratio  
evaluated at . 
Selection bias exists when  is different from zero, i.e., when the two error terms  and  
are correlated. We would expect the correlation between the two error terms because, for 
example, the offered wage influences the decision to work or not. This implies that the error 
term  contains unobserved variables which influence the wage offer, i.e., is correlated 
with . The previous results indicate that in the sample for females, the sample selection 
problem is likely to be more pronounced (see for example Mroz, 1987).
If we estimate the wage equation by the OLS using only data for those individuals who are 
working (i.e., using only the selected sample), we will get inconsistent estimates of . This 
problem arises because we make a specification error of an omitted variable. In other words, 
we have effectively omitted a variable, , which is generally correlated with  and 
biases the estimation results. On the other hand, if we regress  on  and  as an 
additional regressor, the estimated regression would produce consistent estimates. 
The parameters of the sample selection model could be estimated by maximum likelihood 
method. However, in most of the cases the Heckman two-step estimation procedure is 
used (Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 17). Suggested Heckman’s procedure is as follows:
1. Estimate the probit (selection) equation by maximum likelihood in order to obtain 
estimates of . For each observation in the selected sample compute a fitted value of the 
index function or the latent variable ; then compute the inverse Mills ratio  as a 
function of  : 
2. Include  in a regression of  on  in order to get consistent estimates of . The 
coefficient next to  will be a measure of . The estimated , , and  can be derived 
from this coefficient (  by assumption).
In the estimation results, we report models estimated by both the maximum likelihood and 
the Heckman two-step estimation procedures. The wage equation follows the final speci-
fication of the Mincer’s wage equation in (3.1). In addition to education and offered job 
characteristics, labour force participation equation (probit) also depends on demographic 
and family indicators, such as age, marital status (whether a person has a partner), whether 
a person has a partner who works, whether the children are small or in their teenage years, 
etc. A complete list of explanatory variables included in the selection equation is presented 
in Table 1.
The Heckman two-step estimation procedure has been widely applied in empirical work 
because of its relative ease of use, as it requires only a probit estimation followed by least 
squares, something which is available in many statistical packages. Further reading on the 
Heckman selection model can be found, among other literature, in Killingsworth (1983), 
Maddala (1983), Mincer (1993), and Mroz (1987).
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3.3 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
In order to study labour-market outcomes by groups (e.g., gender, race, poverty status, 
etc.), Blinder-Oaxaca (BO) wage decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) enables 
decomposition of mean differences in log wages based on linear regression models in a 
counterfactual manner. The BO procedure divides the wage differential between the two 
groups (for example men and women) into a part that is “explained” by group differences in 
productivity characteristics, such as education or work experience, and a residual part (the 
“unexplained” part) that cannot be accounted for by such differences in wage determinants. 
This “unexplained” part is often used as a measure for discrimination, but it also includes 
the effects of group differences in unobserved predictors ( Jann, 2008).
Starting from the Mincer’s wage equation specified separately for males (M) and females 
(F):
 
where  and  denote a vector of labour market characteristics of men and women 
(gender, education, prior work experience, etc.) included in our final specification of model 
(3.1), and an intercept term,  and  contain the slope parameters, and  and  are 
the error terms, the question is how much of the mean difference in log hourly wages 
between men and women ( ) is accounted for by differences in predictors. 
Assuming that  and  the mean difference in log hourly wages can 
be expressed as the difference in the linear prediction evaluated at the group-specific means 
of regressors:
 .                            (3.5)
The log hourly wage equation, based on the classical human capital earnings model by 
Mincer (1974), is used to estimate the rates of return to individual characteristics. If we 
estimate the Mincer’s wage regression separately for males (M) and females (F):
  and  ,
where  and  are individual labour market characteristics of men and women and 
 and  are the estimated regression coefficients, replacing the theoretical moments by 
its sample counterparts, the mean difference in log hourly wages can then be expressed as 
follows:
 .                                     (3.6)
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In order to identify the contribution of group differences in predictors to the overall out-
come difference (the raw wage gap), (3.6) can be rearranged as follows:
 =  ,   (3.7)
This is the so-called “threefold” decomposition, where the first component accounts for 
the part of the differential which is due to differences between men and women in the 
predictors (the “endowments effect”); the second component measures the contribution 
of differences in the coefficients (including differences in intercepts); and the third com-
ponent is an interaction term accounting for the fact that differences in endowments and 
coefficients exist simultaneously between the two groups. 
The decomposition shown in (3.7) is formulated from the viewpoint of women. In other 
words, the endowments component measures the expected change in female average log 
hourly wages if women had male labour market characteristics. Similarly, the contribution 
of differences in the coefficients measures the expected change in female average log hourly 
wages if women had male coefficients or parameters.
An alternative specification, labelled as the “twofold” decomposition, stems from the con-
cept that there is a non-discriminatory coefficient vector that should be used to determine 
the contribution of the differences in predictors ( Jann, 2008). If   is such a nondiscrimi-
natory coefficient vector, the mean difference in log hourly wages can be decomposed as:
  .          (3.8)
The explained gap is the difference between men and women that is attributable to 
observed differences in the independent variables. It is also labelled as the difference in 
endowments or labour market characteristics. The unexplained part is the difference attribut-
able to different wage equations of men and women. It is also labelled as the difference 
in entitlements (returns) or the wage structure effect. This means that the wage differ-
ence between men and women is due to different returns to the independent variables 
(= differing coefficients) plus the wage difference between men and women, which is not 
captured by the independent variables (= difference in intercepts or the shift parameters) 
(Reimer and Schröder, 2006). 
Positive values of each term in (3.8) are argued to represent male wage advantage, and 
negative terms female wage disadvantage. The unexplained part of the gender wage gap is 
often labelled discrimination, since if the men’s slope coefficient exceeds that for women, 
then a male advantage appears. However, if important control variables are missing in the 
model, the unexplained gap captures not only wage discrimination but also these unob-
served differences (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
The determination of the components of the twofold decomposition is more involved be-
cause an estimation for the unknown non-discriminatory coefficient vector  is needed. If, 
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for example, wage discrimination is directed only against women and there is no (positive) 
discrimination of men, then we can use  as an estimate for . The decomposition in 
(3.8) can then be written as:
  ,                    (3.9)
where  and  are the observed averages of log hourly wages of men and women;  
and  are the averages of individual characteristics;  and  are the regression coef-
ficients for the model explaining hourly wages, estimated separately for men and women. 
The explained components of both Oaxaca decompositions (3.7) and (3.9) are based upon 
differences in the means for men and women of each explanatory variable contained in 
the final specification of model (3.1). The difference in the intercept terms of the two 
Oaxaca decompositions has been seen as part of the unexplained component of the gender 
pay gap. In the empirical part of the report, we estimate and interpret the twofold BO 
decomposition.
3.3.1 Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
The total decomposition of the log hourly wage differential into an explained and an 
unexplained part can also be examined from the perspective of a detailed contribution 
of the single predictors or sets of predictors. For example, one might want to evaluate 
how much of the gender wage gap is due to differences in education and how much is 
due to differences in work experience. Similarly, it might be relevant to determine how 
much of the unexplained gap is related to differing returns to education and how much is 
related to differing returns to work experience ( Jann, 2008). Identifying the contributions 
of the individual predictors to the explained part of the differential is easy because the total 
component is a simple sum over the individual contributions.
Starting from the twofold decomposition in (3.9), we can write:
 , (3.10)
where , ... are the means of single regressors, and , ... are the relevant coeffi-
cients. The first component in (3.10) reflects the contribution of the group differences in 
; the second of differences in ; and so on.
In a similar fashion, starting from the twofold decomposition in (3.9), we can write:
 .   (3.11)
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There are two issues to be considered here when estimating detailed BO decomposition 
results:
1. The detailed decomposition results for the unexplained part have a meaningful interpre-
tation only for variables that have a natural zero point.
2. The decomposition results for categorical predictors depend on the choice of the omit-
ted or base category.
Jann (2008) elaborates the second point in the following way. The effect of a categori-
cal variable is usually modelled by including dummy (= 0/1) variables for the different 
categories in the regression equation, where one of the categories (the “base” category) 
is omitted to avoid collinearity. For example, in a regression with an intercept (constant), 
for a variable with  group categories, we need to include  dummy variables. The 
decomposition result for the single dummy variable depends on the choice of the base or 
omitted category, because the associated coefficients quantify the differences with respect 
to the base category. Therefore, if the base category changes, the decomposition results will 
change.
“For the explained part of the decomposition, this may not be critical because the sum 
of the contributions of the single indicator variables (that is, the total contribution of the 
categorical variable) is unaffected by the choice of the base category. For the unexplained 
part of the decomposition, however, there is again a trade-off between the group member-
ship component (the difference in intercepts) and the part attributed to differences in slope 
coefficients. For the unexplained part, changing the base category not only alters the results 
for the single dummy variables but also changes the contribution of the categorical variable 
as a whole,” ( Jann, 2008).
However, coefficients for the unexplained part of the gap stemming from the Blinder–
Oaxaca decomposition for different levels of education are calculated using the constant 
deviation contrast transformation. The transformation is based on the series of estimations 
in which categories (in this case: primary, secondary and tertiary level of education) are 
used one after another as the base (omitted) category, under the restriction that the sum 
of the coefficients must be equal zero. Using this estimation approach, the results of the 
Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition are independent of the choice of the omitted category. 
This transformation is applied to all the dummy variables representing categorical variables 
with three or more categories. More details on the transformation can be found in Yun 
(2005) and Jan (2008).
3.3.2 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with sample selection
Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) elaborate the BO decomposition approach with selectivity 
corrected wage equations. Starting from the twofold decomposition in (3.9), correction for 
selectivity bias requires a wage decomposition of the following form: 
 ,    (3.12)
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where  and  are the predicted averages of log hourly wages of men and women;  
and  are the mean vectors of wage determining variables (education, work experience, 
etc.);  and  are the regression coefficients (returns) for the model explaining hourly 
wages, estimated separately for men and women;  and  are estimates of  (see 
(3.4)), estimated separately for men and women;  and  are estimates of the mean of 
the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) (see (3.4)), estimated separately for men and women.
The paper of Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) discusses how to treat the last term in (3.12). 
The question is whether this term should be subject to further decomposition into 
discrimination and human capital components, and if so, how this should be done. In 
other words, under what theoretical framework would group differences in the correlation 
parameters (i.e., between the wage equation error and the selection equation error), the 
wage returns, or the probit selection weights constitute labour market discrimination?  The 
authors conclude that the estimation of wage inequity in the presence of sample selectivity 
bias depends on assumptions as well as objectives of the applied empirical strategy. In 
the empirical part of this report we use the most straightforward approach and identify 
the overall selection component as a separate category, to be estimated in addition to the 
explained and the unexplained part of the gap (see also Reimers, 1983).
3.4 Quantile regressions
Whereas the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) results in estimated parameters that 
approximate the conditional mean of the outcome variable given certain values of the 
explanatory variables, quantile regression aims at estimating either the conditional median 
or other quantiles (e.g., the 10th, 25th, 75th, 90th, etc.) of the outcome variable. The most 
common form is median regression, where the objective is to estimate the median of the 
dependent variable, conditional on the values of the independent variables. In other words, 
median regression fits a line through the data that minimizes the sum of the absolute 
residuals rather than the sum of the squares of the residuals, as in ordinary regression. 
Summarizing, quantile regression estimates the conditional quantile function, in which the 
quantiles of the conditional distribution of the response variable (log hourly wage) are 
expressed as a linear function of the independent variables (education, work experience, 
etc.) (Buchinsky, 1994; Koenker and Bassett, 1978). 
Application of the quantile regressions allows us to estimate the wage inequity by gender 
at different points of the wage distribution. In the empirical part of the report, we estimate 
the Mincer’s equation separately for men and women at different quantiles of the wage 
distribution. We specify the th quantile of log hourly wages  conditional on the set of 
covariates  as:
   ,
 
where  equals the 10th, the 25th, the 50th, the 75th, and the 90th quantile.
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3.4.1 Quantile regressions and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
In order to investigate the differences in the wage distribution by quantile  of the respec-
tive unconditional wage distribution, we use the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition 
approach for quantile regression which is an extension of the standard Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition technique. Exposition in this part follows Antonczyk et al. (2010).
For the analysis of the gender wage gap, one can decompose the difference of the uncondi-
tional sample quantile functions for the th quantile between male and female employees 
(denoted by  and ) as follows:
 .        (3.13)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.13) denotes the coefficients effect. The 
second term captures the effect of workers’ characteristics. For each quantile, the diffe- 
rence between the observed unconditional quantile of the log hourly wage for males and 
the same quantile for females is decomposed into a part explained by the different char-
acteristics and a part explained by the different coefficients. This can be considered as a 
generalisation of the BO decomposition for the mean.
The term  is the estimated counterfactual quantile function. This counterfactual 
distribution can be used to decompose the differences in distribution. In other words, 
this is the quantile function of wages that would be generated for female workers if they 
had male characteristics  but were still paid according to female coefficients  
Antonczyk et al. (2010) argue that this is the more policy relevant one (as compared to 
using a counterfactual distribution using female characteristics and male coefficients), 
because the characteristics of the female population may be altered over time by policy 
interventions (e.g., through additional education), while the coefficients (returns) and the 
impact of unobservables, are more difficult to be influenced in a market economy. The 
crucial underlying assumption for the estimation of a counterfactual wage distribution 
is that a change in the covariates  will not change the parameters of the conditional 
distribution of  given covariates  (see Chernozhukov et al., 2008).
To implement the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition, we use the approach pro-
posed by Melly (2006), programmed into the Stata user-written command rqdeco. This 
procedure is numerically equivalent to the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition when 
the number of simulations used in the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition goes to 
infinity. The implemented estimator is much faster because it does not rely on simulations. 
In the first step, the distribution of the dependent variable (log hourly wage) conditional 
on the explanatory variables (i.e., education, work experience, occupation, etc.) is estimated 
using the linear quantile regression (see Section 4). The conditional distribution of the log 
hourly wage is then integrated over the explanatory variables to obtain the unconditional 
distribution. This procedure allows us to estimate more precisely the unconditional distri-
bution of a variable by using the information contained in the regressors. 
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4. Gender Pay Gap in Serbia
4.1 Labour market trends in Serbia
4.1.1 Main labour market indicators 
Female employment rate in Serbia is significantly lower than male. Gender gap in employ-
ment rates stood at an average of -15 percentage points during the analysed period (October 
2008-October 2011). The observed gender gap in employment is mainly caused by higher 
inactivity of women, which is above men’s by 16.7 percentage points. Unemployment is also 
higher among women than among men, but to a far lesser extent – gender unemployment 
gap stood at an average of 2.5 percentage points during the period of analysis (Graph 4.1).
Graph 4.1: Main labour market indicators, October 2008–October 2011
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
Between October 2008 and October 2011, all the main labour market indicators worsened 
for both men and women. However, the worsening of employment and unemployment 
rates was less pronounced for women than for men, which led to reductions in gender 
employment and unemployment gaps. While male employment rate fell by 9.7 percentage 
points (from 62.2% to 52.5%), female fell by 6.7 percentage points (44.6% to 37.9%), 
reducing the employment gap by 3 percentage points, from -17.5 to -14.6 percentage 
points (Graph 4.1). 
Similarly, male unemployment rate rose by 10.8 percentage points (from 12.7% to 23.5%), 
while female rose by 8.2 percentage points (17.4% to 23.5%), reducing the gender unem-
ployment gap by 2.5 percentage points, from 4.6 to 2.1 percentage points (Graph 4.1).
The rise in inactivity was slightly more pronounced for women (by 3.1 percentage points, 
from 46.0% to 49.1%) than for men (by 2.5 percentage points, from 28.8% to 31.3%). 
Therefore the gender gap in inactivity rose by 0.5 percentage points over the analysed 
period, from 17.2 to 17.7 (Graph 4.1). 
The worsening of all labour market indicators in Serbia is a reflection of the strong impact 
of the global economic crisis on the Serbian labour market. However, female employment, 
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although at lower levels, was more resistant to the crisis. This is because women in Serbia 
are more often employed in the public sector, which did not adapt to the crisis by cutting 
down employment to the same extent as the private sector (FREN 2011). Furthermore, 
the fact that women who work are on average better educated and more skilled than men 
who work may have contributed to this trend, because low-skilled workers are more likely 
to lose jobs during the crisis than high-skilled ones. Elasticity of employment to GDP 
during the crisis in Serbia stood at 2.6, which by far exceeded elasticities observed in the 
neighbouring economies. Such high elasticity of employment to GDP indicates that the 
crisis sped up the unfinished process of enterprise restructuring and economic transition 
(FREN 2010, p.20).  
Graph 4.2: Employment rate by… 
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Gender employment gap is high at the level of primary (17.4 percentage points) and sec-
ondary (16.5 percentage points) education, while it is almost non-existent at the tertiary 
level of education. The employment gap at the level of primary and secondary education 
is caused by both higher inactivity (by 20.1 percentage points and 17.6 percentage points 
respectively) and higher unemployment of women (by 2.4 and 4.4 percentage points re-
spectively) (Graph 4.2, left panel). On the other hand, very low gender differences in the 
employment rate among those with tertiary education are the result of the slightly higher 
unemployment (by 1pp) and slightly lower inactivity (by 0.6pp) of women at this level of 
education (Table A4.2 in Appendix 4).25
The gender employment gap is the most pronounced among the oldest members of the 
labour force (55-64). Their employment gap (22.3 percentage points) is significantly higher 
than the gap observed among women and men in the prime age group of 25-54 years (14.6 
percentage points) and youth (8.3 percentage points). We can explain this by the changing 
role of women as well as the fact that younger women are more educated than those from 
25 Appendix 4 - appendix to this chapter with supporting data referenced throughout, is available online only, at 
www.fren.org.rs/node/220.
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older generations26. The low gender employment gap among youth may be due to the very 
low baseline, i.e. very low levels of youth employment more generally (Graph 4.2, right 
panel). 
For the oldest working age group (55-64) the gap in employment is caused by differences 
in inactivity rates, which are significantly higher for women than for men (by 26.7pp). This 
is due to the fact that women retire earlier in Serbia (their legal retirement age is 60). This 
can also be confirmed by the fact that unemployment rate for women in this age group is 
lower than for men (by 3.7 pp), (Table A4.2 in Appendix 4).
For the two other age groups, youth (15-24) and the prime age group (25-54), gaps in 
inactivity between the genders are significantly lower (11pp and 14pp respectively). On the 
other hand, within these two groups women are more likely to be unemployed than men 
are (women face 11.1 percentage points higher unemployment than men among youth, 
and 3.4 percentage points higher unemployment than men within the prime age group) 
(Table A4.2 in Appendix 4). 
Gender employment gap in urban areas (11pp) is significantly lower than in the non-urban 
ones (20.6pp). This difference is mainly due to the higher inactivity gap in non-urban 
areas (21.6pp vs. 13.6pp in urban), but also due to the higher unemployment gap in these 
areas – 4.6pp, compared to almost zero in urban areas (see Table A4.3 in Appendix 4).
Gender employment gap is the lowest in Belgrade (10.8pp), and it is entirely caused by 
the gap in inactivity rates, since unemployment gap between the genders is close to zero. 
In other regions – Vojvodina, Western Serbia and Šumadija, and Eastern and Southern 
Serbia –employment gaps between the genders are higher (16.1, 15.1 and 18.2 percentage 
points respectively), mostly due to higher female inactivity, but also due to higher female 
unemployment. Notably, the gap in unemployment is the highest in Eastern and Southern 
Serbia where it reaches 6.2 percentage points (see Table A4.4 in Appendix 4).
Finally, the gender employment gap is significantly higher among the Roma population 
(28pp) than among other nationalities (14.8pp), due to both significantly higher unem-
ployment and inactivity rates among Roma women in comparison to Roma men. Gender 
unemployment gap is by 22.4 percentage points higher among the Roma population (24.8 
vs. 2.4 percentage points), while the inactivity gap is higher by almost 15 percentage points 
(31.4 vs. 16.5 percentage points; see Table A4.5 in Appendix 4).
4.1.2 Type of employment
Compared to men, women in Serbia are more often in wage employment than in self-
employment (75.2% compared to 69.8% of men; Graph 4.3). Although a higher percent-
age of employed women are in wage employment than men, women are a minority in total 
26  Among those aged 55-64, men have a better overall educational structure (29% with primary, 52% with secondary and 
18% with tertiary education) than women (47% with primary, 39% with secondary and 14% with tertiary education). On 
the other hand, among those in the prime age group, female educational attainment is more equivalent to male (women: 
22% with primary, 57% with secondary and 20% with tertiary education; men: 18% with primary, 65% with secondary and 
15% with tertiary education).
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wage employment (42.6% of the total). The fact that fewer women work overall could 
imply that women are more likely to choose employment only if it is better quality and 
lower risk (i.e. wage employment) in comparison to men, who are less wage elastic and will 
work regardless of the type of work which is available to them. Moreover, women work 
half as frequently as self-employed (13.0% vs. 26.2%), while they are found to work three 
times as frequently as unpaid family members (11.8% compared to 4% of men), most often 
in agriculture. This difference may also be due to the fact that men who work on their own 
agricultural land will tend to report as self-employed while women will report as unpaid 
family members.
Graph 4.3: Structure of employment           …and share of women by type
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The structure of employed men by type of employment stayed the same between 2008 
and 2011, while it changed for women (Graph 4.3). Since overall male employment fell 
by 10 percentage points, the fall in all three categories was approximately the same. The 
share of women in wage employment increased (by almost 3 percentage points), while the 
share of women who are self-employed and unpaid family members decreased by 0.4 and 
2.5pp respectively. However, these changes in the structure do not suggest an increase in 
the number of women in wage employment, since their employment rate fell by 6.7pp. 
Thus, the number of employed in all three categories decreased, but the fastest decrease was 
observed for unpaid family members27.
Women with primary educational attainment are predominantly employed as unpaid fam-
ily members, who make up 40% of the total number of employed women with primary 
education, compared to 11.8% for all women (Graph 4.3 and Table A4.6 in Appendix 
4). Only 36.7% of women with primary education are in wage employment (compared to 
75.2% for all women). Among men with primary education, there is a high share of the 
self-employed (47.6% compared to 26.2% for all men), and a significantly lower number 
27  The change could also have occurred because of the change in the question for employment status in LFS between 2008 
and 2011. The question was changed in October 2009 to include 8 instead of 6 categories. The change included introduction 
of two new categories among the self-employed: Temporary contract worker and Artist, Athlete, etc. so women could have 
been more likely to now select the self-employed category instead of unpaid family members. 
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of those in wage employment (43.8% vs. 69.8% for all men). These data seem to indicate 
that much of the self-employment in Serbia is last resort, i.e. due to lack of opportunities 
for wage employment, rather than opportunity based.
More education increases the share of wage employment among both women and men. 
The share of wage employment in all types of employment stood at 81.7% for women and 
74.1% for men with secondary education. This share is even higher for those with tertiary 
education – 92.3% for women and 84.8% for men (Table A4.6 in Appendix 4). 
Presence of women among unpaid family members rises with age (Table A4.7 in Appendix 
4). While among youth (15-24), women make 29.3% of unpaid family members, this per-
centage increases to 67.9% for the 25-54 age group and reaches almost 90% in the 55-64 
age group. Additionally, 27.1% of employed elderly women are unpaid family members, 
thus indicating another dimension of labour market vulnerability of elderly women apart 
from inactivity – they are very often unpaid for their work. Furthermore, this points to 
the possibility that men working on their own agricultural land report themselves as self-
employed and heads of household, while women are registered as unpaid family members, 
indicating unequal access of rural men and women to resources. 
The share of the wage employed in urban areas is very high among both women and men, 
and it is considerably higher for women (almost 90%) than for men (81.7%). This is due 
to the low number of farmers in urban areas. A higher percentage of men in urban areas 
can be found among the self-employed (17.9% vs. 9.5% among women; Table A4.8 in 
Appendix 4).
Analysis by regions shows that Belgrade, as a predominantly urban area, has particularly 
high levels of wage employment for both genders, and especially women. The share of 
wage-employed in Belgrade is 91% for women and 84.7% for men (Table A4.9 in Ap-
pendix 4).
Gender gap wage employment is the most pronounced in Vojvodina, where 80.2% of 
female employment is wage employment, while this percentage for men is 70.3%. In this 
region women can also be found slightly more frequently among unpaid family members 
(by 4.4 pp: 6.8% for women vs. 2.4% for men) (Table A4.9 in Appendix 4). 
In the two Southern regions: West Serbia and Šumadija and Eastern and Southern Serbia, 
which have higher shares of non-urban areas, trends are very similar to country level non-
urban trends. The share of wage employment is significantly lower and around 1pp in 
‘favour’ of women, while the female share is significantly lower among the self-employed 
and significantly higher among the unpaid family members than male (Table A4.9 in 
Appendix 4).
Employment structure of Roma shows their lower share in wage employment than the rest 
of the population. This figure is slightly higher for men (by 1.6pp), with a higher likelihood 
for women to be self-employed (in 27.5% of the cases vs. 35.9%), as well as unpaid family 
members (28% vs. 7.6%; Table A4.10 in Appendix 4).
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4.1.3 Unadjusted gender wage gap and labour market characteristics
In this section we focus on wage employment only, which is the sub-sample of employees 
that we use in our regresion analysis. We describe wage characteristics for men and women, 
gender differences in wages as well as the structure of wage employment in Serbia. 
The sample for the regression analysis consists of 25,580 individuals (11,271 women and 
14,309 men) for whom we observe wages in the LFS in the period from October 2008 
to October 2011. The base sample includes individuals in the age group 15-64, who work 
full-time either in the public or in the private sector28, are not in training or formal educa-
tion, and are not self-employed and/or unpaid family members29. We do not observe type 
of settlement (urban/non-urban) for October 2009.
In all regression specifications, the dependent variable is log hourly real wage30, deflated 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (using October 2008 as baseline).
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of male and female wages (15-64)
Hourly log wages Hourly wages gap (%)
Female Male
1st quintile 4.063 4.047 -1.6
2nd quintile 4.452 4.508 5.6***
3rd quintile 4.719 4.773 5.5***
4th quintile 5.032 5.051 1.8***
5th quintile 5.496 5.507 1.1
Mean 4.734 4.766 3.3
Sample 11,271 14,309
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
The mean unadjusted wage gap in Serbia is 3.3%. However, the gap differs significantly 
accross the female and male wage distribution. In order to analyse these differences we 
split the female and male samples into five wage brackets (quintiles) and than compare 
the average wage of men and women within each of the quintiles. At the lowest part of 
the distribution (lowest 20% of the wages) female wages are on average even 1.6% higher 
than male, although this difference is not statistically significant. The gap grows to 5.6% 
and 5.5% in the 2nd and 3rd quintile of the wage distribution. The gap then starts dropping 
again and becomes statistically insignificant at the top of the wage distribution (Table 4.4; 
for a more detailed discussion see section 4.2.2 of this chapter).
28  We exclude those who are working in socially owned enterprises and those who answer the ownership question in the 
survey as „other.“
29  We will later test our results for robustness separately for public and private sector workers.
30  From 2008 to 2011 definition of the wage variable within the LFS changed twice. The first change occurred between October 
2009 and October 2010, when the question on the exact wage amounts was replaced with 14 wage brackets. The second 
change occurred between April 2011 and October 2011, when the 14 wage brackets were replaced with 10 wage brackets.
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In this section we disaggregate the average unadjusted gender wage gap and average fe-
male wages by level of education, work experience, occupation, sector of activity, type of 
ownership, formal/informal contract and region31.  Since labour market characteristics of 
employed women vary in comparison to those of employed men, we also contrast these 
different gender wage gaps and female wage levels against variations in labour market 
characteristics of both genders. This is a necessary step because in the next section (in the 
econometric analysis of the wage gap) we will adjust the gender wage gap with respect to 
these variations in labour market characteristics. That step will ensure that we compare 
wages between a man and a woman with exactly the same labour market characteristics 
(instead of the average employed woman against an average employed man, who have very 
different labour market characteristics). The data on the unadjusted gender wage gap and 
labour market characteristics are summarised in the Graphs 1.5-1.7 below. 
Graph 4.5: Unadjusted gender wage gaps, 
female log wages and employment gaps, by level of education (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Oct 2008 – Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
Notes: 1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by 
level of education. Lighter circles represent those characteristics which can be found more frequently among 
employed women than among employed men (e.g. employed women more frequently have tertiary educa-
tion than employed men), while darker circles represent those characteristics which can be found more fre-
quently among employed men (e.g. employed men more frequently have secondary education than employed 
women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference between the genders by that 
particular labour market characterisic.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A4.11 in Appendix 4.
31  While graphs on education, occupation and sector of activity are shown below, data on work experience, type of owner-
ship and formal/informal contract and region can be found in Appendix 4.
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Employed women more frequently have tertiary education than employed men (the lighter 
circle in Graph 4.5), while employed men are more frequently found with primary or second-
ary education than women (the darker circles in Graph 4.5). This is because women with 
lower educational attainment more frequently stay out of the labour market. Yet, the gender 
employment gap is the least pronounced among those with primary education, i.e. only a 
slightly higher share of all working men have primary education than it is the case with 
working women (the darker circle for Primary education in Graph 4.5 is the smallest in 
surface). This is probably due to the fact that individuals with the lowest educational attain-
ment mostly work in agriculture, where female employment is almost as frequent as male. 
Based on these observations, we can conclude that the educational structure of employed 
women is much better than that of employed men. Namely, 28.5% of women in wage 
employment have tertiary education, compared to 18.5% of employed men. Only 10.6% of 
all wage-employed women have primary education and 60% have secondary, compared to 
13% for primary and 68.5% for secondary for men. We can consider this a type of discrimi-
nation against women, since in order for women to become employed, they need higher 
educational attainment on average than men do, i.e. they need to invest in their education 
more if they want to get into wage employment. 
Graph 4.5 shows that women with tertiary education earn more than women with second-
ary and primary education (the higher positioned the circle on the graph, the higher the 
pay for women with that particular characteristic represented by the circle). Therefore, 
consistent with economic expectations, wages grow with the level of education, i.e. there 
are positive returns to education in Serbia.
Graph 4.5 further shows that the difference in the average wage (the unadjusted gender 
wage gap) between women and men with primary education is the highest – 12.5% (the 
farther to the right the circle is placed, the wider the wage gap betwen women and men 
with that particular characteristic). The difference decreases with the level of education: it 
stands at 10.7% for those with secondary and at 5.1% for those with tertiary education.
The graph also clearly shows that the female wage level is negatively correlated with the 
wage gap between the genders, i.e. the higher the female wages, the lower the gap.   
In Serbia, employed women have less work experience than men. The average years of 
experience for women are 15.9, while for men they are 18.132. This advantage for men is 
mainly due to the higher share of those working for longer than 20 years. Namely, 35.5% of 
women have more than 20 years of working experience, compared to 42.5% for men (Table 
A4.12 in Appendix 4). This may be due to the fact that men are legally required to have 40 
years of work experience before they can retire, while women are allowed to retire with 35.
Wages grow and the gender gap is reduced with work experience. The unadjusted wage gap 
is higher at lower levels of work experience – up to 10 years of experience (6% and 7.3% for 
those working 0-5 years and 6-10 years respectively). On the other hand, wage differences 
among those who work 10 years or longer are low and not statically significant; for those 
working more than 20 years, the gap is even slightly in favour of women (Table A4.12 in 
32  T test confirms the statistical difference of the mean years of experience (16.02; df = 25578, p<0.01). 
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Appendix 4). In other words, women start off “slower” in terms of wage levels, but they 
manage to catch up with men over time, as they build up more work experience. This trend 
could also reflect the greater gender equality at the start of career (in socialism) for those 
with over 20-25 years of experience.
When we disaggregate the data by occupation, we observe that the difference between 
average female and male wage is higher in occupations which require lower skills and 
pay lower wages than in occupations which require higher skills and pay higher wages 
(Graph 4.6). Exceptions to this trend are Elementary occupations, which “belong” to the 
occupations with lower gaps. 
Graph 4.6: Unadjusted gender wage gaps, 
female log wages and employment gaps, by occupation (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Oct 2008 – Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
Footnotes: (a) Professionals include armed forces.
(b) Technicians and associate professionals include skilled agricultural workers.
Notes: 1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by oc-
cupation. Lighter circles represent those occupations in which women can be found more frequently than men 
(e.g. women can be found more frequently working as Clerks than men), while darker circles represent those 
occupations in which men are employed more frequently (e.g. men can be found more frequently working as 
Plant and machine operators than women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference 
in gender frequencies within each occupation.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A4.13 in Appendix 4.
Among Senior officials and managers, there are almost twice as many men as women. 
This could suggest a “glass ceiling” for women, who, although their overall educational 
structure is better than male among employees, cannot access the top positions, which pay 
the highest wages. However, this could also be the case because women have less work 
experience than men (although labour market discrimination affects duration of work 
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experience as well, so it may be a self-reinforcing mechanism). Of course, a supply side 
reason for this could be that women select away from positions with greater responsibility 
due to different preferences in comparison to men (as we discussed in the literature review). 
The fact that the unadjusted gender wage gap is low among Senior officials and managers 
suggests that those women who break the barrier and access these senior positions receive 
wages that are on average the same as male33. Adams and Funk (2011) show that female 
directors are more risk-loving than male directors, which suggest that “if women must be 
like men to break the glass ceiling, we might expect gender differences to disappear among 
directors.”
Among Clerks, women receive higher wages than men (by 4.4%) and they take up the 
majority of all positions. This is why the circle in Graph 4.6 is lighter and is on the left side 
of the x-axis. Among Professionals, where women occupy more than half of all positions, 
the difference in wages is not statistically significant, while among Technicians, the dif-
ferences in wages is also low and in the favour of men (3.7%), but statistically significant.
Among low-skill, low wage occupations women receive wages which are more than 20% 
below male wages. Among Service and sales workers, where almost one quarter of women 
work (23%) and where they make the majority of workers (56.8%), the gap is 21.3%. The 
gap is also high among Craft and trades workers and Plant and machine operators (26.7% 
and 20.2%), while female employment shares in these sectors are also significantly lower 
than male. Among the Elementary occupations, where women make a slightly higher share 
of workers (51.2%), the difference in wages is not statistically significant.
When it comes to sectors of activity, we observe a clustering of low-skill – low wage sectors vs. 
high-skill – high wage sectors (Graph 4.7). The highest differences in wages (unadjusted gender 
wage gaps) can be found in low skill sectors: Agriculture, Industry and Traditional Services (12, 
13.2 and 16.2% respectively). In both Agriculture and Industry, women work less frequently, 
while in Traditional Services they work more frequently than men (Graph 4.7). 
In Modern services, where women are found to be working more frequently than men 
(although the share of both women and men working in this sector is low - 8 and 6% 
respectively), women earn the same wages as men (the gap of 1.5% and it is not statistically 
significant). Women can most frequently be found to work in Public Services (60.7% of all 
employed women work there). However, on average, female wages in this sector are lower 
by 3.5% than male (Graph 4.7).
Women make 41% of workers in the private and 48.2% of all workers in the public sector. 
In the private sector, women earn 9.4% lower wages than men, while in the public sector 
this difference is not statistically significant (Table A4.15 in Appendix 4). Although it 
may seem attractive to rush to the conclusion that the public sector discriminates against 
women less than the private sector, we must keep in mind that workers in the public 
sector are on average better educated and there is a significantly larger portion of high-
skilled workers. As we have seen throughout this analysis, the gender wage gap shrinks 
as education and skill levels grow.
33  They are lower by 3.6% than those for male managers, but this difference is not statistically significant. 
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Graph 4.7: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by sector of activity (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
Footnotes: (a) Traditional services: Trade, HORECA, Transport. 
(b) Modern services: Communication, Financial intermediation, Real Estate, Experts. (c) Public Services: Public 
Administration, Education, Health, Social Service Activities, ET Organisations.
Notes: 1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by sector 
of activity. Lighter circles represent those sectors in which women can be found more frequently than men 
(e.g. women can be found more frequently working in Public services than men), while darker circles represent 
those sectors in which men are employed more frequently (e.g. men can be found more frequently working in 
Industry than women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference in gender frequencies 
within each sector.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A4.14 in Appendix 4.
Women have permanent contracts more often than men (90.6 vs. 87.7% of all wage 
employees) (Table A4.16 in Appendix 4). The difference in the average wage between 
the genders is statistically significant only among those with permanent contracts, where 
women earn lower wages than men (by 5.2%). The wage gap among those working with 
temporary contracts is not statistically significant (and it is slightly in favour of women). 
We also analysed gender differences between workers who have a written contract with 
their employers vs. those who do not (as a proxy for those working in the formal vs. in-
formal economy; Table A4.17 in Appendix 4). We find that the percentage of women 
working without a written contract is lower than the percentage of men by 2.4 percentage 
points (3.2% in comparison to 5.6%). When working without a written contract, the pay 
gap between women and men is significantly higher: 12.5% as opposed to 4.5% when there 
is a written contract involved34. 
34  The explanation of both gaps being higher than the average one is similar to the one next to education. Wages without a 
contract are significantly lower and thus the gap within that sub-group is effectively the gap in the lower part of the wage 
distribution. However, cutting the left side of the distribution removes extreme values, so that distribution of wages for 
those with contracts is less variable and therefore closer to the median.
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The wage gap is higher in non-urban  (8.1%) than in urban (4.0%) areas. Both genders can 
be found working predominantly in urban areas (Table A4.18 in Appendix 4). Women 
make the highest percentage of workers in Belgrade – 48.3%, where the wage gap is also 
the highest – 6.8%. This is interesting, since wage levels in Belgrade are the highest on 
average, and our data so far shows that the gap is generally lower when wages are higher 
(at the higher level of education and work experience, and in better paid occupations and 
industries). The wage gaps in the regions of Vojvodina, West Serbia and Šumadija, and 
East and South Serbia are lower than in Belgrade (3.1%, 4.5% and 4% respectively) (Table 
A4.19 in Appendix 4).
We also analyse the gap among the Roma population, but the results are not reliable due to 
the small number of Roma among the wage employed. The sample of Roma women is only 
52, and thus the value of this analysis is only anecdotal.  In the Roma population, women 
make only 22.9% of the wage-employed and their percentage in the total population of 
women is lower than 1%. The gender wage gap in the Roma population is 16.8%, but due 
to the low sample size we cannot confirm its statistical relevance (Table A4.20 in Appendix 4). 
4.2 Understanding the gap (econometric analysis)
As we have shown in the previous section, the two genders differ significantly according 
to characteristics and skill levels of women and men who work. Therefore, in this section 
we adjust the gender wage gap to reflect these differences in characteristics. In that sense, 
we move away from a simple calculation of the difference in the average wage between an 
average employed man and an average employed woman, i.e. the unadjusted pay gap, and 
reweigh it by labour market characteristics of each employed individual. We then get the 
adjusted gender wage gap, i.e. the true wage gap between the genders.
The purpose of this section is to throw more light on the reasons why the gender pay gap 
exists and persists in the Serbian labour market. Identifying factors which explain the 
gender pay gap is extremely important from the policy perspective, because only knowing 
what affects the gender pay gap can help policy makers design measures to tackle it. 
4.2.1 Mincer wage equation and Blinder-Oaxaca estimation results
Table 4.8 shows estimation results of five different specifications (S1 to S5) of the Mince-
rian wage regression35. Robustness checks (population subgroups of 19-64 and 19-59 years 
of age; wages with and without extreme values and with inclusion of part-time workers) are 
reported in Table A4.22 in Appendix 4. In all of the reported specifications, standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the robust (“sandwich”) estimator. 
The coefficient for female in specification S1, where female is the only explanatory variable, 
represents the unadjusted gender pay gap. Coefficients in specifications S2-S4 represent 
the gender pay gap adjusted for variables marked with yes. Coefficients for all explanatory 
variables in the Mincerian wage equation are reported in Table A4.21 of Appendix 4.
35  Sample definition can be found in the previous section of this chapter (page 6). We do not observe information on 
settlement (urban/rural) for October 2009 and thus we exclude this variable from the regression analysis.
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Table 4.8. Mincer equation estimation results (Specifications S1 to S5)
VARIABLES S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Female -0.033*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.105*** -0.110***
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Educ. & work experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Work-related variables (1) Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes
Sample 25,580 25,580 25,580 25,580 25,580
R-squared 0.001 0.269 0.282 0.406 0.437
RMSE 0.54 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.41
F-test 23300 1747 935 681 669
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008 – Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
 (1) Occupation (ISCO), Sector of activity (NACE), Ownership (public/private), Type of contract (temporary/
permanent; written/non-written).
Specification S1 estimates that women in Serbia, on average, have 3.3% lower hourly wages than 
men (this is also what we conclude from descriptive analysis presented in the previous section).
This gap in earnings between the genders widens to 8.5% when we account for educa-
tion and work experience (specification S2). Coefficients for the two education dummy 
variables measuring secondary and tertiary education are positive and rising with level of 
education (elementary education is the omitted category), i.e. returns to education increase 
with education, such that those with secondary and tertiary education have 27.5% and 83% 
(respectively) higher wages than individuals with elementary education only. Similarly, the 
coefficient for work experience is positive, showing that wage increases with experience 
(see Table A4.21 in Appendix 4).
Accounting for time fixed effects (year dummies; specification S3) does not change the 
coefficient for gender (nor for education and work experience), suggesting that the speci-
fication is robust. The gender wage gap increases further to 10.5% when additional job 
characteristics, such as sector of activity, occupation and type of contract, are taken into 
account (specification S4). 
Adding regional variables “pushes” the female coefficient even higher – to 11% (specifica-
tion S5). As expected, following the analysis shown in the previous section, wages are 
higher in Belgrade than in other regions (see Table A4.21 in Appendix 4). 
Coefficients for education stay positive and rising with level of education when we include 
job-specific and regional characteristics into the equation, but returns to education become 
substantially lower due to their correlation36 with these characteristics (see Table A4.21 
in Appendix 4). In other words, returns to education are overestimated in the previous 
specifications, because we do not include job characteristics. 
36  Most importantly, working as a professional correlates positively with tertiary level of education (0.62) and negatively 
with secondary level of education (-0.45); working in an elementary occupation correlates positively with primary level of 
education (0.35) and working in public sector.
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The estimates from Mincerian equations can be summarised in the basic Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, where the difference in the average log hourly wage (unadjusted gender 
wage gap) is decomposed into the explained part (due to differences in personal, job spe-
cific and regional characteristics) and the unexplained part, i.e. the adjusted gender wage 
gap (differences in returns to the same characteristics and differences due to unobservable 
differences in personal characteristics) (Table 4.9). 
From the Mincerian wage estimates and the descriptive analysis of the unadjusted gender wage 
gap in the previous section, we have seen that on average, employed women have 3.3% lower 
hourly wages than men. However, unlike the trends we observe in the Western economies (see 
literature review), the differences in labour market characteristics between men and women 
(e.g. education, work experience, job characteristics) cannot explain the gender wage gap in 
Serbia. In fact, exactly the opposite trend is in place. When personal labour market character-
istics and region are taken into account, the gap widens from 3.3% to 11% (by 7.7pp). This can 
be explained by the fact that an average employed woman in Serbia has better labour market 
characteristics than an average employed man. This occurs because a significant portion of low-
skilled women stays out of the labour market, meaning that they self-select out of employment 
due to the low opportunity cost37 of not working (higher female reservation wage at low-skill 
level). This may be due to, for example, care for children and the elderly as well as presence of 
the more traditional household models where women are exclusively in charge of reproductive 
work (especially among the less educated households). It could also be the case that discrimina-
tion of low-skilled women occurs at the point of entry into the labour market, so that they do 
not have many opportunities to obtain work. 
Although female labour supply decisions are beyond the scope of this research38, it is 
important to keep in mind that this greatly impacts the actual gender wage gap, since 
non-employment of low-skilled women increases the wage of the average working 
woman and therefore hides the real gender wage gap in the economy. In other words, if 
women who worked had the same labour market characteristics as employed men, the 
gender wage gap would be substantially larger.
Table 4.9. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition – main results (specification S5)
Coefficient Standard errors
Men (mean log-hourly wage) 4.766*** (0.005)
Women (mean log-hourly wage) 4.734*** (0.005)
Difference (unadjusted gender pay gap) 0.033*** (0.007)
Explained part -0.077*** (0.005)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.110*** (0.005)
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37 This may be further reinforced by the high levels of outmigration and strong reliance of households on remittances from 
family members working abroad.
38 Although we use Heckman selection correction to correct for self-selection into employment. See section 4.2.4 of this 
chapter for more details. 
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Differences in labour market characteristics
Graph 4.10 shows the impact of the most important labour market characteristics on the 
true (adjusted) gender pay gap and explains why it is underestimated by 7.7 percentage 
points. What makes the true gender pay gap seem smaller is that employed women on 
average have higher educational attainment and work in more senior jobs than men (but 
not in the most senior; this is also visible from descriptive statistics in the previous section). 
Moreover, women are better positioned regarding the occupation in which they work, 
meaning that they can more frequently be found working in the better-paid occupations. 
Women are also better off when it comes to the type of ownership of their employer, since 
they more frequently work in the more wage egalitarian public sector, as well as the type of 
working contract they have (they more frequently have permanent and written contracts). 
On the other hand, the fact that women on average have less work experience than men 
overestimates the true gender wage gap. 
Graph 4.10: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca BO decomposition (in percentage points) 
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
For standard errors see Table A4.23 in Appendix 4.
Notes: 1) The blue bars placed on the negative side of the x-axis represent characteristics which underesti-
mate the true gap, while the blue bars placed on the positive side overestimate the true gap (red bars refer to 
differences in returns which we discuss in the next section). 
2) Unobservables are only present under differences in returns, since they represent differences in unobservable 
characteristics which cannot be measured.
We now show the separate contribution of each of these individual labour market char-
acteristics to the gender pay gap, since Graph 4.10 (and Table A4.23 in Appendix 4) only 
shows grouped effects of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary), work experience 
(work experience and work experience squared), time (seven waves of data), occupation 
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(eight categories), and sector of activity (five categories). The statistically significant contri-
butions are summarised in the Table 4.11 below.
Differences in educational attainment between employed women and employed men 
account for 36% of the explained part of the wage gap (darker bars, 2.8 out of the 7.7pp; 
Graph 4.10), meaning that the prime ‘responsible’ labour market characteristic which 
underestimates the true wage gap is better female educational attainment. Women can 
more frequently be found working when they have tertiary education than with other levels 
of education (Graph 4.5). Since workers with tertiary education have higher wages, female 
average wages would be lower (and therefore the wage gap would be higher) if employed 
women had the same educational characteristics as employed men. This difference underes-
timates the true gap by 2.1pp (Table 4.11). On the other hand, since wages grow with work 
experience, the fact that women on average have less work experience than men (Table A4.12 
in Appendix 4) overestimates the true gender wage gap by 0.4pp (Graph 4.10). 
The gender wage gap would be higher by 2.4pp if women had the same occupational 
characteristics as men (Graph 4.10). Differences in occupational characteristics account 
for 31% of the explained part of the gap. However, unlike is the case with education, 
differences in characteristics between men and women in different occupations operate 
in different directions: while some underestimate, others overestimate the true wage gap. 
Women are more frequently found in such high wage jobs as Professionals and Technicians 
and associate professionals than in other professions, and less frequently in low wage jobs 
such as Craft and trades workers and Plant and machine operators (Graph 4.6). These dif-
ferences underestimate the gap by 1.4pp, 0.8pp, 2.1pp and 1.1pp respectively (Table 4.11). 
On the other hand, compared to men, women are less frequently found in high wage jobs 
of Senior officials and managers and more frequently in low wage jobs such as Service and 
sales workers and Elementary occupations (Graph 4.6). These differences overestimate the 
gender wage gap by 0.4pp, 1.8pp and 0.7pp respectively (Table 4.11). Additionally, a lower 
share of women among Senior officials and managers (they make only 35% of them) points 
to a different type of discrimination – the glass ceiling effect.
Overall, differences in the distribution of the genders across sectors of activity have a 
negligible and not statistically significant effect on the gender wage gap (Graph 4.10, 
darker bar for Sector of activity). However, a more detailed analysis indicates that this level 
of aggregation hides (albeit small) differences in characteristics that do actually contribute 
to the gap individually (while they cancel each other out when pooled together). Namely, 
the fact that women more often work in Modern Services and less often in Agriculture 
(Graph 4.7) underestimates the true wage gap by 0.2pp and 0.3pp respectively, while the 
fact that they can less often be found working in Industry overestimates the gap by 1pp. 
Women’s higher frequency of employment in the public sector and their lower frequency 
of employment in the private sector underestimate the true gap by 1.4pp (Graph 4.10). 
They make 18% of the explained part of the gender wage gap. Namely, since wages are 
lower in the private sector, if more women were to work in the private sector, wage differ-
ences between the genders would be higher.
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The facts that women less often have temporary contracts and less often work without 
written contracts underestimate the true gap by 0.8pp (0.4 pp each) (Graph 4.10).
Finally, regional differences underestimate the gap by 1pp and make 13% of the ex-
plained part. Higher female employment in Belgrade, where there are more jobs that are 
paid above average, and their lower employment in East and South Serbia region, where 
wages are below average, underestimate the true wage gap by 0.6pp and 0.4pp respectively 
(Table 4.11).
Table 4.11. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (specification S4)
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher 
frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-2.1pp)
Professionals (-1.4pp), Technicians 
and associate professionals (-0.8pp), 
Modern(a) services (-0.2pp)
Public sector (-0.7pp)
Permanent contract (-0.2pp)
Written contract (-0.2pp)
Belgrade region (-0.6pp)
 These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Service and sales workers (1.8pp) 
and Elementary occupations (0.7pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Lower 
frequency 
of women
Managers (0.4pp)
More work experience (0.4pp)
Industry (1pp)
  
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Primary or lower (-0.4pp) and 
secondary education (-0.3pp)
Craft and trades workers (-2.1pp) and 
Plant and machine operators (-1.1pp)
Agriculture (-0.3pp)
Private sector (-0.7pp)
Temporary contract (-0.2pp)
Non-written contract (-0.2pp)
Eastern and Southern 
Serbia region (-0.4pp)
  These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 
(without April 2010). For standard errors see Table A4.24 in Appendix 4.
Note: Number in the brackets shows how much the gap is underestimated or overestimated when not ad-
justed for the difference in the characteristic. Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each 
characteristic to adjustment of the total gap. 
Footnotes: (a) Modern services: Communication, Financial intermediation, Real Estate, Experts. 
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Differences in returns
In the previous sub-section, we analysed in detail the explained part of the gender pay gap. 
We looked at the contribution of average personal characteristics of employed women vs. 
employed men to the observed difference in their wages. In that sense, we assumed the same 
returns to the same characteristics for both genders, i.e. we assumed that employers would 
pay the same wage to a woman if she had the same labour market characteristics as a man. 
The main conclusion that stemmed from that analysis is that if women in Serbia had the 
same labour market characteristics as men, the gender pay gap would be 11%.
This unexplained, or adjusted, wage gap of 11% exists because of: i) labour market discrimi-
nation against women, in a sense that there are differences between the genders in returns 
to the same labour market characteristics, and ii) unobserved heterogeneity of workers’ 
characteristics, which we were not able to capture through variables such as education, 
work experience, occupation, etc. 
The largest share in the unexplained part of the wage gap – 90% – stems from unobserv-
able characteristics of workers (Graph 4.10, lighter bar – Unobservable characteristics), 
i.e. individual characteristics which are important for labour market valuation but go 
beyond the variables we analyse (such as education and work experience). These could 
include differences in female and male labour market behaviour which employers reward 
or punish within the same occupations and sectors of the economy, e.g. that women may 
be less flexible in terms of working hours or business trips, due to home/reproductive 
responsibilities; other non-measurable effort- and ability-related variables, as well as labour 
market frictions. Due to constraints in data availability, these unobserved characteristics 
are beyond the scope of this analysis.
On the other hand, differences in returns to personal labour market characteristics and 
choice of occupation can account for 10% of the wage gap. However, the most prominent 
among them is the difference to returns on permanent contracts, where men have higher 
returns. Since 90% of the workers in the sample are workers with permanent contracts, 
this difference is actually the difference in returns at the level of the entire sample and 
thus could also be attributed to unobservable differences. Therefore, we conclude that the 
adjusted gender wage gap cannot be explained by differences in returns at all, but rather 
that the entire adjusted gap exists due to different returns between men and women on 
unobservable characteristics.
However, our detailed analysis of differences in returns (see Table A4.3 in Appendix 4) 
points to interesting differences in returns in specific occupations and sectors. Since 
for some characteristics women have higher returns, while for some characteristics men 
have higher returns, in total differences in returns cancel each other out, and the level 
of adjusted gap is the same as the level of differences in wages due to unobservable 
characteristics. 
Although differences in returns for working in different occupations are in total statistically 
insignificant (Graph 2.3), a detailed analysis (see Table A4.24 in Appendix 4) shows that 
returns are higher for women when working as Professionals (by 0.8pp), Technicians and 
81
associate professionals (by 0.6pp), and Clerks (by 0.9pp). At the same time, these are the 
occupations with the lowest unadjusted gap (see Graph 4.6 for details). On the other hand, 
differences in returns are lower for women when working as Service and sales workers (by 
1pp) and Craft and trades workers (by 1.2pp), which are also occupations with the highest 
unadjusted gap (Graph 4.6). 
Similarly, although differences in returns for working in different sectors are in total sta-
tistically insignificant (Graph 4.10), a detailed analysis (see Table A4.24 in Appendix 4) 
shows that returns are lower for women who work in Industry (by 1.3pp). This is probably 
due to the fact that women work in those industries, such as textile production, where 
wages are lower than in other, more masculinised industries.
A detailed analysis of differences in returns (see Table A4.24 in Appendix 4) also shows 
that returns to work in the public sector are higher for women (by 1.6pp), while in the pri-
vate sector they are higher for men (by 1.4pp). However, we discuss differences in returns 
between the public and the private sector in greater detail in section 4.2.5 of this chapter. 
4.2.2 Gender pay gap at different parts of the distribution: quintile
        regressions
In the previous sub-section, we analysed the unadjusted and adjusted gender wage gaps at 
the level of the whole sample. In this section we split the sample into five wage brackets 
(quintiles) for men and women and compare the wages between men and women within 
these quintiles.
As we saw in the previous section, the main differences in labour market characteristics 
between employed women and men are the level of education and occupation. Since higher 
educational levels and high-skill – high wage occupations are associated with higher wages, 
and vice versa, the explained part of the wage gap becomes significantly lower once we 
split the sample into wage quintiles. In other words, splitting the sample automatically 
corrects for some of the differences between the average employed woman and the average 
employed man at the level of the entire wage distribution, since the two become a lot 
more similar once they are compartmentalised according to wage levels. Thus, the adjusted 
wage gaps shown in this analysis are much lower and they are not comparable to the 
adjusted wage gap for the population as a whole (which stands at 11%). However, they are 
comparable between the different quintiles.
From Graph 4.12 (and Table A4.25 in Appendix 4) we see that both the unadjusted and 
the adjusted wage gap vary significantly across the wage deciles. At the bottom of the 
distribution (the lowest 20% of all wages) female wages are on average 1.6% higher than 
male (unadjusted gap), although this difference is not statistically significant. Female 
characteristics in this part of the distribution are better than male, so they underestimate 
the gap by 2.2 percentage points (mainly due to the higher share of permanent and written 
contracts). Once we correct for these differences, the adjusted gap becomes positive, i.e. 
men have 0.5% higher wages than women among the lowest 20% of wage earners, but this 
difference stays statistically insignificant. 
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At the top of the distribution (the highest 20% of all wages) female wages are lower than 
male by 1.1% (unadjusted gap), although this difference is not statistically significant. 
Again, female characteristics in this part of the distribution are better than male, so they 
serve to underestimate the gap by 3.2 percentage points, mainly due to the higher share 
of female workers with tertiary education and their more frequent employment among 
Professionals. Once we correct for these differences, the adjusted gap grows to 4.4% and it 
is statistically significant. 
The largest unadjusted and adjusted gaps can be found within the 2nd and the 3rd quin-
tile of the wage distribution, and they stand at 5.6% and 5.5% respectively. Since female 
characteristics do not differ significantly from male within these two wage quintiles (row 
Explained part), the adjusted gap stays approximately the same as the unadjusted gap 
(5.8% for the 2nd and 5.4% for the 3rd quintile). 
The unadjusted gap for the 4th quintile is 1.8%. Female characteristics within this quintile 
are slightly better than male (row Explained part), due to their slightly better positioning 
regarding practically all labour market characteristics (education, occupation, sector of 
activity and ownership). Therefore, once we correct for these better female characteristics, 
the adjusted gap becomes 3%. 
Graph 4.12: Unadjusted and adjusted gaps 
in different quintiles of the wage distribution 
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008 – Oct 2011 (without April 2010). 
For standard errors see Table A4.25 in Appendix 4.
From Graph 4.12 we can see that the explained portion of the gap (difference between 
the unadjusted and adjusted gap), which occurs due to differences in labour market char-
acteristics between the genders, is higher at the top end of the distribution, which means 
that women at the top end of the wage distribution on average have better labour market 
characteristics compared to men, more so than is the case in the lower parts of the wage 
distribution. Since we expect these trends to differ between the public and the private 
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sector, we will discuss this pattern in greater detail in the section below, which compares 
the wage gap by type of ownership.  
Results of the quantile regression analysis, which serve as a robustness check to the 
analysis above, point to similar conclusions. The unadjusted gaps are significantly lower 
at the higher levels of the wage distribution (at the 75th and 90th percentile), than at the 
lower percentiles and median (they are the highest at the 25th percentile). However, when 
adjusted for gender differences in labour market characteristics, the differences in the gap 
become less prominent since female characteristics in the upper parts of the distribution 
are better than male (see Graph A4.27 in Appendix 4).
4.2.3 Gender pay gap before/after the financial crisis: separate waves 
In this section we apply the same methodology as above on each of the seven LFS waves 
separately in order to observe changes in trends through time. This allows us to observe 
changes in trends through time, which is particularly relevant because our analysis covers 
the period of economic crisis, which impacted the Serbian labour market in 2009 (therefore 
we use the wave from Q4 2008 as pre-crisis baseline). 
In this period, the definition of the wage variable within the LFS changed twice. The first 
change occurred between October 2009 and October 2010 and it involved replacing the 
question on the exact wage amounts with an option to select one of the 14 wage brackets 
the individual belongs to. During this period, male wages dropped by 6.1%, while female 
wages dropped by 4.6%. We would have expected this switch from exact reporting of wages 
to wage brackets to reduce the previous underreporting of wages for both genders and 
hence induce wage increases that would not have been the result of labour market dynam-
ics, but rather of methodological changes.
At the same time, the period we analyse was also the period of the strongest impact of 
the global economic crisis on the Serbian labour market. During this period, wages in the 
public sector were frozen (which led to their drop in real terms) and anecdotal evidence 
indicates that many employers in the private sector cut wages in order to cope with the 
negative impact of the crisis without having to fire their workers. Yet, we expect that the 
real drops in wages were partially hidden by the increase in reported wages, which occurred 
due to the methodological changes we discuss above. Therefore, we can say that the real 
wage drops in this period are underestimated for both genders. 
The second methodological change occurred between April 2011 and October 2011, when 
14 wage brackets were replaced with 10 wage brackets. During this period, we saw signifi-
cant growth of wages: female wages grew by 13.7%, while male grew by 15.8% (Graph 4.13 
and Table A4.28 in Appendix 4). While this methodological change could have led to a 
further increase in the self-reported wages (as switching from 14 to 10 brackets increases 
the width of each bracket), we also need to keep in mind that this was the period of recovery 
from the economic crisis, and that wages in the public sector were finally “unfrozen,” which 
may have also impacted this wage growth. In other words, although part of the observed 
wage growth could be attributed to methodological changes, we do not expect this effect 
to have been very strong. 
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Due to these methodological irregularities, we will analyse separately the period between 
October 2008 and October 2009 and between October 2010 and April 2011 and then 
report the wage gap for October 2011 separately. However, there is no reason to believe 
that this change of question would have impacted the reporting of female vs. male wages 
differently (it would cause an equal reduction in under-reporting of wages for both gen-
ders). For that reason, in spite of the potential changes in wages levels across the waves, the 
changes in gaps remain reliable. 
In the first observed period, between October 2008 and October 2009, the unadjusted 
gender pay gap fell by 4pp from 6.2% to the statistically insignificant 2.3% (Graph 4.13 
and Table A4.28 in Appendix 4). This fall was due to higher growth of female wages in 
this period: female wages grew by 5.6%, while male grew by 1.8% (Graph 4.13 and Table 
A4.28 in Appendix 4). Since the explained part of the gap remained at approximately the 
same level between the years (it fell by 1pp, statistically insignificant39), the adjusted gap 
followed the same trend as the unadjusted, so it fell by 4.9pp from 15.5% to 10.6% (Graph 
4.13). The shrinking of the wage gap in this period could probably be explained by the fact 
that the economic crisis had a stronger impact on masculinised sectors (and occupations) 
of the economy (e.g. construction, industrial production) than the feminised ones, which 
could have served to narrow the wage gap (as well as the employment gap). However, as the 
shrinking of the gap in this period occurred due to the more negative impact of the crisis 
on men, and also because there are more men in employment than women, we may also 
expect the gap to grow back to pre-crisis levels as the masculinised sectors recover. 
Graph 4.13. Trends of male and female log hourly wages (left panel) and BO 
decomposition components (right panel), between Oct. 2008 and Oct. 2011
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For standard errors see Table A4.28 in Appendix 4.
The second period we analyse, between October 2010 and April 2011, starts with the 
statistically insignificant unadjusted gap of 0.8% (Graph 4.13 and Table A4.28 in Ap-
39  Since there is no formal test that we could use to assess the statistical significance of the unadjusted gap difference, we 
compared the confidence intervals between two adjusted gaps. Since the confidence intervals for the gaps do not overlap 
we can conclude that the difference between adjusted gaps is statistically significant.
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pendix 4) and rises to 2.2% (also statistically insignificant), due to a faster fall of female 
wages than male (female wages fell by 7.9%, while male fell by 7.1%). The explained part 
of the gap remained almost the same in this period (7.8pp in October 2010 and 7.4pp in 
April 2011, Table A4.28 in Appendix 4) and thus the adjusted gap followed the trend of 
the unadjusted: it rose from 8.7% to 9.5% (the rise was statistically insignificant; Graph 
4.13 and Table A4.28 in Appendix 4). 
Gap growth in the period between October 2010 and April 2011, although statistically 
insignificant, is important because it may indicate a shift in the trend of the gender gap 
decline observed in the previous period. Especially since over the next period (October 
2011), the unadjusted gap rises to the statistically significant level of 4% (Graph 4.13 and 
Table A4.28 in Appendix 4). Although changes throughout the period are not fully meth-
odologically comparable, the rise in the unadjusted gaps in last two periods may suggest 
the slow returning of the gap to its pre-crisis level. This could confirm out hypothesis that 
the narrowing of the gap was only a temporary outcome of the stronger negative impact of 
the crisis on male than female returns to characteristics. 
However, while the unadjusted gap rose by 3.2pp between October 2010 and October 
2011, the adjusted gap remained at the same level (Graph 4.13 and Table A4.28 in Ap-
pendix 4). This suggests that women have lost some of their advantages in labour market 
characteristics in comparison to men during the second part of the crisis period we observe. 
More specifically, the explained part of the gap dropped by 3.4pp (from 7.8pp to 4.4pp), 
mainly due to the decreasing impact of differences in occupational characteristics between 
the genders. This seems to be due to the fact that more women than men with tertiary 
education lost their jobs during the crisis (employment for men with tertiary educa-
tion dropped by 0.6pp, while for women this drop amounted to 4.9pp), so the overall 
characteristics of women who remained in employment worsened relative to male. 
4.2.4 Heckman selection model
The basic idea of the Heckman selection model is to account for the effects of self-selection, 
i.e. a person’s decision not to work, on the pay gap (assuming that not being in employment 
is at one’s will). Since a large number of those out of employment in Serbia are not “will-
ingly out of work,” but they are unemployed (unemployment rate is 20% for women and 
18% for men), we follow the aproach in Beblo et al. (2003) and eliminate the unemployed 
from the sample of non-employed, and keep only the inactive ones40. We further follow 
Beblo et al. (2003) in dropping those who are (i) students and other inactive under 19 years 
of age, (ii) pensioners and other inactive older than 60 and (iii) people with disabilities. The 
aim of these restrictions is to have a homogeneous sample of those who are “voluntarily” 
inactive.
Results of the Heckman estimation procedure show that self-selection is a statistically 
significant factor for both men and women. For both genders the sign is negative, suggest-
ing that wages have a negative correlation with the probability of being in employment. 
40  In this case we do not follow Beblo et al. (2003) to narrow the sample to the 22-54 group, since the basic results of the 
estimation are the same as for the 15-64 subsample.
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The signs and the size of the coefficients in the selection equation are as expected and they 
show that the probability of being employed is (see Table A4.30 in Appendix 4): 
(i) higher for those with higher education, 
(ii) lower for women with children of any age (the sign of the coeficient is higher as 
the age of the children is lower),
(iii) lower for women who have partners and higher for men who have partners,
(iv) higher for younger and older working age population members.
Column “without selection effect correction” in Table 4.14 shows the results of the BO 
decomposition without applying Heckman’s selection procedure. As we already mention 
in the previous sections of this chapter, the unadjusted gap of 3.3% in Serbia is underesti-
mated due to better female labour market characteristics (by 7.7pp), and the adjusted gap 
stands at 11%. 
Table 4.14. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with 
and without selection correction
Without selection 
correction
With selection 
correction
Men (mean log-hourly wage) 4.766*** 4.854***
(0.005) (0.007)
Women (mean log-hourly wage) 4.734*** 4.890***
(0.005) (0.010)
Difference (unadjusted gender pay gap) 0.033*** -0.036***
(0.007) (0.012)
Explained part -0.077*** -0.077***
(0.005) (0.005)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.110*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.011)
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Since workers (both men and women) with a low predicted probability of participation 
are predicted to earn less than workers with similar productivity endowment (i.e. labour 
market characteristics) but with a higher predicted probability of participation, their wages 
should be corrected upward. Since rho coeficient for women is higher than for men (Table 
A4.30 in Appendix 4), their wages are corrected upwards more than male: by 15.6% vs. 
8.8% (Table 2.7).
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Since the selection effect of 6.6pp (calculated as the differential between correction of 
wages for the two genders = 15.6% - 8.8%) is higher than the unadjusted pay gap of 3.3%, 
the corrected unadjusted pay gap changes the sign and becomes negative at -3.6%. The 
explained part of the BO decomposition stays at the same level and underestimates the 
adjusted gap by 7.7pp, making the Heckman corrected adjusted gap positive again at 4.1% 
(Table 4.14, column “with selection effect correction”). 
In other words, the level of the unadjusted gap of 3.3% overestimates the true gap by 6.6 
percentage points, due to the fact that men have a higher probability of being employed 
than women (depending on education, age, number of children and marital status). The 
true gap is underestimated by 7.7 percentage points, due to better labour market charac-
teristics of employed women (education, occupation, sector of activity, etc.). These effects 
combined result in the adjusted wage gap of 4.1%. Therefore, when we compare the results 
with and without the effect of selection, we can conclude that the selection effect of 6.6pp 
can explain 60% of the unexplained part of the gap, i.e. a significant part of the adjusted 
gap (6.6pp out of 11%). 
To summarise these findings further, let us review what we explained in the methodology 
chapter: because working may be systematically correlated with the unobservables that 
affect the offered wage, those in employment will tend to have higher wages than those 
not in employment (that might be the reason why they are not in employment in the first 
place). The Heckman procedure serves to remove this bias from our results, by correct-
ing for the fact that unobservable characteristics that affect both the probability of being 
employed and wages are better rewarded by the market for men than for women, which 
shrinks the unexplained part of the gap. Therefore, the different returns to unobservables 
for men and women that we see from the BO decomposition, which account for 90% of 
the adjusted gender wage gap, can partially be explained by self-selection. 
4.2.5 Gender wage gap across type of ownership: private vs. public
          sector analysis
In this section we compare the gender pay gap between the private and public sector in 
Serbia41. Due to the strong labour market duality in the Western Balkans, where the public 
and the private sectors operate under different “rules of the game,” this analysis can provide 
important policy insights.
On average, for both women and men, wages are higher in the public than in the private 
sector. This difference is higher for women, since their average wage in the private sector 
is by 42.2% lower than their average wage in the public sector. This difference for men 
stands at 34.5% (Table 4.15 and Graph 4.16, left panel).
41  For the public sector analysis we exclude the impact of written contract variable, since more than 99% of workers in the 
public sector have a written contract. In the private sector this percentage is significantly lower (10% of men and 6% of 
women work without written contracts) so we keep this variable.
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Table 4.15. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition,
separately for public and private sectors 
Public Private Difference
Men (log hourly wage) 4.976*** 4.631*** 34.5%
(0.006) (0.006)
Women (log hourly wage) 4.960*** 4.538*** 42.2%
(0.007) (0.007)
Difference (unadjusted pay gap) 0.016* 0.094*** 7.8pp
(0.009) (0.009)
Explained part -0.058*** -0.017*** -4.1pp
(0.007) (0.006)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.075*** 0.110*** 3.6pp
(0.008) (0.008)
Sample 10,844 14,736
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data for Serbia, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
† Detailed BO decomposition for public/private sector is available in Appendix (Table A4.35). 
Consequently, the unadjusted wage gap is higher in the private than in the public sec-
tor. While it stands at 9.4% in the private sector, the gap of 1.6% in the public sector is 
not statistically significant (Table 4.15 and Graph 4.16, right panel).
Graph 4.16. Male and female log hourly wages (left panel) and wage gaps
(right panel) in the private and public sectors in Serbia
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data for Serbia, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
However, once we adjust the wage gap to account for the different labour market char-
acteristics between men and women in the two sectors, the gap widens significantly in 
the public sector – from 1.6% to 7.5%, while it grows only slightly in the private sector 
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– from 9.4% to 11% (Table 4.15 and Graph 4.16, right panel)42. This is because women in 
the public sector have better labour market characteristics than men, which is not the case 
in the private sector. 
Differences in characteristics in the public vs. the private sector
The most important labour market characteristics that underestimate the gender pay gap 
in the public sector are the effects of education and occupation. Better female positioning 
regarding these two characteristics underestimates the gap by 3.7pp and 2.8pp respectively 
(darker bars for education and occupation in Graph 4.17 are on the left side of the y-axis). 
Additionally, women in the public sector are better off regarding regional location of their 
employment (i.e. more women work in regions characterised by higher wages), which also 
underestimates the gap by 1pp (darker bar for Region in Graph 4.17 is also on the left 
side of the y-axis). On the other hand, men are better positioned regarding the sector of 
activity (i.e. they more frequently work in the better paid sectors) and work experience 
(darker bars for these two variables in Graph 4.17 are on the right side of the y-axis), which 
overestimates the gap by 1.3 and 0.3pp respectively. 
Graph 4.17: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by sector of ownership 
– explained part – the impact of differences in characteristics between 
the genders on the gender wage gap (in percentage points)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data for Serbia, waves Oct 2008 – Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
In the private sector, labour market characteristics of individuals underestimate the gap 
to a far lesser extent than in the public sector (by 1.9pp in comparison to 5.9pp in the 
public sector; lighter bar for Total in Graph 4.17 is much smaller than the purple bar). 
42  We omit the variable for type of working contract (temporary/permanent) from the wage analysis.
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This is the result of the fact that some labour market characteristics of employed women 
are better than those of employed men, while others are worse. More specifically, employed 
women are better off in terms of educational attainment, they have a higher number of 
written contracts and they more frequently work in regions where wages are higher. These 
characteristics underestimate the gap by 1.4, 0.9 and 0.9pp respectively (lighter bars for 
these variables in Graph 4.17 are on the left side of the y-axis). On the other hand, men 
are better positioned in terms of (better paid) occupations and they have more work experi-
ence. These characteristics overestimate the gap by 1.2 and 0.6 pp respectively (lighter 
bars for these variables in Graph 4.17 are on the right side of the y-axis). The coefficients 
obtained for sector of activity are not statistically significant. 
Table 4.18. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the public sector 
– explained part – detailed impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap 
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-3.2pp)
Professionals (-1.7pp), 
Technicians and associate 
professionals (-1.2pp), 
Belgrade region (-0.4pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Elementary occupations (1.7pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Lower frequency
 of women
Managers (0.6pp)
More work experience (0.3pp)
Industry (1.1pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Secondary education (-0.5pp)
Service and sales workers 
(-0.5pp) Craft and trades 
workers (-1.5pp) and Plant and 
machine operators (-0.5pp)
Eastern and Southern 
Serbia region (-0.5pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data for Serbia, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 
(without April 2010). Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each characteristic 
to adjustment of the total gap.
Note: Number in the brackets shows how much is unadjusted gap underestimated or overestimated 
by the difference in the characteristic. Negative sign shows underestimation, while positive shows 
overestimation. For standard errors see Table A4.35 in Appendix 4.
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Table 4.18 summarises the explained part of the unadjusted gap in the public sector. The 
most important positive female labour market characteristic is a 13pp more frequent pres-
ence of women (in comparison to all employed women) in high wage jobs, which require 
tertiary education (41.5% of all women vs. 28.5% of all employed men) and an 8.6pp more 
frequent presence of women among Professionals (27.2% of all women vs. 18.8% of all 
men) (Table A4.35 in Appendix 4). These characteristics lower the gap by 3.2 and 1.7pp 
respectively. Additional better female characteristics are their higher frequency in high 
wage occupations such as Technicians; and their lower frequency in low pay occupations 
that require secondary education, such as Craft and trades workers, Plant and machine op-
erators and Service and sales workers. Furthermore, women less frequently work in Eastern 
and Southern Serbia, which is a region characterised by the lowest wages (see Table A4.35 
in Appendix 4 for differences in characteristics). 
On the other hand, the most important worse female than male labour market characteris-
tics, which work to overestimate the unadjusted pay gap in the public sector, are their lower 
frequency in Industry (32% of all men employed in the public sector work in Industry, which 
is in public ownership, vs. 8.9% of all women employed in the public sector) and their higher 
frequency in low wage Elementary occupations (14.4% of all women employed in the public 
sector vs. 8.6% of men; Table A4.35 in Appendix 4). These characteristics overestimate the 
gap by 1.1pp and 1.7pp respectively (Figure 2.11). Additional worse female than male char-
acteristics are a lower frequency of women in high pay occupations such as Senior officials 
and managers, and their lower average working experience (see Table A4.7 in Appendix 4 for 
differences in characteristics and Figure 2.11 for the size of the impact on the gap). If these 
characteristics were the same the unadjusted gap in the public sector would be higher.
In total, better female than male labour market characteristics among those working 
in the public sector prevail over the worse ones, so that the overall unadjusted gap is 
underestimated, i.e. it would be higher (by 6pp) if women were to have the same char-
acteristics as men.
The most important better female than male characteristics in the private sector are the 
lower frequency of women among Craft and trades workers (11% of all privately employed 
women vs. 30% of men) and their lower frequency among Plant and machine operators 
(4.7% of all privately employed women vs. 19% of men; Table A4.35 in Appendix 4), 
which underestimate the gap by 2.5 and 1.5pp respectively (Table 4.19). Additionally, 
better female than male characteristics are their higher frequency in high wage jobs, which 
require tertiary education, their higher frequency among Professionals, Technicians and 
associate professionals, and their higher frequency in Modern services. Moreover, more 
women in the private sector have permanent and written contracts than men, which we 
can explain by the fact that women are more concerned about the non-pecuniary aspects 
of jobs, such as job quality, and they self-select away from the more precarious types of 
employment. Women also more frequently work in Belgrade, where wages are higher than 
in other regions, and they have a lower frequency in low wage jobs, such as those which 
require primary education only, are located in the sector of Agriculture and in Eastern and 
Southern Serbia, where wages are the lowest of all regions (see Table A4.35 in Appendix 
4 for differences in characteristics and Table 4.19 for the size of the impact on the gap).
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Table 4.19. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the private sector 
– explained part – detailed impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-0.9pp)
Professionals (-0.4pp), technicians 
and associate professionals (-0.3pp)
Modern(a) services (-0.3pp) 
Written contract (-0.5pp)
Belgrade region (-0.7pp)
These characteristics make the 
true gap seem smaller.
Service and sales workers (5.4pp) 
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Lower frequency 
of women
More work experience (0.8pp)
Industry (0.6pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Primary education (-0.5pp)
Craft and trades workers 
(-2.5pp), Plant and machine 
operators (-1.5pp)
 Agriculture (-0.4pp)
Non-written contract (-0.5pp)
Eastern and Southern 
Serbia region (-0.2pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data for Serbia, waves Oct 2008 – Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each characteristic to adjustment of the total gap.
Note: Number in the brackets shows how much is unadjusted gap underestimated or overestimated by the 
difference in the characteristic. Negative sign shows underestimation, while positive shows overestimation.
For standard errors see Table A4.35 in Appendix 4.
The most important worse female than male labour market characteristic in the private 
sector is their higher frequency among Service and sales workers (38% of all privately 
employed women vs. 15% of men, Table A4.35 in Appendix 4), which widens the gap by 
5.4pp. Additionally, women can less frequently be found in high wage jobs among Senior 
officials and managers and in the better paid jobs which require more work experience, as 
well as in Industry (see Table A4.35 in Appendix 4 for differences in characteristics and 
Table 4.19 for the size of the impact on the gap). 
In total, better female than male labour market characteristics among those working 
in the private sector slightly prevail over the worse ones, so that the overall unadjusted 
gap is underestimated, i.e. it would be higher (by 1.9pp) if women were to have the same 
characteristics as men.
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In summary, sources of the explained part of the wage gap differ between the private 
and the public sector. In the private sector, labour market characteristics of individuals 
underestimate the gap to a far lesser extent than in the public sector. In the public sec-
tor, female employees are better off in terms of educational attainment and occupation, 
which serves to hide the real extent of differences in wages between the two genders. In 
other words, women working in the public sector on average have better education and 
work in better jobs, so if there were no discrimination, the average female wage in the 
public sector should be above male. Region is also a strong source of the differences in the 
public sector. This is probably due to the fact that the entire national level administration, 
which employs more women and offers higher wages than sub-national, i.e. municipal 
administrations, is located in Belgrade. The low unadjusted gap (difference between the 
average male and female wage) in the public sector is therefore greatly underestimated, 
so that once we correct for the fact that women in the public sector have better labour 
market characteristics than men working in the public sector, the wage gap grows from 
1.6 to 7.5%. 
Differences in labour market characteristics between the genders are a lot less pro-
nounced in the private sector. Therefore, the wage gap in the private sector is not hidden 
by better female characteristics, so it is a lot more visible. This leads to a false impression 
that the wage gap is a lot more pronounced in the private than in the public sector. Yet, 
the adjusted gender wage gap in the two sectors differs by only 3.5pp (7.5% in public vs. 
11% in private).
Differences in returns in the public vs. the private sector
The adjusted gender wage gap in the public sector cannot be explained even partially by 
differences in returns. On the contrary, returns to all observable characteristics are slightly 
higher for women than for men on average (the part of the gap due to average differences 
in returns is negative), so this effect cancels out some of the male advantage which is due to 
“better” unobservable characteristics. Thus, in the public sector, differences in unobservable 
characteristics between men and women are actually larger by 4pp (11.5% vs. 7.5%) than 
the total unexplained part of the wage gap, i.e. the adjusted wage gap (the darker bar for 
unobservable characteristics in Graph 4.20 below is longer than the darker bar for Total). 
The slightly higher average returns for women in the public sector hide the fact that in 
some cases women have higher returns, while in others, they have lower returns on the 
same labour market characteristics than men. Most importantly, returns on observable 
characteristics are higher for women when it comes to occupation, i.e. women are better 
paid than men (ceteris paribus) when working as Professionals (by 2.2pp), Technicians (by 
2.5%) and Clerks (by 0.9pp, Table A4.35 in Appendix 4).  On the other hand, men are 
better paid than women (ceteris paribus) when working as Service and sales workers (by 
1pp). Additionally, men have higher returns on education (by 1.2pp), meaning that the fact 
that they have higher education makes them earn more in the public sector on average than 
is the case for women. 
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Therefore, male unobservable characteristics are better awarded than female when it 
comes to the public sector and they seem to be the main culprit for the existence of 
the wage gap between the two genders in the public sector. This may also be the effect 
of discrimination, in the sense that men with certain labour market characteristics are 
better able to negotiate and obtain higher wages than their female counterparts with 
the same characteristics.  
Graph 4.20. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by sector of ownership 
– unexplained part – the impact of differences in returns to characteristics 
and differences in unobservable characteristics between the genders 
on the gender wage gap (in percentage points)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
The situation is the opposite in the private sector, where differences in returns on 
average are higher for men. The wage gap, which is due to differences in unobservable 
characteristics between the genders, stands at 6.4% (Graph 4.20). In other words, differ-
ences in returns to the same characteristics can account for 42% of the adjusted gap, while 
differences in unobservable characteristics can account for the remaining 58%.
Most importantly, returns are higher for men in Industry (by 1.3pp) and in Traditional 
Services (1.2pp), as well as in occupations such as Craft and trades workers (by 0.9pp, Table 
A4.35 in Appendix 4).  On the other hand, returns are higher for women in occupations 
such as Clerks (by 1.1pp). It is important to note that sectors of activity and occupations 
are correlated, since it may be the case that some sectors are simply doing better than 
others, so that wages are higher for everyone, sales workers and professionals included.
In summary, the private sector is characterised by more explicit discrimination than the 
public sector, as the presence of lower returns to characteristics for females indicates, 
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but this could also be because there are more sectors in the private sector, so the wage 
dispersion is wider, and it may be very sector specific, rather than due to the fact that 
private employers discriminate more.
Differences along the wage distribution in the public vs. the private sector
In this section we analyse the wage gap at the different ponts of the wage distribution 
in the public and private sectors separately. We split the sample into five wage brackets 
(quintiles) and compare differences in wages between men and women within these wage 
quintiles43. 
In the public sector, the unadjusted gap is the lowest at the top (among the top 20% of all 
wages) and the bottom (among the lowest 20% of all wages) parts of the wage distribution 
(2.3% and 2.4% respectively) and it is the highest in the middle parts of the distribution 
(4.6%, 4.0% and 4.6 for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintile). On the other hand, the adjusted wage 
gap is distributed slightly more evenly across the wage distribution, since differences in 
characteristics have the highest impact exactly at the top and the bottom parts of the 
distribution. Therefore, once we correct for these differences, the wage gap increases both 
at the bottom and the top of the wage distribution (Graph 4.21). 
At both the top and the bottom of the wage distribution in the public sector, female labour 
market characteristics are better than male, so they underestimate the true gap. The most 
important characteristic at the top of the wage distribution, which underestimates the wage 
gap, is women’s higher frequency among Professionals and the higher share of women with 
tertiary education within this group. The female advantage in characteristics at the bottom 
of the wage distribution is mainly caused by the lower frequency of women among the low 
skill Elementary occupations, as well as their lower share in employment in East and South 
Serbia, where wages are the lowest in the country (Table A4.37 in Appendix 4). This is 
very intuitive, given the labour market trends in Serbia, where women with the worst 
skills often self-select out of the labour force because they cannot earn more than their 
reservation wage. On the other hand, women need better labour market characteristics 
to be able to enter into the top paid positions in the public sector than men do.
In the middle of the wage distribution (within the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles), women still 
have better characteristics than men, but to a lesser extent (the explained part of the gap 
is 0.6, 0.5 and 0.7 respectively). The most important advantage of women within the 2nd 
and 3rd quintiles is their higher frequency among Technicians, while within the 4th quintile, 
women are more likely to have tertiary education than men (Table A4.37 in Appendix 4).
43  We drop the dummy variables for year effects in the BO decomposition analysis. Our preliminary analysis showed a 
significant impact of time effects on the explained part of the gap, which is impossible to interpret, due to the variation in 
the definition of the wage variable throughout the years. Namely, the interpretation of this coefficient would compare par-
ticipation of men and women in survey waves and interpret the differences as higher participation in years where the wages 
were higher. As already discussed in section 3.5 of our analysis, there are some methodological issues with comparisons of 
wage levels across years, so the impact of this variable on the explained part cannot be interpreted. 
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 Graph 4.21: Unadjusted and adjusted pay gap at different points in the wage
distribution for public (left panel) and private sector (right panel)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Oct 2008–Oct 2011 (without April 2010).
A somewhat different trend emerges in the private sector. The unadjusted gap is the lowest 
(3.3%) at the bottom quintile of the wage distribution (within the lowest 20% of all wages) 
and it rises until the middle of the distribution, where it reaches its peak of 12.3% and then 
drops to 10.4% at the top of the wage distribution (within the highest 20% of all wages). 
Differences in labour market characteristics between the genders, similarly to the public 
sector, are most pronounced at the top and bottom parts of the wage distribution (Table 
A4.38 in Appendix 4). The explained part of the gap is the highest at the top and the 
bottom of the wage distribution (3.6pp vs. 2.2pp respectively), while it is close to zero in 
the middle of the distribution (it is 0.4pp or lower for all three quintiles). 
The most important characteristic at the top of the wage distribution is the better overall 
education of women. The female advantage at the bottom of the wage distribution is 
mainly caused by the fact that women more often have written contracts than men, i.e. they 
are less likely to work in the informal sector (Table A4.39 in Appendix 4). This is rather 
intuitive, as female labour supply is more wage elastic than male (because they choose 
between reproductive work, leisure and paid work, while men choose between leisure and 
paid work only), so women are more likely to select away from employment when wages 
are too low. Furthermore, women are more concerned with the quality of employment, so 
as second earners in the household they can “afford” to self-select away from precarious 
employment without written contracts (see literature review for details). On the other 
hand, and similarly to the trends observed in the public sector, women need better labour 
market characteristics to be able to enter into the top paid positions in the private sector 
than men do.
Differences in characteristics affect the adjusted wage gap differently across the quintiles: 
while it is still the lowest at the bottom part of the distribution, it is the highest at the 
top of the distribution, suggesting a glass ceiling effect, which means that it is more 
difficult for women to access the best paid positions in the private sector.
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5. Gender Pay Gap in Macedonia
5.1 Labour market trends in Macedonia
5.1.1 Main labour market indicators 
Female employment rate in Macedonia is significantly lower than male. Employment gap 
between the genders stood at an average of -18.6 percentage points during the analysed 
period (Q4 2008 - Q4 2011). Since female unemployment rate is only 0.8 percentage 
points below male, the observed gap in employment is mostly a reflection of substantial 
female inactivity, which is by 26.8 percentage points higher than male (Graph 5.1). 
Graph 5.1: Main labour market indicators, Q4 2008 – Q4 2011
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Although the global economic crisis hit Macedonia during the analysed period, no signifi-
cant changes in the main labour market indicators for either gender have been observed. 
Gender gap in employment decreased only slightly – by 1 percentage point, as female 
employment rate grew by 2.1 and male by 1.1 percentage points. According to World 
Bank (2011), Macedonia experienced a small employment contraction, or even expanded 
employment during the crisis relative to its GDP fall (World Bank 2011, p.27). 
Female unemployment rate decreased by 0.9 percentage points more than male (albeit 
from a higher level), while female inactivity rate fell by 1.3 percentage points and male 
remained at the same level (Graph 5.1). In fact, Macedonia is the only ECA country where 
unemployment decreased during the crisis (World Bank 2011, p.27). 
The fact that women increased their labour market participation in Macedonia during the 
economic crisis could be understood as a coping mechanism of households facing income 
shocks – adding a family member to the labour market or replacing a family member 
who lost their employment. The fact that the overall employment rate did not increase 
substantially and that there were some changes between types of employment indicates 
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that labour churning44 may have been a significant characteristic of labour market adjust-
ment to the crisis. However, without the analysis of flows in and out of employment, we 
cannot see whether people switched to jobs of worse quality. The fact that we observe a 
small increase in self-employment rates during the crisis (by 0.3 percentage points among 
women and 1.4 among men, Graph 5.3) may indicate that the recession pushed people 
into self-employment out of economic necessity (rather than market opportunity), which 
would certainly represent cases of last resort employment of almost certainly worse quality 
than wage employment. At the same time, an active labour market policy implemented by 
the Macedonian government during the period, which focused on self-employment, may 
have partially affected these trends45. 
Finally, it is important to recognise demand side constraints (i.e. unavailability of additional 
work), which are particularly pertinent during an economic downturn and which may have 
limited further increases in female employment.
Mojsoska-Blaževski (2011) suggests a possibility that the crisis did not have a strong 
impact on the Macedonian labour market because government reform of labour taxes may 
have offered enough financial space to companies to keep their workers (p.84). Namely, 
Macedonia reduced social contributions from 32 to 26.9 percent of gross wages in 2009, 
essentially reducing the cost to hire or keep workers (World Bank 2011, p.14). The effect 
of the crisis on job loss may have also been reduced because of rigid regulations on firing 
workers, which made it very difficult for companies to reduce numbers of employees. 
When we disaggregate the main labour market indicators by level of education, the gender 
employment gap is the highest among individuals who only completed primary school. 
The gap amounts to 23.6 percentage points in comparison to 12.7 for those who completed 
secondary and 7.8 for those with tertiary education (Graph 5.2, left panel). 
Employment gap among those with primary and secondary education is caused by the 
lower activity of the low-skilled women (39.4 and 17.2 percentage points respectively; 
Table A5.1 in Appendix 5).46 At the same time, gender gap in unemployment is not high 
among the low-skill cohorts of the population (-0.6 and 1.4 percentage points respectively). 
This indicates that a large portion of women with low educational attainment choose not 
to supply their labour to the market. According to a World Bank (2008) study, the majority 
of inactive women stated they wanted to work but felt discouraged by the current situation 
in the labour market so they stopped searching for work altogether. 
On the other hand, the gender employment gap among individuals with the highest edu-
cational attainment is mainly due to higher unemployment among women than among 
men (unemployment gap amounts to 7.3 percentage points) and to a lesser extent due to 
higher female inactivity (inactivity gap amounts to 2.4 percentage points). This suggests 
44  Changes in labour market status or type of employment, such as episodes of wife entering labour market as husband exits 
or an individual switching from wage employment to last resort self-employment, which may not necessarily be visible at 
the level of average labour market indicators.
45  In 2011, 950 persons started a business through this programme, out of which 340 females.
46 Appendix 5 - appendix to this chapter with supporting data referenced throughout, is available online only, at  
www.fren.org.rs/node/220. 
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that women with tertiary education are a lot more likely to supply their labour than women 
with less education. The fact that their unemployment is higher than that of men with 
tertiary education may point to discrimination of women by employers at the point of job 
entry and/or that male unobservable characteristics are more valued by employers than 
female47. However, women with tertiary education seem to be more hopeful about find-
ing employment than women with lower educational attainment, so they are more likely to 
actively seek work rather than withdraw into inactivity. An interesting finding emerges from 
a World Bank (2008) study. Namely, both women and men in Macedonia are discouraged 
about finding employment because they “lack personal connections” and are not affiliated 
with the political parties in power. Their findings show that this attitude prevailed regardless 
of these individuals’ educational attainment. However, if we consider that higher educational 
attainment also improves individuals’ social capital and possibly even their access to political 
parties, we may conclude that both women and men with better educational attainment are 
less likely to be discouraged about their employment prospects.
Graph 5.2: Employment rate by…
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Observed by age (Graph 5.2, right panel), the employment gap is the highest among the 
oldest members of the labour force (age group 55-64). Their gender employment gap (36.1 
percentage points) is significantly wider than the gap among the prime age group (20.8pp). 
On the other hand, gender employment gap is the lowest among youth (8.7 percentage 
points). We can probably explain this by the changing role of female household members 
as well as by the fact that new generations of females are more educated than older ones, 
which leads to declining employment and participation gaps between the genders. At the 
same time, inactivity is high among youth of both genders, mostly due to school/university 
attendance. 
47  Since unemployment as defined in the LFS covers only those individuals who are actively seeking a job, rather than those 
who may officially register as unemployed in order to claim benefits, we are not concerned about the perverse incentives 
which may motivate women as second earners to declare themselves as unemployed.  
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Gender employment gap for all analysed age groups is mainly caused by variation in inactiv-
ity rates between the genders, which is most pronounced among the oldest age cohort (36.1 
percentage points; Table A5.2 in Appendix 5). This is probably due to the fact that women 
retire earlier than men and require less work experience to qualify for retiring. However, 
female unemployment rate for the oldest age group (55-64) is also higher than male (by 5.5 
percentage points), which suggests that elderly women in particular have more difficulty in 
finding employment than men, i.e. that the effect of employer discrimination and/or unob-
servable differences in labour market characteristics may be especially pronounced among 
women in the age bracket 55-64. For the other two (younger) age groups (15-24 and 25-54), 
unemployment rates are only slightly higher among women (by 3.4 and 1.7 percentage points 
respectively) (Table A5.2 in Appendix 5). Therefore, the most senior group of working age 
women seems to be particularly vulnerable in the labour market.  
5.1.2 Type of employment
Compared to men, women in Macedonia are more often in wage employment than in 
self-employment (77.1% compared to 70.1% of men) (Graph 5.3). From the perspective 
of market economies, this could be argued as surprising since it is mostly men who prefer 
wage employment due to greater chances of promotion (e.g. they are not exposed to 
the glass ceiling effect) and because women may favour self-employment due to greater 
opportunities for flexible working arrangements. Yet, in transition countries, the op-
posite mechanism seems to be at work, since women on average have more secure jobs, 
because of their more frequent employment in the public sector (public administration, 
health and education). 
Due to serious demand-side constraints in the labour market, such as high unemployment 
and low levels of generation of new jobs, self-employment could be characterised as 
employment of last resort (due to lack of wage employment opportunities). The fact that 
self-employment among men increased by 1.4 percentage points during the crisis may 
support this argument (Graph 5.3, left panel). At the same time, some of the prerequisites 
for self-employment are initial capital for investment and informal networks, both of 
which may be more accessible to men than to women. 
Although a higher percentage of employed women than employed men are in wage em-
ployment, women are a minority in total wage employment (40.9% of the total). The fact 
that fewer women work overall could imply that women are more likely than men to 
choose employment only if it is better quality (including family-friendly working hours) 
and lower risk (i.e. wage employment), whereas men are less wage elastic and will work 
regardless of what type of work is available to them. The fact that women work less often 
as self-employed (8.4% vs. 24.2% of men) speaks in favour of this proposition (Graph 5.3). 
Women are also found to more frequently work as unpaid family members (14.5% of all 
employed women, compared to 5.7% of men), most often in agriculture. 
Structure of the employed does not change significantly between 2008 and 2011. As dis-
cussed previously, it seems that the overall increase in employment rate for both genders is 
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due to the rise in self-employment and stagnation in all other categories, which may be last 
resort employment, i.e. a coping mechanism against negative income shocks. 
Graph 5.3: Structure of employment by type and gender (15-64)… 
…and share of women by type of employment (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Women with primary educational attainment are predominantly employed as unpaid 
contributing family members. They make half of the total number of employed women 
with primary education only, compared to 14.5% on average at other levels of educational 
attainment (Table A5.3 in Appendix 5). Only 39.5% of women with primary education are 
in wage employment (compared to 77% for all women). Among men with primary educa-
tion, there is a high share of the self-employed (42.4% compared to 24.2% for all men), 
and a significantly lower number of those in wage employment (45% vs. 70.1% for all 
men). These data also seem to support our proposition that much of the self-employment 
in Macedonia is employment of last resort.
Since the self-employed and unpaid family members with low educational attainment 
frequently work in agriculture, one explanation of the variability in types of employment 
observed among men and women may be that men and women frequently work on one 
farm. In that case, men may be more likely to answer that they are self-employed (head of 
the household), while women who work with them answer that they are unpaid contribut-
ing family members. This points to unequal access of rural women to resources, compared 
to rural men. 
More education increases the share of wage employment among both women and men. 
Wage employment on average represents over 80% of all types of employment for individu-
als with secondary education and 85% for those with tertiary (Table A5.3 in Appendix 5). 
Disaggregation by age groups indicates that the presence of women among unpaid family 
members rises with age (Table A5.4 in Appendix 5). Among the 55-64 age group 90% of 
all unpaid family members are women. This indicates another dimension of labour market 
vulnerability of elderly women apart from inactivity – they are very often unpaid for their 
work.
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5.1.3 Unadjusted gender wage gap and labour market characteristics
In this section we focus on wage employment only, which is the sub-sample of employees 
that we use in our regresion analysis. We describe wage characteristics for men and women, 
gender differences in wages as well as the structure of wage employment. 
The sample that we use throughout our analysis in this chapter consists of 19,737 indi-
viduals (8,107 women and 11,630 men) for whom we observe wages in the LFS in the 
period from the 4th quarter of 2008 to the 4th quarer of 2011.48 The base sample includes 
individuals in the age group 15-64, who work full-time either in the public or the private 
sector49 and receive positive wages from employment.50 We exclude those in training or 
formal education, as well as the self-employed and/or unpaid family members.51 
Gender wage gap is analysed at the level of real log hourly wages, deflated using the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI), with October 2008 as the baseline. 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of male and female wages (15-64)
Hourly log wages Unadjusted
Female Male wage gap (%)
1st quintile 3.479 3.594 11.5***
2nd quintile 3.801 3.957 15.6***
3rd quintile 4.026 4.221 19.5***
4th quintile 4.374 4.496 12.2***
5th quintile 4.808 4.911 10.3***
Mean 4.088 4.222 13.4***
Sample 8,107 11,630
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008 – Q4 2011.
The mean unadjusted wage gap in Macedonia is 13.4% in favour of men. However, the 
gender gap differs significantly across the wage distribution. In order to analyse these dif-
ferences we split the female and male samples into five wage brackets (quintiles) and then 
compare the average wage of men and women within each of the quintiles. The gap is the 
lowest in the 1st and the 5th quintile and the highest in the middle of the distribution. At 
the bottom of the wage distribution female wages are on average 11.5% lower than male. 
The gap grows to 15.6% in the 2nd and to 19.5% in the 3rd quintile of the wage distribu-
tion, where it reaches its maximum. In the higher wage quintiles, the gap drops again, first 
to 12.2% in the 4th quintile and then to 10.3% at the top quintile of the wage distribution 
48  LFS in Macedonia is implemented twice per year, in the second (Q2) and fourth quarter (Q4).
49  We exclude those whose answer to the ownership question in the survey is „other.“
50  162 cases with zero wages are excluded from the analysis. We further exclude those workers with missing values for 
tenure (22 cases) and sector of ownership (176 cases in which sector of ownership is “other”, rather than public or private). 
51  We will later test our results for robustness separately for public and private sector workers.
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(Table 5.4; for a more detailed discussion on gender gap per quintiles see section 5.2.2 of 
this chapter).
In this section we disaggregate the average unadjusted gender wage gap and average female 
wages by level of education, tenure, occupation, sector of activity, type of ownership and 
type of working contract.52  Since labour market characteristics of employed women vary 
in comparison to those of employed men, we also contrast these different gender wage gaps 
and female wage levels against variations in labour market characteristics of both genders. 
This is a necessary step because in the next section we will reweigh the average differences 
between men and women in each cohort and adjust the gender wage gap accordingly, based 
on these variations in labour market characteristics. That step will ensure that we compare 
wages between a man and a woman with exactly the same labour market characteristics 
(instead of the average employed woman against an average employed man, who have very 
different labour market characteristics). The data on the unadjusted gender wage gap and 
labour market characteristics are summarised in Graphs 5.5-5.7 below. 
Graph 5.5: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by level of education (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Notes: 1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by 
level of education. Lighter circles represent those characteristics which can be found more frequently among 
employed women than among employed men (e.g. employed women more frequently have tertiary educa-
tion than employed men), while darker circles represent those characteristics which can be found more fre-
quently among employed men (e.g. employed men more frequently have secondary education than employed 
women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference between the genders by that 
particular labour market characterisic.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A5.5 in Appendix 5.
52  While graphs on education, occupation and sector of activity are shown below, data on years of tenure, type of ownership 
and type of working contract can be found in Appendix 5.
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Educational structure of employed women is much more favourable than that of employed 
men: 28.1% of women in wage employment have tertiary education (compared to 20.6% 
of employed men), while 12.7% of them have primary education only (compared to 17.7% 
of employed men) (Graph 5.5 and Table A5.5 in Appendix 5). 
Therefore, the higher positioned the circle on the graph, the higher the pay for women with 
that particular characteristic represented by the circle. Graph 5.5, not surprisingly, shows 
that women with tertiary education earn more than women with secondary and primary 
education (the circle for tertiary education is higher positioned on the y-axis). 
Graph 5.5 shows that the highest wage gap between the genders can be found among 
those with primary education, closely followed by secondary. Therefore, the unadjusted 
gender wage gap shrinks with the level of education. The difference in the average wage 
between women and men with tertiary education is significantly lower than between 
women and men with lower levels of education – 10.4% in comparison to 20.1% for those 
with secondary and 22.3% for those with primary. 
When it comes to tenure53 with current employer (Table A5.6 in Appendix 5), the lowest 
difference in the average wage (only 2.1%, not statistically significant) was observed among 
those with over 20 years with the same employer. This trend could reflect the greater gender 
equality at the start of career (in socialism) for those with over 20 years of experience. 
For those individuals with lower tenure, the difference in the average wage between the 
genders is higher (against women), and varies between 14 and 17%. This might imply 
that young women in particularly experience wage discrimination in the labour market, 
possibly due to their childbearing responsibilities. At the same time, the tenure structure is 
approximately similar for both genders, with slightly lower average tenure of women (10.3 
years vs. 11.1 for men). This difference is due to higher participation of men in the group 
with tenure longer than 20 years (Table A5.6 in Appendix 5).
When we disaggregate the data by occupation, we observe a clustering of occupations that 
require lower skills and pay lower wages vs. occupations that require higher skills and pay 
higher wages (Graph 5.6). The unadjusted wage gap is wider in occupations that also have 
lower female wages (the lower circles to the right of the x-axis).
Plant and machine operators and Service and sales workers are two sectors characterised 
by the largest unadjusted gender wage gap among all occupations (gap is 36.6% and 29% 
respectively), as well as the lowest female wages. Furthermore, women can be found more 
frequently in these two occupations than men and these are the sectors in which women 
work more often than in the other two low-skill, low wage occupations (Elementary oc-
cupations and Craft and trades workers, see Table A5.7 in Appendix 5). Namely, more than 
one third of all women in wage employment work in these two sectors (21.4% and 17.8% 
of them respectively). The fact that the gap is the highest among Plant and machine opera-
tors may be because female workers predominately work in the textile industry, which has 
by far the lowest wages in the country (Mojsoska-Blaževski, 2011). In conclusion, among 
the low-skill, low wage occupations, those in which women can be found more frequently 
also have larger wage gaps.
53  We use tenure as a proxy variable for experience, since we do not have data on total work experience. 
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Graph 5.6: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by occupation (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Footnotes: (a) Professionals include armed forces. (b) Technicians and associate professionals include skilled 
agricultural workers.
Notes: 1) Size (surface) of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment 
by occupation. Lighter circles represent those occupations in which women can be found more frequently than 
men (e.g. women can be found more frequently working as Clerks than men), while darker circles represent 
those occupations in which men are employed more frequently (e.g. men can be found more frequently work-
ing as Senior officials and managers than women). The size of the circle shows the extent of this difference in 
gender frequencies within each occupation.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A5.7 in Appendix 5.
The unadjusted wage gap is a lot smaller among high-skill, high wage occupations. In three 
of the four of these occupations, women can be found more frequently than men (three of 
the four circles in the upper-left part of the Graph 5.6 are lighter). Interestingly enough, 
of all the high-skill, high wage occupations, women can be found least frequently among 
Senior officials and managers (the only darker circle), who along with Professionals have 
the highest wages. Namely, among Senior officials and managers there are twice as many 
men as women, possibly suggesting a “glass ceiling” for women, who, although their overall 
educational structure is better than male, cannot access the top positions, which pay the 
highest wages. Of course, a supply side reason for this could be that women select away 
from positions with greater responsibility due to different preferences in comparison to 
men. For those women who do access Senior officials and managers, they receive wages 
which are on average by 9%54 lower than those for male Senior officials and managers. 
Among Clerks, women on average receive the same wages as men (i.e. insignificantly 
higher, by 1.5%) and they take up the majority of all positions. This is probably due to a 
large frequency of female employment in the public sector. Similarly, the lowest positive 
54  This difference is only marginally significant, at the 0.1 level, probably due to the small sample of managers.
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difference in the average wage between the genders (by 3.6%) is among Professionals, 
where women occupy approximately one half of all positions.55 
Graph 5.7: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by sector of activity (15-64)
Agriculture
Industry
Tradional Services
Modern Services
Public Services
3
3,2
3,4
3,6
3,8
4
4,2
4,4
4,6
4,8
-15 -5 5 15 25 35
Fe
m
al
e 
lo
g 
w
ag
es
Unadjusted wage gap (%)
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Footnotes: (a) Traditional services: Trade, HORECA, Transport. (b) Modern services: Communication, 
Financial intermediation, Real estate, Experts. (c) Public services: Public administration, Education, 
Health, Social service activities, ET organisations.
Notes: 1) Size (surface) of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female 
employment by sector of activity. Lighter circles represent those sectors in which women can be 
found more frequently than men (e.g. women can be found working in Public services more fre-
quently than men), while darker circles represent those sectors in which men are employed more 
frequently (e.g. men can be found working in Industry more frequently than women). The size 
(surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference in gender frequencies within each sector.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A5.8 in Appendix 5.
When it comes to sectors of activity, the largest unadjusted wage gap (i.e. difference in the 
average wage) is observed in Industry (28.9%), followed by Traditional services (18.5%). 
These sectors are also the sectors – apart from Agriculture – with the lowest wages (low-
skill, low wage sectors, in which men work more frequently than women) (darker circles 
in Graph 5.7)). 
In Agriculture, the wage gap is lower than average (10.2% vs. average 13.4%). However, 
this is a sector characterised by the lowest wages, so a government imposed minimum wage 
(which applies to both genders) could be the reason why the gap is not very large (Graph 
5.7).
55  Since this group includes army officers, numbering around 40,000 men and on   ly 1,000 women, women actually make 
the majority in this group when we exclude the army. 
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Women work more frequently than men in high wage, high-skill sectors, such as Modern 
services and Public services. This is consistent with the fact that in Macedonia high-skilled 
women tend to work, while low-skilled women stay out of the labour force. However, these 
two sectors differ significantly in the size of the unadjusted wage gap. Modern services, 
where both fewer men and women work (around 8% of women and 6% of men) is the 
only sector where women on average receive higher wages than men (by 9%). On the other 
hand, in Public services, where almost one third of women and one quarter of men work, 
women earn 9% less than men.
When we analyse wage data according to whether the sector is in public or private owner-
ship, a couple of interesting trends emerge (data can be found in Table A5.9 in Appendix 
5). There is a clear cleavage according to ownership, so that we observe a substantially 
higher unadjusted pay gap (i.e. larger difference in the average wage) in the private than 
in the public sector (17.7 vs. 4%). Although it may seem attractive to rush to the conclu-
sion that the public sector discriminates against women less than the private sector, we must 
also keep in mind that workers in the public sector are on average better educated and that 
there is a significantly larger portion of high-skilled workers among them. As we have seen 
from Graphs 5.5-5.7, the pay gap shrinks as education and skill levels grow. Furthermore, 
although much of the transition literature points to the fact that women dominate the 
public sector because of the traditionally female occupations it covers (such as education 
and health), this does not seem to be the case in Macedonia. Although women can be 
found to work in the public sector more frequently than in the private sector, the share of 
women in the public sector compared to all employed women is almost equal to the share 
of men (in addition, more men work in the economy as a whole, so their numbers in the 
public sector by far exceed female). Women in Macedonia could have had a somewhat 
lower access to public employment than in the neighbouring countries, due to affirmative 
action to have the large-sized Albanian ethnic minority equally represented in the public 
sector (regardless of gender). 
The difference in the average wage between the genders is more pronounced among work-
ers with permanent contracts – 14.7% vs. 12.8% among those with temporary contracts. 
Yet, women also have permanent contracts more often than men do (88.6 vs. 84.3% of all 
wage employees) (Table A5.10 in Appendix 5). 
We also analysed gender differences between workers in the informal and formal sector 
of the economy, i.e. those who have a written contract with their employers vs. those who 
do not. We found that the percentage of women working without a written contract is 
lower than the percentage of men by 4 percentage points (4.4% in comparison to 8.4%). 
When working without a written contract, the pay gap between women and men is even 
higher – 20.8% as opposed to 13.7% when there is a written contract. However, we do not 
include these data in our econometric analysis since the data on written contract were not 
available for the 4th quarter of 2008.
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5.2 Understanding the gap (econometric analysis)
As we have shown in the previous section, the two genders differ significantly according 
to characteristics and skill levels of women and men who work. Therefore, in this section 
we adjust the gender wage gap to reflect these differences in characteristics. In that sense, 
we move away from a simple calculation of the difference in the average wage between an 
average employed man and an average employed woman, i.e. the unadjusted pay gap, and 
reweigh it by labour market characteristics of each employed individual. We then get the 
adjusted gender wage gap, i.e. the true wage gap between the genders.
The purpose of this section is to throw more light on the reasons why the gender pay gap 
exists and persists in the Macedonian labour market. Identifying factors which explain the 
gender pay gap is extremely important from the policy perspective, because only knowing 
what affects the gender pay gap can help policy makers design measures to tackle it. 
5.2.1  Mincer wage equations and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Table 5.8 shows estimation results of four different specifications (S1 to S4) of the Mince-
rian wage regression. Robustness checks (population subgroups of 19-64 and 19-59 years 
of age; wages with and without extreme values and inclusion of workers with zero wages) 
are reported in Table A5.12 of Appendix 5. In all of the reported specifications, standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the robust (“sandwich”) estimator. Our 
dependent variable is log hourly real wage.56
Table 5.8: Mincer wage regressions (Specifications S1 to S4)
Variable S1 S2 S3 S4
Female -0.134*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.179***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Education and tenure Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Work related variables (1) Yes
Sample 19,738 19,738 19,738 19,738
Adjusted R-square 0.018 0.30 0.31 0.41
Log Likelihood -13557 -10268 -10054 -8514
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
(1) Occupation (ISCO), Sector of activity (NACE), Ownership (public/private), Type of contract (temporary/
permanent; written/non-written).
56  Wages in the 4th quarter of 2008 are reported as exact wage amounts, while in the consecutive waves respondents select 
a wage bracket for their earnings. In 2009 and 2010 there were 10, and in 2011 there were 11 wage brackets. Wages are 
transformed from nominal to real wages using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with the 4th quarter of 2008 as baseline. 
The data on CPI were taken directly from the Macedonian National Statistical Office (Državen zavod za statistika) website.
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The coefficient for female in specification S1, where female is the only explanatory variable, 
represents the unadjusted gender pay gap. Coefficients in specifications S2-S4 represent 
the gender pay gap adjusted for variables marked with x. Coefficients for all explanatory 
variables in the Mincerian wage equation are reported in Table A5.11 of Appendix 5.
The specification S1 estimates that women in Macedonia, on average, have 13.4% lower 
hourly wages than men (this is also what we conclude from analysis of the unadjusted 
gender wage gap presented in the previous section).
This gap in earnings between the genders widens to 17.5% when we account for educa-
tion and tenure (specification S2). Coefficients for the two education dummy variables 
measuring secondary and tertiary education are positive and rising with level of education 
(elementary education is the omitted category), returns to education increase with educa-
tion, such that those with secondary and tertiary education have respectively 7.6% and 26% 
higher wages than individuals with elementary education only. Similarly, the coefficient 
for tenure is positive, showing that the wage increases with the time spent working for the 
same employer (See Table A5.11 in Appendix 5).57
Accounting for time fixed effects (specification S3) does not change the coefficient for gen-
der (nor for education and tenure), suggesting that the specification is robust over time. The 
gender wage gap increases further, albeit slightly – from 17.5 to 17.9%, when additional 
job characteristics, such as sector of activity, occupation and type of contract, are taken 
into account (specification S4). Coefficients for education stay positive and rising with 
the level of education when we include job characteristics into the equation, but returns to 
education become substantially lower due to their correlation with job characteristics58 (see 
Table A5.11 in Appendix 5). In other words, returns to education are overestimated in the 
previous specifications, because we exclude job characteristics. 
The estimates from Mincerian equations can be summarised in the basic Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, where the average log hourly wage is decomposed into the explained part 
(due to differences in workers’ personal and job characteristics) and the unexplained part 
(differences in returns to the same personal characteristics and differences due to unob-
servable differences in personal characteristics) (Table 5.9). 
From the Mincerian wage estimates and the descriptive analysis of the unadjusted pay gap 
in the previous section, we have seen that on average, employed women have 13.4% lower 
hourly wages than men. However, unlike the trends we observe in the Western economies 
(see literature review), the differences in labour market characteristics between men and 
women (e.g. education, tenure, job characteristics) cannot explain the gender wage gap in 
Macedonia. In fact, exactly the opposite effect is in place. When personal labour market 
characteristics are taken into account, the gap widens. This can be explained by the fact that 
an average employed woman in Macedonia has better labour market characteristics than 
an average employed man. This occurs because a significant portion of low-skilled women 
57  The variable measuring total working experience was not available for Macedonia.
58  Most importantly, working as a professional correlates positively with tertiary education (0.66) and negatively with 
secondary education (-0.46); working in a state/socially owned company correlates positively with tenure (0.35) and work-
ing in public services (public administration, education, health, etc) correlates positively with tertiary education (0.35). 
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stay out of the labour market, meaning that they self-select out of employment due to the 
low opportunity cost59 of not working (higher female reservation wage at low-skilled level). 
This may be due to, for example, care for children and the elderly, as well as presence of the 
more traditional household models where women are exclusively in charge of reproduc-
tive work (especially among the less educated households). It could also be the case that 
discrimination of low-skilled women occurs at the point of entry into the labour market, 
so that they do not have many opportunities to obtain work. 
Although female labour supply decisions are beyond the scope of this research,60 it is important 
to keep in mind that this greatly impacts the actual gender wage gap, since non-employment 
of low-skilled women increases the wage of the average working woman and therefore hides 
the real gender wage gap in the economy. In other words, if women who worked had the same 
labour market characteristics as employed men, the gender wage gap would be substantially 
larger. When the gender wage gap is adjusted for personal labour market characteristics (i.e. 
if the average working man and working woman were to have the same educational level, 
tenure and job characteristics), it increases from 13.4% to 17.9%.
Table 5.9 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition – main results (Specification S4)
Coefficients Standard errors
Men (average log hourly wage) 4.222*** (0.004)
Women (average log hourly wage) 4.088*** (0.005)
Difference (unadjusted gender pay gap) 0.134*** (0.007)
Explained part -0.045*** (0.005)
Unexplained part (adjusted gender pay gap) 0.179*** (0.006)
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Differences in labour market characteristics
Graph 5.10 shows the impact of labour market characteristics on the gender pay gap. What 
narrows the unadjusted gender pay gap is that employed women on average have higher 
educational attainment and work more frequently in high-skill, high wage jobs than men do 
(this is also visible from descriptive statistics presented in the previous section). Moreover, 
women are better positioned regarding the sector of activity they work in and the type of 
employment contract they have, meaning that they can more frequently be found working 
in the better-paid sectors of the economy (e.g. services, and especially Public services). They 
also hold permanent contracts more frequently than men do (probably precisely due to the 
fact that they more frequently work in the public sector). 
59  This may be further reinforced by the high levels of outmigration and strong reliance of households on remittances from 
family members working abroad.
60  Although we use Heckman selection correction to correct for self-selection into employment. See section 5.2.4 of this 
chapter for more details. 
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Graph 5.10: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (in percentage points) 
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Notes: 1) The darker bars placed on the negative side of the x-axis represent characteristics which underesti-
mate the true gap, while the darker bars placed on the positive side overestimate the true gap (lighter bars 
refer to differences in returns, which we discuss in the next section). 
2) Unobservables are only present under differences in returns, since they represent differences in unobserv-
able characteristics that cannot be measured.
3) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A5.13 in Appendix 5.
However, women are worse off than men when it comes to tenure, since theirs is on average 
lower than male (see section 5.1.3 for details). This is likely the result of a number of fac-
tors, including career interruptions due to childbearing, the fact that the average working 
woman is more educated than the average man (which implies more time in education 
instead of at work), as well as earlier retirement age. Therefore, gender differences in tenure 
work in the opposite direction from most of the other personal characteristics, i.e. they 
make the true gender wage gap seem bigger than it is (albeit slightly; the darker bar for 
tenure is positive but very small).  
We now show the separate contribution of each of these individual labour market characteris-
tics to the gender pay gap, since Graph 5.10 only shows grouped effects of education (primary, 
secondary, and tertiary together), tenure (tenure and tenure squared), time (seven waves of data), 
occupation (eight categories), and sector of activity (five categories). Separate contribution of 
each of the individual characteristics can be found in Table A5.14 in Appendix 5.
The unadjusted wage gap is “underestimated” by 1.8pp due to the effect of higher average 
education of employed women than employed men (Graph 5.10, darker bar). Compared 
to men, working women have tertiary education more frequently then working men, while 
men are more frequently found with primary education only (Graph 5.5). Since workers 
with tertiary education have higher wages, female average wages would be lower (and 
therefore the wage gap would be higher) if employed women had the same educational 
characteristics as employed men. Educational differences between the genders can account 
for 40% of the explained part of the gap.
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The unadjusted gender wage gap would be higher by 2pp if women had the same occu-
pational characteristics as men (Graph 5.10, darker bar). Occupational characteristics ac-
count for 44% of the explained part of the gap. However, unlike is the case with education, 
differences in characteristics between men and women in different occupations operate in 
different directions: while some make the true wage gap seem larger, others make it seem 
smaller (see Graph 5.6 for details).
Less frequent presence of women among the highly paid Senior officials and managers 
(women make only 30% of them) overestimates the wage gap by 0.3pp. On the other 
hand, lower female than male frequency in managerial positions points to a different type 
of discrimination – the glass ceiling effect. Another factor that overestimates the wage 
gap is the higher percentage of women in low pay jobs among Plant and machine opera-
tors and Service and sales workers (by 6.6pp and 1.2pp respectively). These characteristics 
overestimate the gap by 1.1pp and 0.2pp respectively. 
At the same time, a higher frequency of women in high pay jobs conducted by Profes-
sionals, Technicians and associate professionals and Clerks (by 4pp, 4.7pp and 3.7pp) 
underestimates the pay gap by 0.9pp, 0.3pp and 0.2pp respectively. Also, the fact that 
women can less frequently be found in the low pay jobs among Craft and trades workers 
and Elementary occupations (by 16.3pp and 2.6pp) underestimates the gap by 1.6pp and 
0.6pp respectively. In total, occupational differences underestimate the gap (by 2pp), since 
those characteristics that underestimate the gap prevail over those that overestimate the 
gap.
The gender pay gap would be higher by 0.7pp if employed women were distributed by 
sector of activity in the same manner as men (Graph 2.3, darker bar) – sector of activity 
accounts for around 15% of the explained gap. More specifically, the fact that women less 
frequently work in low pay jobs in Agriculture (Graph 5.7) underestimates the gap by 
0.4pp, while their high frequency in high pay jobs in Modern and Public Services (Graph 
5.7) underestimates the gap by 0.2pp and 0.1pp respectively.
The fact that a higher percentage of women (by 4.2pp) have permanent contracts under-
estimates the gender pay gap by 0.4pp (permanent contracts entail higher wages than 
temporary ones): type of contract accounts for 8% of the explained part of the wage gap 
between the genders. 
Since wages grow with tenure, the fact that women on average have less tenure than men 
overestimates the gender wage gap by 0.2pp (Graph 5.10, darker bar). Therefore, tenure 
contributes around 4% to the total explained gender pay gap (albeit in the opposite direc-
tion from the above factors).
Table 5.11 summarises the above discussion. Overall, better labour market characteristics 
of women in comparison to men prevail over the worse ones, so that the total unadjusted 
gender wage gap of 13.4% is an underestimate. This is why it increases to 17.9% when we 
reweigh the data so that it is possible to compare women and men with exactly the same 
labour market characteristics. Therefore, we can say that the true gender wage gap is 17.9%.
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Table 5.11: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition – explained part 
– the impact of differences in characteristics between the genders 
on the gender wage gap
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-1.1pp)
Professionals, technicians 
and associate profession-
als, Clerks   (-1.4pp)
Modern(a)  and Public 
Services(b)  sector (-0.3pp)
Permanent contract (-0.4pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Plant and machine operators and 
Service and sales workers (1.3pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Lower frequency 
of women
     
Managers (0.3pp)
Higher tenure (0.2pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Primary and secondary 
education (-0.7pp)
Craft and trades workers (-1.6pp) 
and Elementary occupations
(-0.6pp)
Agriculture (-0.4pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011. 
For standard errors see Table A5.14 in Appendix 5.
Note: Numbers in brackets show how much the gap is underestimated or overestimated when not adjusted 
for the difference in the characteristic. Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each char-
acteristic to the adjustment of the total gap.
Footnotes: (a) Communication, Financial intermediation, Real estate, Experts 
(b)  Public administration, Education, Health, Social service qctivities, ET organisations
Differences in returns
In the previous sub-section, we analysed in detail the explained part of the gender pay gap. 
We looked at the contribution of average personal characteristics of employed women vs. 
employed men to the observed difference in their wages. In that sense, we assumed the same 
returns to the same characteristics for both genders, i.e. we assumed that employers would 
pay the same wage to a woman if she had the same labour market characteristics as a man. 
The main conclusion that stemmed from that analysis is that if women in Macedonia 
had the same labour market characteristics as men, the gender pay gap would be 17.9%.
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In this section of the report, we analyse this unexplained part of the wage differential, i.e., 
the adjusted gender wage gap. This unexplained, or adjusted, wage gap of 17.9% exists 
because of: i) labour market discrimination of women, in the sense that there are differ-
ences in returns to the same labour market characteristics between the genders, and ii) 
unobserved heterogeneity of workers’ characteristics, which we were not able to capture 
through variables such as education, tenure, occupation, etc. 
According to the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition presented in Graph 5.10 
(and Table A5.13 in Appendix 5), the largest share of the unexplained part of the wage 
gap – 69% (12.5% out of 17.9%; Graph 5.10, bar Unobservable characteristics) – stems 
from unobservable characteristics of workers, i.e. individual characteristics which are 
important for labour market valuation but go beyond the variables we analyse (such as 
education, tenure etc.). These could include differences in female and male labour market 
behaviour which employers reward or punish within the same occupations and sectors of 
the economy, e.g. that women may be less flexible in terms of working hours or business 
trips, due to home/reproductive responsibilities; other non-measurable effort- and ability-
related variables, as well as labour market frictions. Unfortunately, due to constraints in 
data availability, these unobserved characteristics are beyond the scope of this analysis.
On the other hand, differences in returns to personal labour market characteristics 
and choice of occupation can account for 31% of the unexplained wage gap (5.4% out 
of 17.9%, Graph 5.10). Women, on average, have lower market returns to education, 
choice of occupation and sector of activity, when these characteristics are treated as 
one61 (Graph 5.10, red bars). A more detailed decomposition reveals that for some of the 
labour market characteristics, such as specific occupations (managers, professionals, etc.), 
male returns are higher than female, while for others, it is exactly the opposite: female 
returns are higher than male (Table A5.14 in Appendix 5). 
The overall differences in wage returns to education account for approximately 3% of the 
unexplained part (0.6 of the 17.9% gap).62 Investment into tertiary education has higher 
pay-offs for men than for women (by 0.8 percentage points), which can be explained by 
the glass ceiling which reduces female opportunities for promotion and their access to 
top managerial positions. Furthermore, men with tertiary level of education, on average, 
make 28% higher wages than men with primary level of education, while for women this 
difference is 21%.63 While differences in returns to secondary education are not statistically 
significant, women have higher “returns” to primary education than men (by 0.5pp), which 
61  For example, the coefficient for education is the sum of the coefficients for primary, secondary and tertiary level of 
education. 
62  The results from the Mincerian wage equation are presented with primary education as the omitted category. However, 
coefficients for the unexplained part of the gap stemming from the BO decomposition for different levels of education are 
calculated using the constant deviation contrast transformation. The transformation is based on the series of estimations 
in which categories (in this case: primary, secondary and tertiary level of education) are used one after another as the 
base (omitted) category and the restriction that the sum of the coefficients must be equal to zero. Thus the results of the 
Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition are independent of the choice of the omitted category. This transformation is applied for all 
the dummy variables representing categorical variables with three or more categories. More details on the transformation 
can be found in Yun (2005) and Jan (2008). 
63  Statistical significance of this difference is confirmed in the BO decomposition.
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could be explained by the fact that a significant portion of women with primary education 
self-select out of employment so that the ones who stay remain employed because it pays 
off for them. 
Since Mincerian regression coefficients for tenure are approximately equal for both genders 
(0.013 for men and 0.011 for women), the BO decomposition does not show any statistical 
differences in returns to tenure. Therefore, we can conclude that different returns to tenure 
are not the source of discrimination in Macedonia.
Different returns to the same occupation account for 10% of the unexplained part of the 
wage gap (1.8 of the 17.9%). However, depending on the occupation, returns are some-
times higher for women and at other times for men (controlling for education). Returns 
are higher for women in the following occupations: Professionals (by 1.6pp), Clerks (by 
1.4pp), Technicians and associate professionals (by 0.7%), Managers (by 0.2pp).64
The most outstanding difference in returns to occupation is among Plant and machine 
operators, where men have higher returns by 3.6pp.65 As we suggest in the previous section, 
this may be related to the fact that women more often work in the textile industry, which 
is characterised by the lowest wages in the economy. Other occupations where men have 
higher returns than women are Service and sales workers (by 1.3pp) and Craft and trades 
workers (by 0.5pp).
The difference in returns to sector of activity accounts for 17% of the unexplained part 
of the wage differential (3% of 17.9%) and as such is the highest source of differences in 
wage returns to labour market characteristics between men and women. More specifically, 
returns are higher for men in Industry (by 1.5pp), Public Services66 (by 1.1pp) and Tradi-
tional Services67 sector (by 0.9pp), while they are higher for women in Modern Services68 
(by 0.4pp).69
When it comes to type of ownership in the economy, returns to working in the public sector 
are higher by 1.2pp for men than for women. This difference accounts for approximately 
7% of the unexplained part of the wage differential. This could be because of the dominance 
of men in top positions within the public sector (such as Ministers and directors of state 
owned companies), which suggests the existence of a glass ceiling effect. 
It is important to keep in mind that the lower returns to labour market characteristics 
for women than for men that we observe in Macedonia may further reinforce low female 
64  Although the unadjusted gap for all of these occupations is positive (see descriptive statistics), when all the characteris-
tics are taken into account, women receive statistically higher returns in these occupations. This effect could be explained 
by higher level of women’s education in the occupations (secondary or tertiary) where women have lower returns, so the 
unadjusted differences in wages in these occupations are mainly due to the differences in wages of workers with the same 
educational attainment.
65  The unadjusted gap is also the highest for this occupation, but it is considerably higher (36%); see Graph 5.6 and Table 
A5.7 in Appendix 5.
66  Public Administration, Education, Health, Social Service Activities, ET Organisations
67  Trade, HORECA, Transport
68  Communication, financial intermediation, Real Estate, Experts
69  The coefficients are not significant for Agriculture.
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labour supply. This is because, on average, the female reservation wage is higher than male 
(i.e. female labour supply is more elastic to wages), because they choose between leisure, 
reproductive work and labour, whereas men choose between leisure and labour only. 
5.2.2 Gender pay gap at different parts of the wage distribution: 
          Quintile regressions
In section 5.2.1, we analysed the unadjusted and adjusted wage gap between the “average” 
woman and the “average” man. In this section we split the sample into five wage brackets 
(quintiles) for men and women and compare the wages between men and women within 
these quintiles.
As we saw in section 5.2.1, the main differences in labour market characteristics between 
employed women and men are in their level of education and occupation. Since higher 
educational levels and high-skill, high wage occupations are associated with higher wages, 
and vice versa, the explained part of the wage gap becomes significantly lower once we split 
the sample into wage quintiles. In other words, splitting the sample automatically corrects 
for some of the differences between the average employed woman and the average employed 
man at the level of the entire wage distribution, since the two become a lot more similar once 
they are compartmentalised according to wage levels. Thus, the adjusted wage gaps shown 
in this analysis are not comparable to the adjusted wage gap for the population as a whole 
(which stands at 17.9%). However, they are comparable between the different quintiles.
From Graph 5.12 (and Table 5.A15 in Appendix 5) we can see that the both the unadjusted 
and the adjusted wage gap vary significantly across the wage distribution. 
The unadjusted gap is the lowest at the bottom of the wage distribution (the lowest 20% of 
all male and female wages) and the top of the distribution (the highest 20%), while it is the 
highest in the middle of the distribution. At the bottom of the distribution female wages 
are on average 11.5% lower than male. The gap grows to 15.6% within the 2nd and to 19.5% 
within the 3rd quintile of the wage distribution, where it reaches its maximum. In the top 
wage quintiles, the gap drops again, to 12.2% in the 4th quintile and then further to 10.3% 
in the top quintile of the wage distribution. 
The pattern of the adjusted part of the gap follows the pattern of the unadjusted gap very 
closely, since gender differences in labour market characteristics (the explained part of 
the gap) are relatively low within all quintiles. However, they are statistically significant 
and in favour of women at the lowest part of the distribution (within the 1st quintile) and 
within the 4th quintile, and they underestimate the real (adjusted) gap by 2pp and 1.4pp 
respectively. Most importantly, in the 1st quintile women are less frequently among those 
with temporary contracts and they work less frequently in Agriculture and in Industry. In 
the 4th quintile, the main female advantage in the labour market is their better educational 
structure and their better position in occupation (mainly due to their higher share among 
Professionals, see Table A5.16 in Appendix 5). 
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Graph 5.12: Unadjusted and adjusted gaps in
different quintiles of the wage distribution 
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Source: Own calculation based on  LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
For standard errors see Table A5.15 in Appendix 5.
Results of the quantile regression analysis, which serve as a robustness check to the analysis 
above, point to similar conclusions. Both the unadjusted and the adjusted gaps are the highest 
(16.6% and 21.9%) at the middle part of the distribution (median) and they shrink in the 
upper and bottom parts of the distribution.70 Similarly to what the quintiles analysis shows, 
the ‘fall’ of the wage gap in the upper part of the distribution is steeper than in the lower part 
of the distribution. Gender differences in labour market characteristics are slightly greater at 
the higher parts of the wage distribution, so the difference between the adjusted and adjusted 
gap in the upper parts of the distribution is larger (Graph A5.17 in Appendix 5). 
However, since we expect these trends to differ between the public and the private sector, 
we will discuss this pattern in greater detail in section 5.2.5 below, which compares the 
wage gap by type of ownership.  
5.2.3 Gender pay gap during the economic crisis: separate waves 
In this section we apply the same methodology as above on each of the seven LFS waves 
separately.71 This allows us to observe changes in trends through time, which is particularly 
relevant because our analysis covers the period of economic crisis, which impacted Mace-
donia in 2009 (therefore we use the wave from Q4 2008 as pre-crisis baseline). 
We split our analysis through time into two sub-periods, because of the more pronounced 
changes (and opposite trends) observed between Q4 2008 and Q4 2009, in comparison to 
the period after Q4 2009.
70  Since the methodology applied in the quantile regressions takes into account the whole sample, unlike the analysis per 
quintiles, the differences in characteristics are significant for all parts of the wage distribution. 
71  The analysis confirms that coefficients for both the unadjusted and adjusted pay gap, as well as the coefficient for the 
explained part of the BO decomposition, are significant for all seven waves (Table 2.5).  
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Graph 5.13: Trends of male and female log hourly wages (left panel) and BO
decomposition components (right panel) between Q4 2008 and Q4 2011
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Changes between Q4 2008 and Q4 2009
Between Q4 2008 and Q4 2009 there was a sharp increase in log hourly wages for both 
men and women. This was a direct consequence of the new law on income tax in Macedo-
nia (see Mojsoska-Blaževski, 2011 for details). This law (introduced to deal with the effects 
of the crisis) had a stronger impact on female wages than on male: female wages grew by 
approximately 25.8%, while male wages grew by 13.3% (Graph 5.13, left panel and Table 
A5.18 in Appendix 5). This may have a been a direct reflection of the fact that women have 
lower wages, therefore reforms towards more progressive taxation benefited them more 
than men. This change led to a sharp decrease of the unadjusted pay gap between Q4 2008 
and Q4 2009, by 12.6 percentage points (from 19.2% to 6.6%, Graph 5.13, right panel and 
Table A5.18 in Appendix 5). 
However, since there was a change in the LFS question on wages between 2008 and 2009 
(instead of being asked the exact wage amounts, individuals were asked to select a wage 
bracket they belong to), wage data between 2008 and 2009 may not be fully comparable. 
We would expect this switch from exact reporting of wages to wage brackets to reduce 
the previous underreporting of wages for both genders and hence induce wage increases, 
which are not the result of labour market dynamics, but rather of methodological changes. 
Yet, there is no reason to believe that this would impact reported wages among women dif-
ferently than it would impact wages among men. Therefore, it may only be that the entire 
magnitude of this increase should not be assigned entirely to the change in tax legislation. 
During the same period, a decrease in the adjusted pay gap was less pronounced – it dropped 
by 9.5 percentage points (from 22% in Q4 2008 to 12.5% in Q4 2009).72 The coefficient for the 
explained part of the BO decomposition dropped from -2.7pp to -5.8pp, meaning that female 
labour market characteristics improved even further in comparison to male during the analysed 
period. Thus, the underestimation of the true wage gap in 2009 was even greater than in 2008. 
72  The trend was similar between Q2 and Q4 2009, when there were no methodological discrepancies between the datasets. 
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The most important change in labour market characteristics which occurred in this short 
time span was the increase of female share in high wage jobs, at the tertiary level of edu-
cation (by 6 percentage points for women vs. 3 percentage points for men) and among 
Professionals (by 4 percentage points vs. 1 percentage point for men), while there was 
a decrease in the share of women among Plant and machine operators (by 6 percentage 
points vs. 1 percentage points for men). This could have occurred due to the inter-sectoral 
reshuffling and churning of female and male employees across types of employment during 
the economic crisis (as we discuss in section 5.1). All the changes observed during this 
period can be found in Table A5.19 in Appendix 5.
In other words, out of the overall decrease in the unadjusted pay gap (by 12.6 percentage 
points between Q4 2008 and Q4 2009):
1) the relative improvement of female (compared to male) labour market characteristics 
(educational level, occupation etc.) accounted for 3.1 percentage points (approxi-
mately one fourth of the total decrease);
2) real changes in the distribution of wages for men and women accounted for 9.5 
percentage points (approximately three quarters of the total decrease).
Changes between Q4 2009 and Q4 2011
However, the above-observed decrease in the gender wage gap was a one-off effect, since 
both the unadjusted and adjusted pay gap returned to a higher level, albeit lower than the 
pre-crisis level, during the following period of analysis. 
In Q2 2010, the unadjusted wage gap grew to 12.3% (by 5.7 percentage points), due to the 
increase in average wages for men (by 1.4%), and a decrease in average wages for women 
(by 4.2%). The adjusted gap grew even faster than the unadjusted one, to 19.7% (by 7.2 per-
centage points). The adjusted pay gap grew faster since female labour market characteristics 
further improved compared to male, i.e. the explained part of the BO decomposition grew 
to 7.4pp (by 1.6 percentage points), probably due to labour force churning between types 
of employment during the crisis. It could have been the case that more men than women 
with the lowest skill levels entered into employment out of economic necessity due to the 
negative impact of the crisis.
Since Q2 2010, until the last analysed quarter (Q4 2011), the unadjusted gap slightly 
increased to 13.4% (by 1.1 percentage points), while the adjusted gap decreased to 16.9% 
(by 2.8 percentage points), due to a considerable drop in the female advantage in labour 
market characteristics. Namely, the coefficient for the explained part of the BO decompo-
sition fell to 3.5pp (by 4.1 percentage points), mainly due to increase in participation of 
men with tertiary education, and a decrease of participation of women among technicians 
(by 4 percentage points).
In general, there seems to have been a lot of churning of labour from certain types of em-
ployment into another (e.g. from wage into self-employment), as well as industry-specific 
changes in the wage structure, which could have depended on the varying extents of GDP 
contractions that different sectors experienced during the economic crisis. 
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5.2.4 Heckman selection model
The basic idea of the Heckman selection model is to account for the effects of self-selection, 
i.e. a person’s decision not to work, on the pay gap (assuming that not being in employ-
ment is at one’s will). Since a large number of those out of employment in Macedonia are 
not “willingly out of work,” but unemployed (unemployment rate is above 30% for both 
men and women), we follow the aproach in Beblo et al. (2003) and eliminate those who 
are unemployed from the sample of non-employed, and keep only the inactive ones. We 
further follow Beblo et al. (2003) in dropping those who are (i) younger than 22 and older 
than 54 (because the selection effects cannot apply for them; and since our robustness 
analysis suggest that the results in the 15-64 subsample are not robust);73 (ii) inactive and 
have children under 1 year of age (i.e. parents of newborns). The aim of these restrictions is 
to have a homogeneous sample of those who are “voluntarily” inactive.
Results of the Heckman estimation procedure show that self-selection is a statistically 
significant factor for men, but not for women. Namely, invers Mills lambda for men is 
negative and statistically significant, while for women it is positive, although not statis-
tically significant. The signs of the coefficients in the selection equation show that the 
probability of being employed is (Table A5.20 in Appendix 5): 
(i) higher for those with higher level of education, 
(ii) lower for men with children aged 3-6 years old; lower for women with children of 
           any age, 
(iii) higher for those who have partners and whose partners work,
(iv) higher for younger and older working age population members.
In the interpretation of selection effects we follow the approach from Neuman and Oaxaca, 
(2004) named “decomposition of the selectivity corrected wage differential.” This aproach 
represents the decomposition of the selection-adjusted wages.74 Table 5.14 summarises the 
analysis of selection effects on the gender pay gap.
Column “without selection” shows the results of the BO decomposition without applying 
Heckman’s selection procedure. The unadjusted gap for the 22-54 sample is slightly higher 
than for the 15-64 sample and it stands at 14.8%. The effects of the characteristics point to 
the fact that the gap is “underestimated” due to better female labour market characteristics 
(by 4pp) and that the adjusted gap is 18.8%. 
73  Namely, the results from two estimation procedures for the 15-64 sample (Heckman’s two-step procedure and maximum 
likelihood procedure) point to different conclusions (Table A5.20 in Appendix 5), while for the subsample 25-54 subsample 
the results point to the same conclusion (Table A5.20 in Appendix 5). In results we show the results from the maximum 
likelihood procedure.
74  The interpretation of the selection effect in BO decomposition is still a matter of debate. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) 
further suggest there are “alternative decompositions that could be considered but that require stronger assumptions and 
perhaps value judgements about what constitutes inequity.”
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Table 5.14: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with and without selection correction 
Without selection
correction
With selection 
correction
Men (average log hourly wage) 4.214*** 4.243***
(0.005) (0.008)
Women (average log hourly wage) 4.065*** 4.055***
(0.006) (0.018)
Difference (unadjusted gender pay gap) 0.148*** 0.188***
(0.007) (0.020)
Explained part -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.005) (0.005)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.188*** 0.227***
(0.006) (0.019)
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Since men with low predicted probability of participation are predicted to earn less than 
men with similar productivity endowment (i.e. labour market characteristics) but with a 
higher predicted probability of participation, their wages should be corrected upward. Thus, 
the corrected wages for men are higher (for almost 3%) in the “with selection” column, than 
in the “without selection” column (Table 5.14).
On the other hand, since the positive (although statistically insignficant) Lambda (Table 
A5.20) for women suggests that women with lower predicted probability of participation 
are predicted to earn more than women with similar productivity endowment (i.e. labour 
market characteristics) but with a higher predicted probability of participation, their wages 
should be corrected downward. Thus, the corrected wages for women are lower (for 1%) in 
the “with selection” column, than in the “without selection” column (Table 5.14).
The corrected wages differential, therefore, is higher than the “uncorrected,” leading to the 
increase of the wage gap. The explained part of the BO decomposition stays at the same 
level, but the unexplained is corrected upwards by 4%, since the effect of the selection is in 
the unexplained part of the equation (Table 2.7). In total, the adjusted gap increases to 
22.7% when selection is taken into account.
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5.2.5 Gender pay gap across type of ownership:
          private vs. public sector analysis
In this section we compare the gender pay gap between the private and public sectors 
in Macedonia.75 Due to strong labour market duality in the Western Balkans, where the 
public and the private sector operate under different “rules of the game,” this analysis can 
provide important policy insights.
Table 5.15 shows that in both sectors all indicators for the BO decomposition (the un-
adjusted pay gap, the explained part and the adjusted pay gap) are statistically significant.
Table 5.15: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition: 
for public and private sector separately 
Public Private Difference
Men (log hourly wage) 4.434*** 4.108*** 32.6%
(0.007) (0.005)
Women (log hourly wage) 4.394*** 3.931*** 46.3%
(0.008) (0.006)
Difference (unadjusted pay gap) 0.040*** 0.177*** -13.7pp
(0.011) (0.008)
Explained part -0.074*** -0.008* -6.6pp
(0.008) (0.005)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.114*** 0.185*** -7.1pp
(0.009) (0.007)
Sample size 6,801 12,937
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
† A detailed BO decomposition for public/private sector is available in Appendix 5 (Table A5.25). 
On average, for both women and men, wages are higher in the public than in the private 
sector. This difference is higher for women, since their average wage in the private sector 
is by 46.3% lower than their average wage in the public sector. This difference for men 
stands at 32.6% (Table 5.15 and Graph 5.16, left panel).
Consequently, the unadjusted wage gap is substantially higher in the private than in the 
public sector – by 13.7 percentage points. While in the private sector men receive 17.7% 
higher wages than women on average, this difference in the public sector is “only” 4% 
(Table 5.15 and Graph 5.16, right panel).
75  However, we are concerned that the sector of ownership is endogenous to the type of occupation (e.g. for teachers, 
doctors) as well as to the level of education (because there is a higher portion of educated individuals working in the public 
sector by default).
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Graph 5.16: Male and female log hourly wages (left panel) and wage gaps 
(right panel) in the private and public sectors in Macedonia
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
However, once we adjust the wage gap to account for different labour market charac-
teristics between men and women in the two sectors, the gap widens significantly in the 
public sector – from 4 to 11.4%, while it grows only slightly in the private sector – from 
17.7 to 18.5% (Table 5.15 and Graph 5.16, right panel). This is because women in the 
public sector have significantly better labour market characteristics than men, while this 
difference in the private sector is very low and is not statistically significant. This can also 
be considered a type of discrimination, since women need to be better educated than men 
to access the same positions in the public sector.
Differences in characteristics in the private vs. the public sector
Graph 5.16 shows the most important labour market characteristics that underestimate the 
gender pay gap in the public and the private sector. In the public sector, the most important 
ones are the effects of education and occupation. Better female positioning regarding these 
two characteristics underestimates the gap by 3.7pp and 4pp respectively. 
On the other hand, in the private sector, labour market characteristics of individuals do not 
underestimate the gap significantly, so none of the characteristics have an impact on the 
wage gap higher than 1 percentage point (either negative or positive, Graph 5.17). How-
ever, a detailed analysis of labour market characteristics that underestimate or overestimate 
the gap in the private sector reveals certain differences that cancel each other out (Table 
A5.23 in Appendix 5).
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Graph 5.17: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by sector of ownership 
– explained part – the impact of differences in characteristics between
 the genders on the gender wage gap (in percentage points)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Educaon
Tenure
Occupaon
Sector of acvity
Type of contract
Gender wage gap
Private Public
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
For standard errors see Table 5.23 in the Appendix5.
Table 5.18 shows in detail the explained part of the unadjusted gap in the public sector. 
The most important positive characteristic of women is their higher share in high wage 
jobs, which require tertiary education (by 14 percentage points: 49.6% of women, 35.1% 
of men) and a higher share of women among Professionals (by 10.7 pp: 33.9% of women; 
23.2% of men) (Table A5.25 in Appendix 5). Additional better characteristics of women 
include their higher frequency (in comparison to men) in high pay jobs of Technicians and 
in Modern Services, and their lower frequency in low pay jobs: Primary and secondary 
education, Craft and trades workers, Plant and machine operators and Service and sales 
workers, as well as in Agriculture (Table A5.25 in Appendix 5). 
On the other hand, their worse labour market characteristics, which make the unadjusted 
pay gap in the public sector overestimated, are lower frequency of women in high pay 
jobs such as Senior officials and managers and in Public services, as well as their higher 
frequency in Traditional services (Table A5.25 in Appendix 5). If these characteristics were 
the same the unadjusted gap in the public sector would be lower (Table 5.18).
In total, better characteristics of women in comparison to men in the public sector prevail 
over the worse ones, so that the overall unadjusted gap is underestimated, i.e. it would be 
higher (by 7.4pp) if women were to have the same characteristics as men.
In the private sector, better and worse female characteristics in comparison to men cancel 
each other out, so that overall, the explained part of the gap is only marginally significant. 
In other words, if women were to have the same characteristics in the labour market as 
men, the increase of the unadjusted wage gap would be only marginally significant.
The most important better characteristic of women in the private sector is their lower 
frequency among Craft workers (by 21 percentage points: 5% of women, 26.5% of men, 
Table A5.25 in Appendix 5), which underestimates the gap by 2%. Additionally, a better 
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characteristic of women is their higher frequency in high pay jobs: those which require ter-
tiary education, among Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals and Clerks 
and in Modern and Public Services; and their lower frequency in low pay jobs: those which 
require primary education only, among Elementary occupations and in Agriculture (Table 
5.19).
Table 5.18: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the public sector 
–explained part – detailed impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-2.7pp)
Tenure (-0.2pp)
Professionals (-2pp), 
technicians and associate 
professionals (-0.6pp), 
Modern(a)  services (-0.1pp) 
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Traditional services(c)  (0.3pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Lower frequency 
of women
Managers (0.7pp)
Public Services(b)  sector (0.5pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Primary and secondary 
education (-1pp)
Craft and trades workers 
(-1.2pp), Plant and machine 
operators (-0.5pp) and Service 
and sales workers (-0.4pp)
 Agriculture (-0.3pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011. 
For standard errors see table 5.25 in Appendix 5. 
Note: Numbers in brackets show how much the gap is underestimated or overestimated when not adjusted 
for the difference in the characteristic. Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each char-
acteristic to the adjustment of the total gap.
Footnotes: (a)  Communication, Financial intermediation, Real estate, Experts (b)  Public administration, 
Education, Health, Social service activities, ET organisations (c) Trade, HORECA, Transport
The most important worse labour market characteristic of women in the private sector is 
their higher frequency among Plant and machine operators (by 13.4 percentage points: 
31.6% women vs. 18.2% men) and Service and sales workers (by 7.6 percentage points: 
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24.4% women vs. 16.8% men). Additionally, women have a low frequency in high pay jobs 
among Senior officials and managers and in jobs which are characterised by higher tenure 
(Table 5.19 and Table A5.25 in Appendix 5). 
Table 5.19: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the private sector 
– explained part – detailed impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap  
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher 
frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-0.5pp)
Professionals (-0.2pp), technicians 
and associate professionals 
(-0.1pp), Clerks (-0.1pp)
Modern(a)  (-0.2pp) and Public(b)  
services (-0.2pp) sector
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Service and sales workers (1.5pp), 
Plant and machine operators (2.5pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Lower 
frequency 
of women
Higher tenure (0.5pp)
Managers (0.2pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Primary education (-0.5pp)
Craft and trades workers (-2pp), 
Elementary occupations (-0.8pp)
 Agriculture (-0.5pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011. 
For standard errors see table 5.25 in Appendix 5.
Note: Numbers in brackets show how much the gap is underestimated or overestimated when not adjusted 
for the difference in the characteristic. Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each char-
acteristic to adjustment of the total gap.
Footnotes: (a) Communication, Financial intermediation, Real estate, Experts (b) Public administration, 
education, Health, Social service activities, ET organisations 
Differences in returns to labour market characteristics 
in the private vs. the public sector
The largest part of the adjusted gender wage gap in both the public and the private sec-
tor exists due to unobservable characteristics between men and women, which account 
for 92% of the adjusted pay gap in the public (10.6 of 11.4%) and 80% in the private sector 
(14.7 of 18.5%) (Graph 5.19 and Graph 5.21). 
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The rest of the unexplained gap (8% in the public and 20% in the private) occurs because 
of different returns to observable personal characteristics of labour market partici-
pants. A detailed disaggregation of the unexplained part of the adjusted wage gap shows 
significant differences in returns between the public and the private sector. While in the 
private sector there are no differences in returns to education, in the public sector, women 
have lower returns to secondary and tertiary education, by 2.4 percentage points in total 
(1.4pp to secondary, 1.5pp to tertiary). However, in the public sector women have higher 
returns to occupational characteristics (by 6.1pp), while in the private sector their returns 
to occupational characteristics are lower than male (by 4pp). While in the private sector 
the differences in returns to the sector of activity are only marginally significant, in 
the public sector women have significantly lower returns (Graph 5.20 below and Table 
A5.24 in Appendix 5).
Graph 5.20: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by sector of ownership 
– unexplained part – the impact of differences in returns to characteristics 
and differences in unobservable characteristics between 
the genders on the gender wage gap (in percentage points)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
In the public sector, overall differences in returns (to education, occupation and activity) 
account for a very small part of the unexplained part – 8%, since they work in the opposite 
direction and therefore cancel each other out (Graph 5.20 and Table A5.24 in Appendix 4). 
Furthermore, the observed differences in returns to education and sector of activity could 
most likely represent a statistical artefact due to the usage of inter-correlated independent 
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variables. In other words, in the public sector, wage returns to a job conducted by a person 
with the same education, within the same occupation and in the same sector of activity do 
not differ significantly for men and women, i.e. they are only slightly higher for men, by 
0.8%.
On the other hand, in the private sector, the difference in returns accounts for a larger part 
of the unexplained gap (around 20%, i.e. 3.8% out of 18.5%). A detailed analysis reveals that 
the main differences in returns exist among Plant and machine operators, where women 
have 4.4pp lower returns when entering this occupation. This may either be due to the fact 
that employers actively discriminate against women by valuing their labour market skills 
as less worthy than male, or because employers in the private sector value certain personal 
characteristics of workers which we cannot observe but which systematically differ between 
the genders. These could vary from differences in female and male labour market behaviour 
which employers reward/punish, e.g. that women may be less flexible in terms of working 
hours or business trips due to reproductive/home responsibilities, to other immeasurable 
effort- and ability-related variables, as well as to labour market frictions. 
Graph 5.21: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
– structure of the unexplained part 
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Differences at different points of the wage distribution
in the private vs. the public sector
In this section we analyse the wage gap at the different points of the wage distribution of in 
the public and private sectors separately. We split the sample into five wage brackets (quin-
tiles) and compare differences in wages between men and women within wage quintiles.76 
76  We drop the dummy variables for year effects in the BO decomposition analysis. Our preliminary analysis showed a 
significant impact of time effects on the explained part of the gap, which is impossible to interpret, due to difference in the 
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In the public sector, the unadjusted gap is the lowest within the first three quintiles of 
the wage distribution (1st to 3rd). The gap in those quintiles is not statistically significant 
and within the 2nd quintile it is even in favour of women. At the higher parts of the wage 
distribution in the public sector, the unadjusted wage gap is significantly higher, reaching 
its maximum of 7.1% within the 5th quintile (the top 20% of all wages in the public sector; 
Graph 5.22 and Table A5.26 in Appendix 5). The adjusted gap follows the trend of the 
unadjusted: the adjusted gap is low within first three quintiles of the distribution and it 
increases within the 4th and the 5th quintiles. Therefore, there is a clear glass ceiling effect 
in the public sector, meaning that women cannot access the best-paid jobs to the same 
extent as men.
The differences between the first three and the last two quintiles in the adjusted gap are 
slightly lower since the female characteristics in the first three deciles are better than male, 
so they lower the gap by 1.7, 1.9 and 1.2pp within the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quintile. On the other 
hand, in the last two quintiles (4th and 5th) the differences in characteristics (explained part) 
are statistically insignificant (Table A5.26 in Appendix 5). 
Most importantly, the better female position within the first three quintiles of the wage 
distribution is due to their better occupational structure, mainly, their lower frequency among 
Plant and machine operators and their higher frequency among Technicians (in the 2nd 
quintile) and professionals (in the 3rd quintile). Additionally, within the 1st quintile, the better 
female position is due to their lower frequency in the low paid Industry sector. Within the 
2nd quintile, the better female position is due to higher frequency of women with tertiary 
education and lower of those with primary education, while within the 3rd quintile, it is due 
to the higher female frequency in the Public services sector (Table A5.28 in Appendix 5).
Graph 5.22: Unadjusted and adjusted pay gap at different points
in wage distribution for public (left panel) and private sector (right panel)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011. 
For standard errors see tables 5.26 and 5.27 in Appendix 5
definition of the wage variable through years. Namely, interpretation of this coefficient would go to compare participation 
of men and women in survey waves and interpret the differences as higher participation in years where the wages were 
higher. As already discussed in section 5.2.3 our analysis, there are some methodological issues with comparisons of wage 
levels across years, so the impact of this variable on the explained part cannot be interpreted.  
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In the private sector the unadjusted gap is the lowest within the 1st quintile of the wage 
distribution (14.8%) and it rises until the 4th quintile, where it reaches its peak (23.1%). It 
then drops to 17.8% within the 5th quintile (the highest 20% of all wages in private sector) 
In all the quintiles of the wage distribution in the private sector, differences in characteris-
tics are in favour of women, but they are statistically significant only at the top and bottom 
of the wage distribution (Table A5.27 in Appendix 5). They adjust the wage gap within the 
1st and 5th quintile by 2.7pp and 1.6pp respectively. Therefore, the glass ceiling is a lot more 
pronounced in the private sector, where women cannot access the top paid positions to the 
same extent as men with the same labour market characteristics. 
The most important characteristic at the top part of the distribution is better education of 
women and their higher frequency in Modern services. The female advantage within the 
1st quintile is mainly caused by the fact that women more often have written contracts, as 
well as by lower female frequency in the lower paid Industry sector and among the low 
wage Plant and machine operators (Table A5.29 in Appendix 5). This is rather intuitive, 
as female labour supply is more wage elastic than male (because they chose between re-
productive/house work, leisure and paid work, while men choose between leisure and paid 
work only), so women are more likely to select away from employment when wages are too 
low. Furthermore, women are more concerned with quality of employment, so as second 
earners in the household, they can “afford” to self-select away from precarious employment 
without written contracts (see literature review in Chapter 2 for details).  
5.3 Gender pay gap among the self-employed
In this section, we focus on the gender pay gap among the self-employed in Macedonia. 
This group of workers consists of two distinct sub-groups: the self-employed persons and 
owners of businesses. For both of these groups, data on earnings are available. The number 
of self-employed women in Macedonia is significantly lower than men. Women make 24% 
of all business owners and 15.4% of all self-employed. 
The sample used for estimating the Mincerian wage regression and the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition includes 4,627 persons (3,787 men and 840 women) from seven waves of 
the Macedonian Labour Force Survey (LFS), covering the period between Q4 2008 and 
Q4 2011. The sample includes all workers in self-employment77 between 15-64 years of age 
who receive positive earnings.78 Our dependent variable is log hourly real wage.79
Table 5.23 shows estimation results of the four different specifications (S1 to S4) of 
the Mincer wage regression (along the lines of our analysis for wage employment). The 
77  This analysis excludes unpaid contributing family members. We also exclude part-time workers and workers who are in 
education or training. 
78  65 cases with zero wages are excluded from the analysis. 
79  Wages in the 4th quarter of 2008 are reported as exact wage amounts, while in the consecutive waves respondents select 
a wage bracket for their earnings. In 2009 and 2010 there were 10, and in 2011 there were 11 wage brackets. Wages are 
transformed from nominal to real wages using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with the 4th quarter of 2008 as baseline. The 
data on CPI were taken directly from Macedonian Statistical Office (Drzaven Zavod za Statistika) website. 
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coefficient for gender in specification S1, where female is the only independent variable, 
represents the unadjusted gender pay gap. Coefficients in specifications S2-S4 represent 
the pay gap adjusted for variables marked with x. Coefficients for all explanatory variables 
in the Mincer equation are reported in Table A5.30 in Appendix 5.
Table 5.23: Mincer wage regressions for self employed (Specifications S1 to S4)
Variable S1 S2 S3 S4
Female -0.070*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.186***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Education and tenure Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Work related variables (1) Yes
Sample 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627
Adjusted R-square 0.002 0.118 0.131 0.240
Log Likelihood -4093 -3808 -3773 -3463
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
(1) Occupation (ISCO), Sector of activity (NACE), Self-employment status (owner/entrepreneur).
Column S1 in Table 5.23 shows that self-employed women in Macedonia, on average, 
have 7% lower hourly earnings than men. The gap widens to 15.9% when adjusted for 
education and tenure (specification S2). Coefficients for the two education dummy 
variables are positive and rising with the higher level of education. Coefficients for the 
two education dummy variables measuring secondary and tertiary education are positive 
and rising with level of education (elementary education is the omitted category), showing 
that returns to education increase with education, such that those with secondary and 
tertiary education have 16.4% and 56%, respectively, higher wages than individuals with 
elementary education only. The coefficient for tenure is insignificant, and adding time fixed 
effects (specification S3) does not change the coefficient for gender (nor for education and 
tenure), suggesting that the specification is robust. 
The wage gap additionally increases to 18.6%, when additional job characteristics are 
taken into account (specification S4). The results show the expected impact of job char-
acteristics on earnings from self-employment. Earnings are: (i) higher for professionals, 
managers and technicians, than for all other occupations and lower for occupations such 
as Service and sales workers, Craft and trades workers, Plant and machine operators and 
Elementary occupations; (ii) are higher in Modern services (Communication, Financial 
intermediation, Real estate, Experts) than in all the other sectors; (iii) higher among own-
ers than self-employed (without employees). Coefficients for education stay positive and 
rising with the level of education, but returns to education are substantially lower due to 
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correlation with job characteristics, with the coefficient for secondary education losing its 
statistical significance  (Table A5.30 in Appendix 5). 
Table 5.24 shows that in self-employment as well as in wage employment, analysed earlier, 
all indicators for the BO decomposition (the unadjusted pay gap, the explained part and 
the adjusted pay gap) are statistically significant.
Table 5.24 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in employment 
and self-employment(a)
Employment
Self-
employment
Difference
Men (log hourly wage) 4.222*** 3.904*** 31.8%
(0.004) (0.009)
Women (log hourly wage) 4.088*** 3.834*** 25.4%
(0.005) (0.021)
Difference (unadjusted pay gap) 0.134*** 0.070*** 6.4pp
(0.007) (0.023)
Explained part -0.045*** -0.116*** 7.1pp
(0.005) (0.013)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.179*** 0.186*** -0.7pp
(0.006) (0.021)
Sample 19,738 4,627
SSource: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
(a) Full table for BO decomposition for is available in Appendix 5 (wage-employment Table A5.13; self-
employment Table A5.31). 
The unadjusted gap in self-employment is 7%, which is considerably lower than the respec-
tive gap in wage employment (by 6.4 percentage points, Graph 5.25, right panel). It should 
be noted that wages in wage employment are significantly higher than in self-employment 
(by 31.8% for men, and 25.4% for women, Graph 5.25, right panel). 
Similarly to wage employment, women in self-employment have better labour market 
characteristics than men, which “underestimates” the gap by 11.6%. In other words, if 
women and men were to have the same characteristics in self-employment the differ-
ence in wages would be significantly higher  – 18.6%. Thus the adjusted gap is slightly 
higher in self-employment than in employment (by 0.7pp)80, since the difference in labour 
market characteristics in self-employment is higher than in employment.
80  This difference is not statistically significant, since the 95% confidence intervals overlap.
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Graph 5.25: Male and female log hourly wages (left panel) and wage gaps 
(right panel) in self-employment and employment in Macedonia
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Differences in characteristics among the self-employed
Graph 5.26 (blue bars) shows that the most important labour market characteristics which 
underestimate the true pay gap in self-employment are education, occupation and status in 
self-employment (self-employed vs. business owner). Better female positioning regarding 
these three characteristics underestimates the gap by 1.8%, 6.9% and 2.4% respectively. 
Graph 5.26: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition –differences 
in characteristics and returns(a)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
(a) Tables for BO decomposition are available in Appendix 5 (Table A5.31 and A5.32). 
Table 5.27 shows the detailed analysis of the explained part of the unadjusted gap in self-
employment. Educational differences underestimate the gap since women with tertiary 
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education can more frequently be found among the self-employed and women with primary 
education less frequently (probably, as we discuss earlier, because low skill men who work 
in family farms tend to report as self-employed while their wives as contributing family 
members), (Table A5.32 in Appendix 5). Among occupations, a higher share of women 
among Managers and Professionals and their lower frequency in jobs such as Service and 
sales workers and Elementary occupations (Table A5.32 in Appendix 5), lowers the gap by 
1.3%, 1% and 3.5%, respectfully. Finally, a higher share of women among business owners 
(Table A5.32 in Appendix 5) underestimates the gap by 2% (Table 5.27). 
Table 5.27: Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition – explained part – 
self-employed
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher 
frequency 
of women
Tertiary education (-1.1%)
Managers (-1%), Profes-
sionals (-1.5%)
Owner (-2.4%)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Lower 
frequency 
of women
Primary education (-1.2%)
Service and sales workers (-0.3%) 
and Elementary occupations (-4.8%)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Notes: Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each characteristic to adjustment of the 
total gap in the public sector. 
On the other hand, since none of the differences in returns are statistically significant, most 
of the unexplained part of the gap is due to differences in unobservable characteristics 
between the genders (16.7% out of 18.5%), (Graph 5.26, red bars and Table A5.31 in Ap-
pendix 5, Unexplained part). This may be linked to the fact that men have more access to 
initial capital for investment and stronger informal networks, which may positively affect 
their returns.
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6. Gender Pay Gap in Montenegro
6.1 Labour market trends in Montenegro
6.1.1 Main labour market indicators 
Female employment rate in Montenegro is significantly lower than male. Gender gap 
in employment rates stood at an average of -13.4 percentage points during the analysed 
period (Q4 2008-Q4 2011). The observed gender gap in employment is mainly caused by 
higher inactivity of women, which is on average by 15.2 percentage points above men’s. 
Unemployment is also higher among women than among men, but to a far lesser extent – 
gender unemployment gap stood at an average of 1.8 percentage points during the period 
of analysis (Graph 6.1).
Graph 6.1: Main labour market indicators, Q4 2008 – Q4 2011
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Source: MONSTAT LFS reports, for population 15-64. 
Between Q4 2008 and Q4 2011, all the main labour market indicators worsened for work-
ing age men, while they mostly stayed stable for working age women. However, worsening 
of the male position in the labour market led to reductions in gender gaps in labour market 
indicators. While male employment rate remained at around 42%, the employment gap 
was reduced by 9.2 percentage points (from -17 to -7.8 percentage points). 
During the same period, male unemployment rate rose by 3.6 percentage points (from 
15.1% to 18.7%), while female unemployment rate oscillated, reaching its peak of 21.9% in 
Q4 2009, only to drop to 17.7% in Q4 2011 (by 0.6pp lower than in Q4 2008). Thus, while 
female unemployment rate was higher than male by 3.2pp in Q4 2008, male unemploy-
ment rate surpassed the female one in Q4 2011 by 1pp (17.7% for women vs. 18.7% for 
men). 
Although the level of female inactivity is significantly higher than male, rise of inactivity 
during the observed period was a lot more pronounced for men than for women. While 
female inactivity remained relatively stable (it rose by 1.1pp), male inactivity rose by 9pp 
(from 30.1 to 39.1%). Therefore the gender gap in inactivity shrank by 7.9 percentage 
points over the analysed period (from 18.1 to 10.2). 
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The worsening of all labour market indicators for men in Montenegro indicates that men 
were more impacted by the crisis than women. This could be due to the fact that women 
can more frequently be found working in the public sector, which was better insulated 
from the crisis than the private sector. Furthermore, the fact that women who work are 
on average better educated and more skilled than men who work may have contributed to 
this trend, because low-skilled workers are more likely to lose jobs during the crisis than 
high-skilled ones. Finally, most of the job losses during the crisis occurred in the industry 
sector, which traditionally employs a more male workforce.  The peculiar fact that male 
inactivity rose three times as much as male unemployment may indicate the unavailability 
of new jobs and discouragement from seeking new employment for those who have lost 
their jobs during the economic crisis. 
Graph 6.2: Employment rate by… 
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The gender employment gap is the highest at the level of primary (15.4 percentage points) 
and secondary (13.1 percentage points) education, while it is non-existent at the tertiary 
level of education (Graph 6.2, left panel). 
The gender employment gap is the most pronounced among the oldest members of the 
labour force (55-64). Their employment gap (22.6 percentage points) is significantly higher 
than the gap observed among women and men in the prime age group of 25-54 years (14 
percentage points) and youth (4.5 percentage points). We can probably explain this by the 
changing role of women, as well as the fact that younger women are more educated than 
those from older generations. The low gender employment gap among youth may also 
be due to the very low baseline, i.e. very low levels of youth employment more generally 
(Graph 6.2, right panel). 
Finally, for the oldest working age group (55-64) the gap in employment could be caused 
by the fact that women retire earlier than men in Montenegro81.
81  Although in 2010, retirement age equalised for the two genders and increased to 67 years of age, there is a long transi-
tion period which still results in many workers of both genders retiring much earlier.
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6.2 Type of employment
Over the analysed period (Q4 2008–Q4 2011), both men and women in Montenegro can 
most often be found in wage employment (79% of men and 89% of women; Graph 6.3, left 
panel). Although a higher percentage of employed women are in wage employment than 
men, women are a minority in total wage employment (46.1% of the total). The fact that 
fewer women work overall could imply that women are more likely to choose employment 
only if it is better quality and lower risk (i.e. wage employment) in comparison to men, who 
are less wage elastic and will work regardless of the type of work which is available to them. 
Men are twice as represented among the self-employed (around 20% of men and 10% of 
women). Percentages of unpaid family members, who most often work in agriculture and 
elementary occupations, have been extremely low and they are comparable across the two 
genders (1% of each gender; Graph 6.3, left panel). 
Graph 6.3: Structure of employment
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Weighted sample.
Over the analysed period, the structure of employment among the two genders stayed 
more or less stable: while the percentage of self-employed women increased from 10.5% 
to 12.7%, percentage of self-employed men decreased from 21.7% to 17.2%. On the other 
hand, percentage of wage-employed women decreased from 88.3% to 86.6%, whereas 
percentage of wage-employed men increased from 77.1% to 82.4% (Graph 6.3, left panel). 
However, since overall male employment significantly fell relative to female during the 
observed period, the share of women among the self-employed and unpaid family mem-
bers rose sharply between Q4 2008 and Q4 2011 (from 26 to 38% and from 41 to 53% 
respectively; Graph 6.3, right panel). 
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Within all educational categories, most men and women are found in wage employment 
(Table A6.1 in Appendix 6).82 The percentage of wage-employed men and women increases 
with the level of education, from 60% (primary education) to 85% (tertiary education) 
for men, and from 58% (primary education) to 94% (tertiary education) for women. At 
the same time, the percentage of self-employed men and women decreases with the level 
of education, from 34% (primary education) to 15% (tertiary education) for men, and 
from 33% (primary education) to 5% (tertiary education) for women. These data seem to 
indicate that much of the self-employment in Montenegro is last resort, i.e. due to lack of 
opportunities for wage employment, rather than opportunity based.
The percentage of unpaid or contributing family members decreases with the level of 
education, from 5% (primary education) to 0.1% (tertiary education) for men, and from 
9% (primary education) to 0.1% (tertiary education) for women. At the tertiary level of 
education (i.e., university degree or higher), percentage of unpaid or contributing family 
members among both men and women in Montenegro is close to zero. 
The overall share of employed women increases with the level of education, from 35% 
(primary education) to 51% (tertiary education). The share of women in wage employment 
also increases with the level of education, from 35% (primary education) to 53% (tertiary 
education), while the share of women in self-employment decreases with the level of 
education, from 35% (primary education) to 27% (tertiary education). The share of female 
unpaid family members is close to the share of male unpaid family members across all 
educational categories.
Observed by age, most men and women are found in wage employment within all age groups 
(Table A6.2 in Appendix 6). The percentage of wage-employed men and women decreases 
with age, from 83% (15-24 years) to 81% (55-64 years) for men, and from 91% (15-24 years) 
to 85% (55-64 years) for women. Among the self-employed, the highest percentage of both 
men and women is in the age category 25-54 years (20% of men and 10% of women). 
The overall share of employed women decreases with age, from 41% (15-24 years) to 36% 
(55-64 years). The share of wage-employed women starts at 43% for the youngest age 
group (15-24 years), peaks at 48% for the middle age category (25-54 years), and drops 
down to 38% for the most senior age category (55-64 years). Although lower than the 
share of self-employed men at all age categories, the share of self-employed women in 
Montenegro increases with age, from 22% (15-24 years) to 30% (55-64 years). The share of 
female unpaid or contributing family members increases with age, from 44% (15-24 years) 
to 53% (55-64 years), but the percentages of unpaid or contributing family members are 
quite low in all age categories for both men and women. 
The percentage of wage-employed is higher among both men and women in urban areas 
(83% men and 93% women) than in rural areas (72% men and 78% women) (Table A6.3 
in Appendix 6). On the other hand, the percentage of self-employed and unpaid family 
members is higher among both men and women in rural areas than in urban areas. The 
latter can be explained by the fact that there are more agricultural workers in rural areas.
82  Appendix 6 - appendix to this chapter with supporting data referenced throughout, is available online only, at  
www.fren.org.rs/node/220.
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The overall share of employed women is higher in urban (47%) than in rural areas (35%). 
There is a higher share of female unpaid family members in rural (43%) than in urban areas 
(41%), which is “compensated,” on the other hand, by a higher share of wage-employed 
women in urban (50%) than in rural areas (37%). 
Analysed by regions (north/central/coastal), the percentage of wage-employed men and 
women is the lowest in the north (68% of men and 82% of women) and the highest in the 
central region (84% of men and 93% of women) (Table A6.4 in Appendix 6).The share of 
women in wage employment increases from the north (41%) to the south (48%).
In all regions, the percentage of self-employed women is lower than the percentage of 
self-employed men by between 6 (coastal) and 14 percentage points (north). The share of 
women in self-employment increases from the north (22%) to the south (37%). Unpaid 
family members are most often found in the north (3% of men and 4% of women), which 
also has relatively more agricultural workers. However, in all regions the percentages of 
unpaid or contributing family members among both men and women are very low. 
6.1.3 Unadjusted gender wage gap and labour market characteristics
In this section we focus on wage employment only, which is the sub-sample of employees 
that we use in our regresion analysis. We describe wage characteristics for men and women, 
gender differences in wages as well as the structure of wage employment. 
The sample that we use throughout our analysis consists of 8,969 individuals (4,973 men 
and 3,996 women) for whom we observe wages in the LFS in the period from the 4th 
quarter of 2008 to the 4th quarter of 2011 (bi-quarterly data). The base sample includes 
individuals in the age group 15-64, who work full-time either in the public or the private 
sector, are not in training or formal education, and are not self-employed and/or unpaid 
family members (we will later test our results for robustness separately for public and 
private sector workers).83 In all regressions specifications, the dependent variable is log 
hourly real wage, deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (base is October 2008). 
Table 6.4 shows that the mean unadjusted wage gap in Montenegro over the analysed 
period is approximately 16.1%. However, the gap differs across the different percentiles of 
the wage distribution, the biggest difference being within the top quintile, where the gap 
is higher by 6.6pp than the average. The unadjusted wage gap is the highest at the median 
level of the wage distribution and it equals 18%.
In this section we disaggregate the average unadjusted gender wage gap and average female 
wages by level of education, tenure, occupation, sector of activity, type of ownership, type 
of contract (temporary/permanent) and region84. Since labour market characteristics of 
employed women vary in comparison to those of employed men, we also contrast these 
different gender wage gaps and female wage levels against variations in labour market 
83  At this stage of the analysis, we were unable to exclude pensioners, people with disabilities or those on regular military 
service, due to the lack of the identifying variable (exgroup).
84  While graphs on education, occupation and sector of activity are shown below, data on tenure, type of ownership, type 
of contract and region can be found in Appendix 6.
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characteristics of both genders. This is a necessary step because in the next section (in the 
econometric analysis of the wage gap) we will adjust the gender wage gap with respect to 
these variations in labour market characteristics. That step will ensure that we compare 
wages between a man and a woman with exactly the same labour market characteristics 
(instead of the average employed woman against an average employed man, who are very 
different by labour market characteristics). The data on the unadjusted gender wage gap 
and labour market characteristics are summarised in the Graphs 1.5-1.7 below. 
Table 6.4. Male and female hourly wages per quintile of the wage distribution
Log hourly wages
hourly wage gap (%)
Female Male
1st quintile 1.61 1.47 14.5
2nd quintile 1.96 1.82 13.8
3rd quintile 2.16 2.00 16.1
4th quintile 2.36 2.23 12.8
5th quintile 2.92 2.70 22.7
Mean 2.20 2.04 16.1
Sample 4973 3996
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Employed women more frequently have tertiary education than employed men (lighter 
circle in Graph 6.5). This is because women with lower educational attainment more 
frequently stay out of the labour market. Some 31% of women in wage employment have 
tertiary education, compared to 23% of employed men, while 5% of women in wage em-
ployment have primary education, compared to 7% of employed men. We can consider this 
a type of discrimination against women, since in order for women to become employed, 
they need higher educational attainment on average than men do, i.e. they need to invest 
into their education more if they want to get employment. Furthermore, there does not 
seem to be a very large difference between female wages across levels of education. This 
is probably due to the fact that although women who work are better educated than men 
who work, they are employed in the lower paying occupations and sectors of the economy, 
which reduces the possible effect of education on their wage growth. 
The unadjusted wage gap between women and men with tertiary education is much lower 
than between women and men with lower levels of education. The gap is 14% for those 
with tertiary education compared to 21% for those with secondary education and 24% for 
those with primary or lower levels of education. 
In Montenegro both men and women have on average 12 years of tenure with the same 
employer (see Table A6.6 in Appendix 6). The distribution of tenure for two genders looks 
very similar: about 38% of both men and women have up to 5 years of tenure; about 18% 
of them have between 6 and 10 years of tenure; about 20% of both men and women have 
between 10 and 20 years of tenure; about 25% of men and 22% women have between 21 
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and 35 years of tenure. The unadjusted wage gap (the difference in the mean log hourly real 
wage) between men and women is the highest for the category from 6 to 10 years of tenure 
and it equals 18%. For the remaining part of the tenure distribution, the gender difference 
is stable at around 15-16% in favour of men. 
Graph 6.5: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by level of education (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Notes: 1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by 
level of education. Lighter circles represent those characteristics which can be found more frequently among 
employed women than among employed men (e.g. employed women more frequently have tertiary educa-
tion than employed men), while darker circles represent those characteristics which can be found more fre-
quently among employed men (e.g. employed men more frequently have secondary education than employed 
women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference between the genders by that 
particular labour market characterisic.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A6.5 in Appendix 6.
When we disaggregate the data by occupation, we observe that the difference between 
average female and male wage (unadjusted gender wage gap) is higher in occupations 
which require lower skills and pay lower wages (i.e., Service and sales workers; Craft and 
trade workers; Plant and machine operators; and Elementary occupations), than in occupa-
tions which require higher skills and pay higher wages (i.e., Senior officials and managers; 
Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; and Clerks) (Graph 6.6, the lower 
positioned the circle on the y-axis, the more to the right on the x-axis it is).
The wage gap is between 20% and 28% in the first group of occupations, compared to 
7-13% in the second group of occupations. The highest gap (28%) is among Craft and 
trade workers and the lowest (7%) is among Senior officials and managers.
Among the higher pay, higher-skill occupations, women can be found working more fre-
quently in all but the top paid one – Senior officials and managers (in the graph, the circle 
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is darker, while circles are lighter for Professionals, Technicians and Associate Professionals 
and Clerks). This possibly suggests a “glass ceiling” for employed women, who, although 
their overall education structure is better than male, cannot access the top positions, which 
pay the highest wages. Of course, a supply side reason for this could be that women select 
away from positions with greater responsibility due to different preferences in comparison 
to men. Although the gender wage gap is the lowest among Senior officials and managers 
(7%) in comparison to the gap in other occupations, it still exists. This may imply that 
women are more frequently Senior officials and managers in sectors which are less paid on 
average, and/or that they cannot access the top management positions.
For the lower-skill, lower pay occupations, women can more frequently be found working 
in those with the lowest female wages – Service and sales workers and in Elementary 
occupations (lighter circles). Therefore, we can conclude that women are on average better 
paid in the more male dominated occupations, i.e. that feminised occupations on average 
pay women less than masculinised professions. 
Graph 6.6: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by occupation (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Footnotes: 
(a) Professionals include armed forces.
(b) Technicians and associate professionals include skilled agricultural workers.
Notes:1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by oc-
cupation. Lighter circles represent those occupations in which women can be found more frequently than men 
(e.g. women can be found more frequently working as Clerks than men), while darker circles represent those 
occupations in which men are employed more frequently (e.g. men can be found more frequently working as 
Plant and machine operators than women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference 
in gender frequencies within each occupation.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A6.7 in Appendix 6.
143
The distribution of employees by sector of activity in Montenegro shows large differences 
in Industry (31% of all employed men and 11% of all employed women) and Public ser-
vices sector (32% of all employed men and 46% of all employed women). Participation of 
women and men in Agriculture and Modern Services is comparable between men and 
women (a gap of about 1 percentage point in favour of men in Agriculture and in favour of 
women in Modern Services). There is a 6pp difference in favour of women in Traditional 
Services (Graph 6.7).
The unadjusted gender wage gap is the largest in Traditional Services and Industry (21%). 
The unadjusted gap is the lowest in Modern Services (3%), where the share of women is 
48%. In Agriculture, the unadjusted gap is 16% in favour of women. 
Graph 6.7: Unadjusted gender wage gaps,
female log wages and employment gaps, by sector of activity (15-64)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Footnotes: (a) Traditional services: Trade, HORECA, Transport. (b) Modern services: Communication, Financial 
intermediation, Real estate, Experts. (c) Public services: Public administration, Education, Health, Social service 
activities, ET organisations.
Notes:1) Size of the circles indicates the differences in the frequency of male vs. female employment by sector 
of activity. Lighter circles represent those sectors in which women can be found more frequently than men 
(e.g. women can be found more frequently working in Public administration than men), while darker circles 
represent those sectors in which men are employed more frequently (e.g. men can be found more frequently 
working in Industry than women). The size (surface) of the circle shows the extent of this difference in gender 
frequencies within each sector.
2) The data used for this graph can be found in Table A6.8 in Appendix 6.
When we disaggregate the data by type of ownership (private vs. public sector) we see 
that men can be found more frequently in the private sector, whereas women more often 
work in the public sector (Table A6.9 in Appendix 6). The unadjusted wage gap is 9% in 
favour of men in the public sector and 24% in the private sector. Although it may seem 
attractive to rush to the conclusion that the public sector discriminates against women less 
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than the private sector, we must also keep in mind that workers in the public sector are 
on average better educated and that there is a significantly larger portion of high-skilled 
workers among them. A more detailed analysis that follows in the next section will reveal 
the true wage gap in the public and private sectors and compare them.
When we disaggregate the data by type of contract (temporary/permanent), we see a quite 
similar structure between the two genders: around 12% employees with a temporary and 
about 88% of employees with a permanent contract (Table A6.10 in Appendix 6). The 
unadjusted wage gap between women and men is close to 18% for those on a temporary 
contract and 16% for those on a permanent contract, in favour of men. 
When we disaggregate the data by region (north, central, and coastal), we see that there 
are more men than women in the north of Montenegro (5 percentage points gap), whereas 
women are more represented in the central and coastal regions (around 5 percentage 
points gap) (Table A6.11 in Appendix 6). The largest difference in wages between men 
and women is in the central region (18%). 
6.2 Understanding the gap (econometric analysis)
As we have shown in the previous section, the two genders differ significantly according 
to characteristics and skill levels of women and men who work. Therefore, in this section 
we adjust the gender wage gap to reflect these differences in characteristics. In that sense, 
we move away from a simple calculation of the difference in the average wage between an 
average employed man and an average employed woman, i.e. the unadjusted pay gap, and 
reweigh it by labour market characteristics of each employed individual. We then get the 
adjusted gender wage gap, i.e. the true wage gap between the genders.
We then attempt to understand the adjusted gap further, by looking at whether women and 
men have different returns to education, tenure, choice of occupation and other personal 
characteristics, i.e. whether the labour market rewards the same characteristics differently 
depending on the person’s gender. 
The purpose of this section is to throw more light on the reasons why the gender pay gap 
exists and persists in the Montenegrin labour market. Identifying factors which explain 
the gender pay gap is extremely important from a policy perspective, because only knowing 
what affects the gender pay gap can help policy makers design measures to tackle it. 
6.2.1 Mincer wage equations and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Table 6.8 shows Mincer wage equation estimation results, estimated on the working age 
population sample (15-64 years), in the period from the 4th quarter of 2008 to the 4th 
quarter of 2011 (bi-quarterly data), excluding workers with missing or zero wages. All 
estimated specifications report heteroscedasticity-corrected robust standard errors. Table 
6.8 also reports goodness-of-fit statistics, such as R-squared, root mean square error, and 
an F-test for overall goodness of fit of the regression. 
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The coefficient next to female in Specification 1 (column 1) in Table 6.8, where female is the 
only explanatory variable, is interpreted as the unadjusted gender pay gap. In Montenegro, 
on average, the gender pay gap between men and women was 16.1% over the analysed 
period, in favour of men. Including education, work experience with the same employer 
(tenure), and time fixed effects (Specification 3) brings the estimated gender pay gap up to 
19.2% (column 3). The full specification in column (5) shows an estimated gender pay gap 
of about 16.1% in favour of men (the specification has the smallest root mean square error 
and R-squared of about 23%). 
Table 6.8. Mincer Equation Estimation Results (Specifications S1 to S5)
VARIABLES S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Female -0.161*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.151*** -0.161***
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Education 
& tenure
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes
Work-related 
variables(1)
Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes
Sample 8,969 8,969 8,969 8,969 8,969
R-squared 0.022 0.161 0.161 0.205 0.233
RMSE 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47
F-test 209 388 181 120 146
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) Occupation (ISCO), Sector of activity (NACE), Ownership (public/private), Type of contract (temporary/
permanent; written/non-written).
Estimation results of the complete Mincer wage specifications are reported in Appendix 6 
(Table A6.12). Estimation results show the expected effect of labour market characteristics 
on the gap. Coefficients for the two education dummy variables measuring secondary and 
tertiary education are positive and rising with level of education (elementary education is 
the omitted category), i.e. returns to education increase with education, such that those 
with secondary and tertiary education have 12.7% and 41.4% higher wages than individu-
als with elementary education only. Such wage compression and low returns to education 
exist due to strong minimum wage legislation, which raises the wage floor. Similarly, the 
coefficient for tenure is positive, showing that wages increase with tenure. 
Estimation results also point to the expected impact of job characteristics and region on 
wages. The wages are the highest for Senior officials and managers, Professionals, Techni-
cians and associate professionals, and Plant and machine operators. The wages are the 
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lowest for occupations such as Service and sales workers and Elementary occupations. 
When it comes to the sector of work, working in Communication and Financial interme-
diation has positive significant effect of wages. The wages are significantly higher in central 
and coastal regions in comparison to the north of Montenegro.
A robustness check (population subgroups of 19-64 and 19-59 years of age; wages with 
and without extreme values and with inclusion of part-time workers) estimation results are 
presented in Table A6.13 in Appendix 6. 
Estimates from the Mincer equations can be summarised in the basic Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, where the difference in the average log hourly wage (unadjusted gender 
wage gap) is decomposed into the explained part (due to differences in personal, job spe-
cific and regional characteristics) and the unexplained part, i.e. the adjusted gender wage 
gap (differences in returns to the same characteristics and differences due to unobservable 
differences in personal characteristics) (Table 6.9). 
Based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, we conclude that:
(i) On average, working women have 16.1% lower hourly wages than men. 
(ii) The differences in labour market characteristics between men and women (i.e., 
education, tenure, job characteristics, time fixed effects, and regional effects) can-
not explain the difference in wages in Montenegro. When these characteristics are 
taken into account, the explained part of the wage gap is not statistically significant 
and the gap stays at the same level. In other words, if women, on average, had the 
same characteristics as men, their wages would not be different than they are now. 
Therefore, the entire earnings gap equals the adjusted one, which is interpreted as an 
effect of labour market discrimination.85
(iii) The fact that the wage gap grows to 19.2% when we include only education and 
tenure into the equation, and it drops down to 16.1% when we add occupation, 
sector of activity and region, implies the following: while employed women have 
better personal labour market characteristics than employed men, they do not “use” 
these characteristics in order to access the better paid occupations and sectors.
Table 6.9. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition - main results (Specification S5)
Coefficient Standard errors
Men (mean log-hourly wage) 0.675*** (0.008)
Women (mean log-hourly wage) 0.514*** (0.008)
Difference (unadjusted gender pay gap) 0.161*** (0.011)
Explained part 0.000 (0.007)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.161*** (0.010)
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
85  In addition to discrimination, the adjusted pay gap can also be a consequence of differences in unobservable character-
istics at the labour market, as well as insufficient disaggregation of certain characteristics.
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Differences in characteristics 
Graph 6.10 shows the most important labour market characteristics that explain the wage 
gap (darker bars). We can see that the labour market characteristics “explaining” the gap 
work in the opposite directions, so that the true gender gap (unexplained part) stays the 
same as the unadjusted wage gap.
Graph 6.10. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (in percentage points)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008 – Q4 2011.
Note: Unobservables are only present under differences in returns, since they represent differences in 
unobservable characteristics which cannot be measured.
In the next section we elaborate in more detail separate effects of each component of the 
wage gap (as presented in Table A6.14 in Appendix 6). This analysis is then summarised 
in Table 6.11 below.
The wage gap would be higher by 2.4 percentage points if women had the same educational 
characteristics as men.
(i) As we have seen from descriptive statistics, a larger share of working women than 
men have tertiary education (31% of women compared to 23% of men). At the same 
time, there are fewer working women than men with primary education only (7% of 
men and 5% of women).
(ii) Since workers with tertiary education have on average higher wages, female average 
wages would be lower (and thus the gap higher) if women had the same educational 
characteristics as men. 
The average tenure of men is 12.2, and for women it is 11.7 years. Since higher tenure 
means higher wages, if men and women were to have the same tenure, the wage gap would 
be lower by 0.2pp.
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The wage gap would be lower by 1.3 percentage points if women had the same occupational 
characteristics as men. However, there are substantial differences across occupations, where 
the share of women in some makes the unadjusted gap lower, while in others it makes it 
seem higher than it truly is.
(i) Somewhat lower frequency of women in the highly paid Senior officials and mana-
gerial positions (3% of men and 2% of women) makes the unadjusted gap bigger 
than the true gap by 0.3pp. 
(ii) Higher frequency of women among Professionals (13% of men and 20% of women) 
and Technicians and associate professionals (17% of men and 23% of women), which 
fall into the top pay occupations, makes the unadjusted gap smaller than the true gap 
by 0.7pp and 0.4pp, respectively.
(iii) Higher frequency of women among Clerks (16% of women compared to 11% of 
men), Service and sales workers (28% of women compared to 20% of men) and in 
Elementary occupations (9% of women compared to 6% of men), which fall into the 
lowest pay occupations, makes the unadjusted gap seem bigger than the true gap by 
0.3, 1.1, and 0.5 percentage points, respectively.
The wage gap would be smaller by 2.1 percentage points if employed women were distrib-
uted by sector of activity in the same way as men. More specifically:
(i) Lower frequency of women in Industry (11% of all employed women compared 
to 31% of all employed men), which is the sector of activity with the 2nd highest 
returns to employment, increases the gap by 1.1pp.
(ii) Higher frequency of women in Public administration, education and health (46% 
of women compared to 32% of men), which is the sector with the lowest returns 
(although not statistically significant), increases the gap by 1.1pp.
The unadjusted gap is lower than the true gap by 0.8%, 0.2% and 0.2%, respectively, for 
north, central, and coastal regions.
Table 6.11 summarises the above discussion. Higher frequency of women in jobs which 
are better paid (Tertiary education, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals, 
central and coastal regions), and their lower frequency in the lower paid jobs (Primary 
education, Secondary education, and northern region) make the unadjusted gap smaller 
than the true gap. These are “positive” characteristics of women on the labour market: if the 
characteristics were the same as for men, the wage gap would be higher.
On the other hand, lower frequency of women in jobs which are better paid (Senior of-
ficials and managerial positions, Industry), and higher frequency of women in lower-paid 
jobs (Clerks, Service and sales, Elementary occupations, Public administration, education 
and health) make the unadjusted gap bigger than the true gap. Namely, these are “negative” 
labour market characteristics of women: if the characteristics were the same as for men, 
the unadjusted wage gap would be lower. These positive and negative characteristics are 
working in opposite directions so they cancel each other out. 
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Table 6.11. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition – explained part 
– the impact of differences in characteristics between the genders 
on the gender wage gap
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
- Tertiary education (-1.7pp)
- Professionals (-0.7pp) 
- Technicians and associate 
professionals (-0.4pp)
- Central region (-0.2pp)
- Coastal region (-0.2pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
- Clerks   (0.3pp)
- Service and sales (1.1pp)
- Elementary occupations (0.5pp)
- Public administration, 
education and health (1.1pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
Lower frequency 
of women
- Senior officials and  
managerial positions (0.3pp)
- Industry (1.1pp)
- Tenure (0.2pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem larger.
- Primary education (-0.4pp)
- Secondary education (-0.3pp)
- Northern region (-0.8pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Note: Number in brackets shows by how much the gap is reduced/increased when not adjusted for the dif-
ference in the characteristic. Percentage points shown in brackets show contribution of each characteristic to 
adjustment of the total gap. 
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data from Q4 2008 to Q4 2011.
Differences in returns
In the previous sub-section, we analysed in detail the explained part of the gender pay gap. 
We looked at the contribution of average personal characteristics of employed women vs. 
employed men to the observed difference in their wages. In that sense, we assumed the 
same returns to the same characteristics for both genders, i.e. we assumed that employers 
would pay the same wage to a woman if she had the same labour market characteristics 
as a man. The main conclusion from that analysis is that if women in Montenegro had 
the same labour market characteristics as men, the gender pay gap would be 16.1%.
This unexplained, or adjusted, wage gap of 16.1% exists because of: i) labour market 
discrimination against women, in a sense that there are differences between the genders 
in returns to the same labour market characteristics, and ii) unobserved heterogeneity of 
workers’ characteristics, which we were not able to capture through variables such as educa-
tion, tenure, occupation, etc.86 
86  These unobservable characteristics can also be due to gender inequality, since women may be less flexible or unable to 
work longer hours due to care responsibilities in the household. 
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In Graph 6.10, the lighter bar “unobservables” shows the share of the true (adjusted) wage 
gap which exists due to differences in unobservable characteristics between the genders. The 
other lighter bars in Graph 6.10 show the differences in returns on analysed characteristics. 
A large share in the unexplained part of the wage differential (adjusted gap), 75% (12pp 
out of 16.1%), cannot be accounted for by different returns to the same labour market 
characteristics between the genders (Table A6.14 in Appendix 6). This means that there 
is some other unobservable heterogeneity between the genders, which leads to the wage 
gap (the lighter bar “unobservable characteristics” in Graph 6.10). As we discuss in the 
literature review of this report, such heterogeneity could exist due to the fact that, for 
example, women may be less flexible or unable to work longer hours due to housework and 
care responsibilities in the household, which is also a form of gender inequality.
On the other hand, differences in returns account for 25% of the adjusted gap (4.1pp out of 
16.1%). A detailed analysis of the unexplained part of the wage gap (adjusted gap) shows 
that women, on average, have higher returns to working in the public vs. the private sector 
in comparison to men, whereas they have lower returns to work experience with the same 
employer (tenure) and sector of activity, when these characteristics are measured as one 
grouped category (Graph 6.10, lighter bars). 
A detailed decomposition (Table A6.14 in Appendix 6) reveals that for some characteristics, 
wage returns are higher for men than for women, and vice versa. The next section discusses 
the most important differences in wage returns separately for men and women in more detail.
Differences in returns to education between men and women are high (Graph 6.10) but 
they are not statistically significant (the same goes for type of contract). Men have higher 
returns to tenure than women. Namely, while the returns to tenure are statistically signifi-
cant for men (the wages are higher by 1% with each additional year of tenure), for women 
they are not statistically significant. This means that women are less rewarded than men by 
year of tenure with the same employer. Further, unlike the positive effect that we find for 
men, longer years of tenure do not seem to have any effect on female wages.
The overall difference in returns to sector of activity is statistically significant and in favour 
of men. More specifically, returns are higher for men in Industry and Public administra-
tion, education and health, by 1.8 and 4.5pp respectively (Table A6.14 in Appendix 6).
The overall difference in returns to working in the public vs. the private sector is statically 
significant and in favour of women. If we look at the Mincer wage regression estimation 
results estimated separately for men and women (Table A6.14 in Appendix 6), estimated 
returns to working in the public vs. the private sector are statistically significant only for 
women, indicating higher wages for females in the public sector, ceteris paribus.
However, since the returns are lower for women for dummy variable Public administration, 
education and health (as a sector of activity), and higher for women in the public sector 
(type of ownership) and these variables significantly overlap, it is difficult to interpret these 
results. Since in the later part of the analysis we separate the public and private sector, 
we will be able to analyse the effect of each sector of activity on wages for the public and 
private sector separately.
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In conclusion, at the level of the whole-sample analysis, 75% of the gap is due to the 
differences in unobservable characteristics, while 25% of the gap is due to, on average, 
higher male returns to observed labour market characteristics, mostly to sector of activity. 
However, due to the opposite effects of ownership and other statistically significant differ-
ences in returns, the importance of returns may be underestimated. This will be investigated 
below, in a separate analysis by the public and the private sector.
6.2.2 Gender pay gap at different parts of the distribution:
          quintile regressions
In the previous sub-section, we analysed the differences in mean unadjusted and adjusted 
wage gaps between men and women. In this section we split the sample into five wage 
brackets (quintiles) for men and women and compare the wages between men and women 
within these quintiles.
Both the unadjusted and adjusted pay gap are statistically significant at each of the five 
percentiles of the distribution. Explained part of the BO decomposition is positive and 
statistically significant only at the top – in the 5th quintile of the wage distribution. Detailed 
results for quintile regressions are available in Appendix 6 (Tables A6.15 and A6.16).
As already mentioned in the descriptive analysis, the unadjusted gaps in the 1st, 2nd and 4th 
quintile are slightly lower than the average unadjusted gap. In the 3rd quintile, the gap is at 
the average level of 16.1%, while in the top 5th quintile, it stands at 22.7% (Graph 6.12).  
The trend of the adjusted (true) gaps closely follows the trend of the unadjusted gaps (since 
the differences in the labour market characteristics are insignificant), except for the 5th 
quintile where the differences in labour market characteristics are significant and in favour 
of men. Since women have worse labour market characteristics in this quintile (due to a 
higher share of men with tertiary education and among Professionals and Clerks in this 
quintile87), the adjusted gap in this quintile is significantly lower than the unadjusted and 
stands at 16.2%.
In other words, the trend of the unadjusted gap across the income quintiles suggests strong 
presence of the glass ceiling in Montenegro, since the unadjusted gap within the 5th quintile 
is higher by 6.6pp than the average wage gap. However, the trends in the adjusted (true) 
gap suggest that the unadjusted gap within the 5th quintile is overestimated, since the true 
gap is at the level of the 3rd quintile, as men within this quintile have better labour market 
characteristics.
Results of the quantile regression analysis, which serve as a robustness check to the analysis 
above, point to similar conclusions, although the differences between the adjusted gaps 
in the percentiles are less pronounced and the differences in the adjusted gaps between 
quintiles are not statically significant (Graph A6.15a in Appendix 6). 
87  In other words, men who have tertiary education are able to access highest-paid positions much easier than women with 
tertiary education. 
152
Graph 6.12. Unadjusted and adjusted gaps 
in different quintiles of the wage distribution
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
6.2.3 Gender pay gap during the economic crisis: separate waves 
In this part of the analysis we apply the same methodology to each period in the data 
(from Q4 2008 to Q4 2011, considering that the data are bi-quarterly). The analysis shows 
that coefficients for both unadjusted and adjusted pay gaps are significant in all analysed 
data periods (Table A6.17 in Appendix 6). Similarly to the overall analysis, the coefficient 
for the explained part of the BO decomposition is close to zero and not significant in any 
of the analysed data periods, confirming that characteristics accounted for in the model 
cannot explain observed wage gap between men and women. Detailed BO decompositions 
for each analysed period are available in Appendix 6 (Table A6.18).
Between Q4 2008 and Q4 2011 there was an increase in wages for both men and women, 
although the increase was more pronounced for women (see Graph 6.13). Namely, while 
female wages grew by almost 10%, male grew by 4%. This led to a decrease in both the 
unadjusted and adjusted pay gaps in this period, by 6 percentage points (from about 18% 
to 12%, see Graph 6.13). However, most of these changes occurred during 2011, while the 
gap, as well as the wage levels for both genders, remained more or less constant between 
Q4 2008 and Q2 2011. This increase in wages occurred due to the increase in the minimum 
wage in 2011, which was indexed to 30% of the average wage, as well as the introduction 
of compulsory fringe benefits (daily meal and holiday allowances).
Over the analysed period, both adjusted and unadjusted wage gaps were reduced, from 
around 18% in 2008 to around 12% in 2011. Although these legal changes in 2011 im-
proved the status of those with the lowest wages (of both genders), which could have 
disproportionately helped employed women, it seems like the crisis also had a stronger 
negative impact on men, which served to further narrow the wage gap. Since male employ-
ment rate fell substantially during the crisis while the female employment rate was stable, 
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the shrinking of the wage gap in this period could probably be explained by the fact that 
the economic crisis impacted masculinised sectors and occupations of the economy (e.g. 
construction, industrial production) stronger than the feminised ones, which could have 
served to narrow the wage gap (as well as the employment gap). However, as the shrink-
ing of the gap in this period occurred due to a more negative impact of the crisis on men, 
we may also expect the gap to grow back to pre-crisis levels, as the masculinised sectors 
recover. 
Graph 6.13. Trends of male and female log hourly wages (left panel) and 
BO decomposition components (right panel) between Q4 2008 and Q4 2011
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
6.3 Heckman selection model 
The basic idea of the Heckman selection model is to account for the effects of self-selection, 
i.e. a person’s decision not to work, on the wage gap (assuming that not being in employ-
ment is at one’s will). A large number of those out of employment in Montenegro are not 
“willingly out of work,” but they are unemployed (unemployment rate is around 20% for 
women and 18% for men). However, due to the lack of information on the main labour 
market status of surveyed individuals, we cannot follow the aproach in Beblo et al. (2003) 
and eliminate the unemployed from the sample of non-employed. However, in order to 
homogenise our sample, we follow Beblo et al. (2003) in dropping those who are (i) in 
education or inactive and under 19 years of age, (ii) inactive and older than 60 and (iii) 
inactive with 1-year-old children.
Heckman selection model estimation results suggest that endogenous sample selection 
is observed for both samples of working men and women. Both Rho in the Heckman 
equation estimated by maximum-likelihood approach, and the inverse Mills ratio in the 
equation estimated by the Heckman two-step approach, are significant for both samples of 
working men and women (see Table A6.19 in Appendix 6).
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Selection equation shows that the probability of being in the workforce grows with age 
and is: 
(i) Higher for those with secondary or tertiary levels of education;
(ii) Lower for women with children of any age between 0 and 14 (i.e., children younger 
than 1 year, between 1 and 3 years, between 3 and 6 years, and between 7 and 14 
years) and lower for men with children aged 3-6 years.
(iii) Higher for men who have a partner and lower for women who have a partner.
(iv) Higher for both men and women who have partner who works (which might also 
be an age-of-partner effect).
(v) Higher for both men and women living in the central region and higher only for 
women living the coastal region.
In order to interpret the selection effects from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition perspec-
tive, we follow the approach of Neuman and Oaxaca (2004), labelled the “decomposition 
of the selectivity corrected wage differential.” This aproach represents the decomposition of 
the selection-adjusted wages.88 Table 6.14 summarises the analysis of the selection effects 
on the gender pay gap. Column “without selection” shows the results of the BO decompo-
sition without applying Heckman’s selection procedure. The unadjusted wage gap which 
takes selection into the labour force in account is higher (17.6%) than the unadjusted wage 
gap without selection (16.1%). 
Since men with low predicted probability of labour force participation should earn less 
than men with similar productivity endowments (i.e., labour market characteristics) but 
with a higher predicted probability of participation, the wages of the latter group should 
be corrected upward. Thus, the corrected wages for men (i.e., accounting for the selection 
into the labour force) are higher by 4.2% in the “with selection correction” column, than in 
the “without selection correction” column. Similarly, negative inverse Mills ratio for women 
suggests that women with lower predicted probability of participation should earn less than 
women with similar productivity endowments (i.e., labour market characteristics) but with a 
higher predicted probability of participation. That is, the wages of the latter group should be 
corrected upward. Therefore, the corrected wages for women are higher by 2.7% in the “with 
selection correction” column than in the “without selection correction” column. “Corrected” 
wage differential (i.e., accounting for the selection into the labour force) is thus higher than 
the “uncorrected” one, leading to the increase in the wage gap. The explained part of the BO 
decomposition stays at the same level, but the unadjusted and adjusted (unexplained) wage 
gaps are corrected upwards by 1.5 percentage points. In other words, when selection is taken 
into account, the total adjusted wage gap grows to 17.6%.
Similarly to the estimation without selection, both unadjusted and adjusted (unexplained) 
wage gaps are almost the same in the decomposition which accounts for the selection, 
suggesting that controlling for labour market characteristics cannot explain the observed 
88  The interpretation of the selection effect within the BO decomposition framework is still a matter of debate. Neuman and 
Oaxaca (2004) further suggest there are “alternative decompositions that could be considered but that require stronger 
assumptions and perhaps value judgements about what constitutes inequity.”
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differences in wages among men and women in Montenegro over the analysed period. In 
other words, if women, on average, had the same characteristics as men, their wages would 
not be different than they are now, even when we take into account selection into the 
labour force. Therefore, the entire earnings gap of 17.6% equals the adjusted one, which is 
interpreted as an effect of labour market discrimination.
Table 6.14. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
with and without selection correction
Without selection
correction
With selection 
correction
Difference
Men (mean log-hourly wage) 0.675*** 0.717*** 4.2%
(0.008) (0.014)
Women (mean log-hourly wage) 0.514*** 0.541*** 2.7%
(0.008) (0.013)
Difference (unadjusted 
gender pay gap)
0.161*** 0.176*** 1.5pp
(0.011) (0.019)
Explained part 0.000 0.000 0.0pp
(0.007) (0.007)
Unexplained part 
(adjusted pay gap)
0.161*** 0.176*** 1.5pp
(0.010) (0.018)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Own calculation based on the LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes:
6.3.1 Gender wage gap across type of ownership: 
           private vs. public sector analysis   
Mincer wage regression in the public vs. the private sector
Mincer wage regressions which are estimated separately for private and public sectors and 
separately for men and women (S5, Tables A6.22-24 in Appendix 6) show that the adjusted 
wage gap is 12% in the public and 17% in the private sector, in favour of men. Further, 
in both private and public sectors, wage returns to education are significantly higher for 
individuals with tertiary education, compared to individuals with primary education. Only 
in the public sector are wage returns to education significantly higher for individuals with 
secondary education, compared to individuals with primary education. These conclusions 
remain for both men and women working in the public vs. the private sector.
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Positive returns to years of tenure are significant in the public sector and only marginally 
significant in the private sector. If we look at the Mincer wage regression estimation results 
estimated separately for men and women, we see that the significant positive effect to tenure 
comes from significant effects for men but not for women in both public and private sectors. 
This means that for comparable years of work experience with the same employer, women 
are paid less than men. Further, unlike the positive effect for men, more years of work 
experience with the same employer does not seem to have any effect on female wages.
Interestingly, wage returns to all time fixed effects dummies are positive and significant 
in public sector only (base category is October 2008), and not significantly different from 
zero at all time periods in the private sector. This means that, compared to October 2008, 
the wages in the public sector became higher over time, while they did not significantly 
increase in the private sector, due to time effects. The same conclusion remains if we look at 
estimation results separately for men and women, showing that time effects were particu-
larly important for increase in wages in the public sector between Q4 2009 and Q2 2011.
Estimated wage returns to all occupations in both public and private sectors are statistically 
significant. For all occupations, wage returns are higher in the private than in the public 
sector. In both public and private sector, among all occupational categories, wage returns 
to Senior officials and managers are the highest. In the public sector, wage returns for 
Elementary occupations are the lowest, whereas in the private sector wage returns for 
Service and sales workers are the lowest. The same conclusions remain when results are 
estimated separately for men and women in the public and private sectors.
When it comes to sector of activity, estimated wage returns show positive significant effect 
for workers employed in Industry or Communication and financial intermediation (base 
category is Agriculture), although in the public sector only. Estimated wage returns to 
sector of activity are not statistically significant in the private sector in the joint sample. 
Only when results are estimated separately for men and women, we observe that for female 
workers employed in Public administration, education, and health wage returns are signifi-
cant in both public and private sectors.  
Finally, in both private and public sectors, wage returns to region of residence are higher 
for individuals living in the central or coastal regions (base category is living in the north). 
This conclusion remains when results are estimated separately for men and women in the 
public and private sectors.
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the public vs. the private sector
In this part of the analysis we compare the gender pay gap between private and public 
sectors in Montenegro. Table 6.15 shows that in both sectors, all indicators of the BO 
decomposition (unadjusted pay gap, explained part and adjusted pay gap) are statistically 
significant. In comparison to the joint analysis in the previous sections, the explained part 
of the BO decomposition becomes significant only when analysis is done for public and 
private sectors separately. 
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On average, for both men and women, wages are higher in the public than in the private 
sector. For men, this difference is 1.9% in favour of public sector wages, and for women this 
difference is 17% in favour of public sector wages (Table 6.15 and Graph 6.16, left panel).
Consequently, the unadjusted gap is 15 percentage points higher in the private than in the 
public sector. Namely, while in the private sector men receive 23.7% higher wages than 
women, this difference in the public sector is “only” about 9% (Table 6.15 and Graph 6.16, 
right panel).
Table 6.15. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition,
separately for public and private sectors a
Public Private Difference
Men (log hourly wage) 0.686*** 0.667*** 1.9%
(0.010) (0.012)
Women (log hourly wage) 0.599*** 0.429*** 17%
(0.010) (0.012)
Difference (unadjusted pay gap) 0.087*** 0.237*** -15pp
(0.014) (0.017)
Explained part -0.031*** 0.064*** -9.5pp
(0.009) (0.011)
Unexplained part (adjusted pay gap) 0.118*** 0.174*** -5.6pp
(0.013) (0.015)
Observations 4,291 4,678
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
aDetailed BO decomposition for public/private sector is available in Appendix 6 (Table A6.24). 
The difference in the adjusted gap is significantly lower – about 6 percentage points, since 
women in the public sector have better labour market characteristics than men, while in 
the private sector they have worse characteristics than men. Namely, the differences in 
the characteristics “underestimate” the true gap by 3% in the public sector, such that the 
adjusted gap in the public sector is 11.7%. On the other hand, in the private sector, the 
differences in characteristics “overestimate” the true gap by 6%, such that the adjusted gap 
in the private sector is 17.5% (Table 6.15 and Graph 6.16, right panel). 
While the unadjusted wage gap in the private sector is 24%, the adjusted pay gap is 18%, 
i.e. worse labour market characteristics of women in comparison to men can explain a 
part of it. Exactly the opposite is true in the public sector. While the unadjusted pay gap 
in favour of men is 9%, the adjusted wage gap is 12%, which means that women working 
in the public sector have better labour market characteristics than men (mainly better 
education and higher participation in better paid occupations).
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Graph 6.16. Male and female log hourly wages (left panel)
and wage gaps (right panel) in the private and public sectors 
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
Differences in characteristics in the public vs. the private sector
Graph 6.17 shows the most important labour market characteristics that “underestimate” 
or “overestimate” the pay gap in the public and the private sector. In the public sector, 
the most important effects are the effects of education (underestimate), sector of activity 
(overestimate), and region (underestimate). Better female position regarding these three 
characteristics underestimates or overestimates the true gap by 4, 2.4, and 1pp, respectively. 
In the private sector, the most important effects are the effects of tenure, occupation, and 
region. While tenure and occupation overestimate the true gap by 0.7pp and 5.9pp, regional 
effects underestimate the gap by 0.9pp.
Table 6.18 shows a detailed analysis of the explained part of the unadjusted gap in the 
public sector. In the public sector, the most important “positive” characteristics are: higher 
participation of women in high-paid jobs that require tertiary level of education (higher 
by 12.4 percentage points: 44.4% of women vs. 32% of men), jobs among Professionals 
(higher by 10.2 percentage points: 31.4% of women vs. 21.2% of men), and jobs among 
Technicians and associate professionals (higher by 11 percentage points: 31% of women 
vs. 20% of men. These three characteristics underestimate the true gap by 3.3, 1.1, and 
0.5 percentage points, respectively (Table A6.24 in Appendix 6). Additional “positive” 
characteristics of women and their impact on the gap can be found in Table 6.18.
On the other hand, “negative” characteristics that work to overestimate the unadjusted pay 
gap are lower participation of women among high-paid jobs of Senior officials and managers 
(lower by 1.7 percentage points: 1.3% of women vs. 3% of men), lower participation of women 
in Industry (lower by 19.7 percentage points: 6.9% of women vs. 21.4% of men), as well as 
higher participation of women in low-paid jobs such as Clerical positions (higher by 5.2 
percentage points: 18.3% of women vs. 13.1% of men), Elementary occupations (higher by 4 
percentage points: 10.7% of women vs. 6.7% of men), and in Public administration, educa-
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tion and health (higher by 20.3pp: 81.9% of women vs. 61.6% of men). If these characteristics 
of women were the same as those of men, the unadjusted gap would be lower.
Graph 6.17. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by sector of ownership 
– explained part – the impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
In total, “positive” characteristics of women in the public sector prevail over “negative” 
ones, so that the overall unadjusted gap is underestimated, i.e. it would be higher by 
around 3.1pp if women had the same characteristics as men. The most important “posi-
tive” characteristics of women in the public sector, that underestimate the wage gap, are 
their higher participation in high-paid jobs (i.e. Professionals), as well as high-paid jobs 
which require tertiary level of education.
Table 6.19 shows detailed analysis of the explained part of the unadjusted gap in the private 
sector. In the private sector, “positive” characteristic of women is their lower participation 
in low-paid jobs with primary education only (lower by 3.1 percentage points: 4.5% of 
women vs. 7.6% of men). On the other hand, “negative” characteristics that work to over-
estimate the unadjusted pay gap are lower participation of women among high-paid jobs 
of Senior officials and managers (lower by 1.2 percentage points: 2.3% of women vs. 3.5% 
of men), lower participation of women among the category Plant and machine operators 
(lower by 18.1 percentage points: 1.5% of women vs.19.6% of men), which belongs to 
a group of higher-paid job positions in private sector, as well as higher participation of 
women in low-paid jobs such as Clerical positions (higher by 4.4 percentage points: 14.1% 
of women, vs. 9.7% of men), Service and sales workers (higher by 26.8 percentage points: 
49.6% of women vs. 22.8% of men), and in Public administration, education and health 
(higher by 4.5 percentage points: 10.4% of women vs. 5.9% of men). These characteristics 
overestimate the gap by 0.2, 0.2, 5.1, and 0.5 percentage points, respectively (Table A6.24 
in Appendix 6). If these characteristics of women were the same as those of men, the 
unadjusted gap would be lower.
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Table 6.18. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the public sector 
– explained part – detailed impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap 
High wage jobs Low wage jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
- Tertiary education (-3.3pp)
- Professionals (-1.1pp) 
- Technicians and associate 
professionals (-0.5pp)
- Central region (-0.1pp)
- Coastal region (-0.1pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
- Clerks   (0.3pp)
- Elementary 
occupations (1.2pp)
- Public administration, 
education and health (1.6pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Lower frequency 
of women
- Senior officials and manage-
rial positions (0.5pp)
- Manufacturing (1.1pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
- Primary education (-0.3pp)
- Secondary 
education (-0.3pp)
- Agriculture (-0.1)
- Service and sales 
workers (-0.3pp)
- Plant and machine 
operators (-0.5pp)
- Northern region (-0.7pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data, waves Q4 2008–Q4 2011.
In total, “negative” characteristics of women in the private sector prevail over “posi-
tive” ones, such that the overall unadjusted gap is overestimated, i.e. it would be lower 
by 6.4pp if women had the same characteristics as men. The most important “negative” 
characteristic of women in the private sector, that overestimates the wage gap, is their 
higher participation in the low-paid Service and sales workers category (higher by 26.8 
percentage points: 49.6% of women vs. 22.8% of men).
In the previous section we concluded that overall, unobservable differences explain the ad-
justed gap better than the differences in returns to labour market characteristics. However, 
when we split the data, we find that in the public sector differences in returns account for 
the largest part of the adjusted gap, while in the private sector, the adjusted gap is better 
explained in the terms of unobservable heterogeneity. (Graph 6.20). These unobservable 
characteristics account for 32% of the adjusted pay gap in the public sector (3.8pp out 
of 11.8%) and 64% of the pay gap in the private sector (11.2pp out of 17.4%). Although 
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overall effects of unobservable characteristics are significant, separate effects of unobserv-
able characteristics in the public and private sectors are not statistically significant, due to 
the smaller sample size when we split the overall sample into two. On the other hand, a 
detailed breakdown of the unexplained part of the wage differences (adjusted gap) between 
men and women shows significant differences in wage returns to labour market character-
istics between public and private sectors. In what follows, we summarise these differences.
Table 6.19. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in the private sector 
– explained part – detailed impact of differences in characteristics 
between the genders on the gender wage gap
High-paid jobs Low-paid jobs
Higher frequency 
of women
- Coastal region (-0.4pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
- Secondary education (0.2pp)
- Clerks (0.2pp)
- Service and sales workers (5.1pp)
- Public administration, 
education and health (0.5pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Lower frequency 
of women
- Senior officials and manage-
rial positions (0.2pp)
- Plant and machine 
operators (0.9pp)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
- Primary education (-0.4pp)
- Northern region (-0.5)
These characteristics make 
the true gap seem smaller.
Source: Own calculation based on LFS data from Q4 2008 to Q4 2011 (bi-quarterly data).
Differences in returns in the public vs. the private sector
In both the public and the private sector men have higher returns to education by around 
2pp, which are, due to the smaller sample size, statistically insignificant. However, in abso-
lute terms these differences are important for the explanation of the adjusted gap. Similarly, 
while in both sectors differences in returns to tenure are statistically insignificant, they are 
lower for women by 2.8pp in the private sector. 
While in the private sector there are no overall differences in returns, in the public sector 
women have higher returns to occupational characteristics by 3.7pp. Most importantly, in 
the public sector, women have higher returns among Technicians and associate professionals 
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(by 2pp), Clerks (2pp), and lower returns among Service and sales workers (1.3pp) (Table 
A6.24 in Appendix 6).
In the private sector differences in returns on employment in different sectors of activity 
are higher for men by 2.4pp. Although statistically insignificant, these differences are high 
in absolute terms and are mainly caused by higher returns to Industry (by1.2pp) and Public 
administration, education and health (by 0.8pp).
On the other hand, women have lower returns to sector of activity characteristics in the 
public sector, by 8.2pp. Most importantly, in the public sector, women have lower returns 
in Industry (1.5%), and Public administration, education and health (7pp) (Table A6.24 
in Appendix 6).
In conclusion, in the public sector, the adjusted gap is better explained in terms of differ-
ences to returns to characteristics. On average, returns are higher for men, and account 
for the 68% of the adjusted gap (7pp out of 11.8%), while the differences in unobservable 
characteristics make 32% (3pp of 11.8%) of the gap. Most importantly, men have higher 
returns for working in Public administration, education and health. 
In the private sector, the adjusted gap is better explained in terms of differences in 
unobservable characteristics, which make 64% of the gap (11.2pp out of 17.4%), while 
the differences in returns (in favour of men) make around 36% of the gap (6.2pp out of 
17.4%). Although none of the differences in returns to characteristics where men have the 
advantage (education, tenure, sector of activity etc.) are statistically significant in them-
selves, when grouped together, they manage to explain an important part of the gap.
Graph 6.20. Detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by sector of ownership 
– unexplained part – the impact of differences in returns to characteristics 
and differences in unobservable characteristics between 
the genders on the gender wage gap (in percentage points)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data from Q4 2008 to Q4 2011 (bi-quarterly data).
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Therefore, we may conclude that discrimination against women, in the form of lower 
returns to the same labour market characteristics than men, is more pronounced in the 
public sector. On the other hand, in the private sector, discrimination seems to stem from 
characteristics which we cannot observe with our data and which may have to do with 
the overall unequal position of women in the Montenegrin society, which increases their 
housework and care responsibilities at home, and therefore reduces their flexibility at the 
labour market. Furthermore, this finding is consistent with Becker’s hypothesis, surveyed 
in the literature review of this report, that increasing competition reduces discrimination 
by employers.   
Differences at different points of the wage distribution
in the public vs. the private sector
In this section we analyse the wage gap at the different points of the wage distribution 
in the public and private sectors separately. We split the sample into five wage brackets 
(quintiles) and compare differences in wages between men and women within these wage 
quintiles. 
Both unadjusted and adjusted pay gaps are statistically significant at each of the five 
percentiles of the distribution in both sectors (Table A6.25 in Appendix 6). In the public 
sector, the explained part of the gap is significant in the 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile, while in the 
private only in the 5th quintile.
In the public sector, the gap is the highest in the 5th (top) quintile, but in the rest of the 
distribution it shrinks as wages grow. Namely, the unadjusted gap in the 1st quintile is 
10.8%, it falls to around 6% in the 3rd and 4th quintile, where it reaches its minimum, and it 
rises to almost 15% in the top quintile. The adjusted gap follows the same pattern, but the 
differences between the quintiles are lower since the differences in characteristics widen 
the gap in the 3rd and 4th quintile (by 0.5pp and 1.1pp) to 5.9% and 6.2%, due to better 
female characteristics (better education on average). More importantly, the gap in the 5th 
quintile becomes lower by 4.3pp when adjusted for better male characteristics (Graph 
6.21, left panel). Main male advantages in this quintile are better education and higher 
participation in better-paid occupations. 
In the private sector, the gap widens towards the upper parts of the distribution. Namely, 
the unadjusted gap is the lowest in the 1st quintile of the distribution (16.8%), and it rises 
to almost 34% in the 5th quintile. The adjusted gap follows the same pattern since in all but 
the last quintile the differences in characteristics are statistically insignificant. In the top, 5th 
quintile, better characteristics of men lower the adjusted gap to 27.8% (Graph 6.21, right 
panel). Better male characteristics are mainly due to better occupational structure of men 
in this quintile (mainly their higher frequency among Professionals and Clerks).
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Graph 6.21. Unadjusted and adjusted gap at different points in the wage
distribution in the public (left panel) vs. the private sector (right panel)
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Source: Own calculation based on LFS data from Q4 2008 to Q4 2011 (bi-quarterly data).
The adjusted gap in the public sector is significantly lower than the unadjusted gap in 
all parts of the wage distribution. This indicates the presence of a glass ceiling in both 
sectors, since the gap is the highest in the 5th quintile for both sectors. However, the glass 
ceiling effect is moderate, since the differences in the adjusted gap at the 5th quintile are 
not significantly higher compared to second highest gap (1st quintile for the public and 
4th for the private sector). Interestingly, average wages are higher in the public sector in all 
quintiles, except for the 5th quintile of the male distribution, where the wages are higher by 
15% for men who work in the private sector. This is the quintile in which we observe the 
highest unadjusted gap in all three countries (34%). 
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7. Comparing the gender pay gap across the three 
    countries
In this chapter, we summarise and compare our findings on the gender pay gap trends 
across the three analysed countries. While we found many similarities in the distribution 
of male and female employment and wage gaps, a number of diverging trends were also 
observed. Given these differences, the countries of the Western Balkans cannot be treated 
as an entirely homogenous group when it comes to attempting to understand gender 
inequalities in the labour market. Country specific institutional frameworks as well as their 
historical path dependencies have also played a role in the shaping of gender relations in 
the economic sphere in this region.
7.1 Labour market trends and characteristics
In all three countries, female employment rates were significantly lower than male 
during the analysed period (2008-2011). The differences are the highest in Macedonia, 
where employment rate for men was higher by 18.6pp. In the other two countries, the 
employment gaps were slightly lower – amounting to 15pp in Serbia and 13.4pp in Mon-
tenegro. The gaps in all three countries were slightly higher than in the EU-27, where the 
employment gap during the same period stood at an average of 12.4pp. 
In all three countries, the employment gap is mainly caused by higher inactivity of 
women. In Macedonia women have higher inactivity rates than men by 26.8pp, in Serbia 
by 16.7 pp, and in Montenegro by 15.2 pp. Unemployment gaps in all the countries are 
very low, although women in all three countries have higher unemployment rates than men 
(in Macedonia by 0.8pp, in Montenegro by 1.8pp and in Serbia by 2.5pp). In comparison, 
the gender unemployment gap in EU 27 is non-existent.
Employment by educational attainment, age groups and type
In all three countries, gender employment gap shrinks with educational attainment. 
The gap is the highest among those with primary education (24pp in Macedonia, 15pp in 
Montenegro, 17pp in Serbia); it shrinks at the secondary level of education in Macedonia 
and Montenegro, but not in Serbia (13pp in Macedonia, 12pp in Montenegro, 17pp in 
Serbia), and it is the lowest (8 pp in Macedonia) or totally diminished among those with 
tertiary educational attainment (there is no gender gap in Serbia, nor in Montenegro, 
among women and men with tertiary education). 
The substantial gender employment gap between the most educated women and men (66% 
vs. 74%) in Macedonia at first glance seems somewhat surprising. However, while the most 
educated individuals are most frequently employed in the public sector, legally regulated 
affirmative action in Macedonia has also resulted in the increase of employment of repre-
sentatives of ethnic minorities in the public sector, from 5.6 to 24.2% between 2004 and 
2010 (CRPM 2012, p. 41-42). Albanians are the largest ethnic minority in Macedonia, and 
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female individuals of Albanian origin are associated with 35% lower probability of partici-
pating in the labor force than female individuals of Macedonian origin. Also, traditional 
norms related to female employment and the patriarchal “male breadwinner” household 
model are still prevalent in Albanian communities (World Bank 2008). Therefore, affirma-
tive action towards inclusion of ethnic minorities in the public sector could have had a 
negative impact on the gender gap between employees in the public sector. Furthermore, 
since employment in the public sector is highly sought after among educated women for 
its perceived security and family friendly working hours, women with tertiary education 
may engage in wait unemployment (i.e. wait for a placement in the public sector) more 
frequently than other population groups. 
Given the rather high gender gap in employment among those with tertiary education 
in Macedonia, it is quite surprising to observe the smallest employment gap of all three 
countries among those with secondary education. Furthermore, in Macedonia, the gender 
employment gap for those with the lowest educational attainment is much more pro-
nounced than in the other two countries. Such pronounced gender gap in employment for 
those with the lowest educational attainment is somewhat surprising, since these employ-
ment figures include all those employed as unpaid contributing family members, which is 
the most common form of employment for women with low education, especially in rural 
areas. 
On the other hand, employment gaps by age groups do not vary much across the three 
countries, with the largest gaps in employment between the genders (above 20pp) found 
among the oldest cohort of the working age population (55-64 years of age) and the small-
est gap between the genders (below 10pp) among the youngest population cohort (15-25). 
However, the youngest working age population cohort has by far the lowest employment 
levels for both genders, both due to higher inactivity (because of education) and higher 
unemployment. On the other hand, the pronounced gap among the oldest working age 
cohort reflects the fact that women tend to retire (or withdraw from the labour market) 
earlier than men in all three countries.   
Compared to men, women in all three countries are more often found in wage employ-
ment than men (75% of women and 70% of men in Serbia, 77% of women and 70% 
of men in Macedonia, and 89% of women and 79% of men in Montenegro). However, 
although a higher percentage of employed women are in wage employment than men, 
women are a minority in total wage employment in all three countries (43% of total em-
ployment in Serbia, 41% in Macedonia and 46% in Montenegro). 
On the other hand, women can less frequently be found working as self-employed in all 
three countries (13% vs. 26% of men in Serbia, 8% vs. 24% of men in Macedonia, and 
10% vs. 20% of men in Montenegro). In Serbia and Macedonia they are found to work 
a lot more frequently as unpaid family members (12% vs. 4% of men in Serbia, and 14% 
vs. 6% of men in Macedonia), most often in agriculture. This difference may be due to the 
fact that men who work on their own agricultural land tend to report themselves as self-
employed while women tend to report themselves as unpaid family members, which results 
in another form of gender inequality in the economic sphere – men’s and women’s unequal 
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access to resources obtained through joined labour. On the other hand, in Montenegro 
there is no difference between men’s and women’s engagement as unpaid family members, 
and unpaid family members represent a very rare type of employment there (1% of each 
gender). 
Employment before and after the economic crisis
Of the three countries, Serbia had a slightly higher employment rate for both genders 
at the onset of the economic crisis (in 2008). However, both its male and female em-
ployment rates suffered a significant negative impact by the crisis, which was not the 
case in the other two countries. While male employment rate dropped by 10pp, female 
dropped by almost 7pp (in Serbia). The male employment rate in Montenegro dropped as 
much as in Serbia (by 10pp), while female employment rate was much more stable, i.e. its 
level remained almost unchanged during the crisis. At the same time, during this period, 
employment rates for both genders in Macedonia slightly increased (Q4 2008–Q4 2011). 
Yet, since employment rates for both genders were initially lower than in Montenegro 
and Macedonia than in Serbia, the new post-crisis employment levels have almost 
converged in all three countries (male: 52% in Serbia, 49% in Montenegro and 52% in 
Macedonia; female: 38% in Serbia, 42% in Montenegro and 34% in Macedonia).
These diverging labour market responses to the economic crisis could reflect the 
different stages of transition these three countries were in when the crisis hit, which 
could have affected trends in demand for labour. For example, Macedonia embarked on 
company restructuring and privatisation (which entailed shedding of excess labour) much 
earlier than Serbia and Montenegro, which were under economic sanctions throughout 
the 1990’s. This could have been the reason why employment levels for both genders at the 
onset of the crisis in Macedonia were lower than in the other two countries. Furthermore, 
elasticity of employment to GDP during the crisis in Serbia stood at 2.6, which by far 
exceeded elasticities observed in the neighbouring economies (FREN 2010, p. 20). Such 
high elasticity of employment to GDP indicates that the crisis sped up the unfinished 
process of enterprise restructuring and economic transition. 
The shrinking of the employment gap may also be due to the overrepresentation of 
women in the public sector in the countries of the Western Balkans. Namely, while the 
private sector adjusted to the crisis through job loss, the public sector adjusted through real 
wage contraction which helped it to maintain employment levels. Therefore, more women 
than men may have kept their jobs during the crisis. 
The narrowing of gender employment gaps in all three countries seems to confirm our 
hypothesis that the crisis had a stronger negative impact on male than female employment 
(although not as pronounced in Montenegro as in the other two countries). Therefore, 
we may expect these gaps to grow back to pre-crisis levels as soon as the masculinised 
sectors of the economy recover. 
168
7.2 Gender differences in characteristics: unadjusted vs. 
       adjusted wage gap
The unadjusted gender wage gap represents the difference in mean log hourly wages be-
tween men and women. However, the two genders in all three countries differ significantly 
according to characteristics and skill levels of women and men who work, i.e. an average 
employed woman is not identical to an average employed man by level of education, work 
experience, occupation, industry sector, etc. Therefore, the adjusted wage gap between the 
genders (obtained by reweighing the gender wage gap so that it reflects these differences 
in characteristics) is a much more relevant indicator of the gender wage gap. 
In order to illustrate this point, we can observe that the share of women among all wage 
employees with tertiary education is 49% in Macedonia, 51% in Montenegro and 55% in 
Serbia. The differences become more pronounced among those working with secondary 
education, where only 40%, 43% and 41% of all wage employees in Macedonia, Montene-
gro and Serbia respectively are women. Among wage employees with primary education, 
only 33%, 35% and 39% in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia respectively are women. 
Graph 7.1 below shows unadjusted and adjusted gender gaps for all three countries. 
When gender differences in labour market characteristics are taken into account, the 
gap widens in Serbia and Macedonia, while it stays at the same level in Montenegro.
Graph 7.1. Unadjusted and adjusted gender wage gaps in 
Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro
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Source: Own calculations from LFS data, 2008-2011.
Therefore, unlike the trends we observe in Western economies, where working women on 
average have worse educational attainment, work experience and job related characteristics 
than men, due to historical discrimination (see Chapter 2), the differences in labour mar-
ket characteristics between men and women cannot explain the gender wage gap in the 
Western Balkans.
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In fact, in Serbia and Macedonia these differences in characteristics hide the true mag-
nitude of the gap, because employed women in the two countries on average have better 
characteristics than employed men (this is to a great extent due to the fact that women 
with the worst labour market characteristics are unemployed or inactive, i.e. discriminated 
at the point of entry into wage labour, rather than discriminated through lower wages). In 
other words, the explained part of the wage gap is negative: as soon as we try to explain 
the existence of the gap, we end up with an even larger gap.
Observed in greater detail, in both Serbia and Macedonia, this female advantage is split 
between their better education and better occupational characteristics (such as occupation 
and sector of activity)89. This suggests that women in Serbia and Macedonia “use” their 
better personal labour market characteristics, such as education, to obtain jobs in the 
more highly paid occupations and sectors. However, they are not paid as well as men 
within these highly paid occupations and sectors. 
In Montenegro, a different trend is observed. When we control for gender differences in 
education and work experience with the same employer (tenure), the estimated gender pay 
gap amounts to 19.2%. However, when we add occupation, sector of activity and region, 
the gender pay gap shrinks to 16.1% in favour of men. The fact that the wage gap grows to 
19.2% when we include only education and tenure into the equation, and it drops down 
to 16.1% when we add job characteristics, can suggest the following: while employed 
women have better personal labour market characteristics than employed men, they do 
not, or are not at all able to, “use” these characteristics in order to access the better paid 
occupations and sectors of the economy. Therefore, men are better positioned regarding 
the occupation and sector of activity then women, i.e. they work in better paid occupations 
and sectors. 
As shown in Graph 7.1, the unadjusted gender wage gap is the most pronounced in 
Montenegro. The highest unadjusted gap in Montenegro may be due to the strong tourism 
sector and the consequentially higher female employment in the private sector, including 
tourism (Montenegro has the lowest employment and inactivity gap of all three countries). 
As we have concluded from our analysis, low unadjusted gender wage gaps in the Western 
Balkans in comparison to Western countries are the consequence of low female labour 
market participation, especially among those with “worse” labour market characteristics. 
As more women with worse labour market characteristics enter the labour market, we can 
expect the unadjusted wage gap to widen. Therefore, it is intuitive to observe the largest 
unadjusted wage gap in the country with the lowest employment gap. 
On the other hand, the true, or adjusted, gap is the most pronounced in Macedonia. As the 
adjusted gap refers to differences in wages between individuals with the same labour market 
characteristics (men and women with the same educational attainment and work experi-
ence and those working in the same occupation/sector of the economy), it can be ascribed 
to labour market discrimination. In other words, while the high wage gap in Montenegro 
exists due to greater diversification of women across occupations and sectors of activity, 
and possibly their “ghettoisation” into female occupations and sectors, in Macedonia, 
89  See sections 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 in country chapters for a more detailed account of differences in characteristics.
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discrimination within occupations and sectors of activity is more dominant. This may 
be due to the fact that female unemployment is a lot more pronounced in Macedonia than 
in the other two countries, while female employment is lower than in the other two. This 
excessive female labour supply in Macedonia may be lowering female wages vis-à-vis male 
within the same occupations/sectors to a greater extent than this is the case in the other 
two countries. Furthermore, while we have observed higher female wages in the public 
than in the private sector in all three countries, female access to the Macedonian public 
sector may be more limited than in the other two countries, so they may be willing to 
accept lower wages. This is possibly due to affirmative action towards equal representation 
of ethnic minorities in the public sector which we discuss at the beginning of this chapter. 
Gender differences in returns to characteristics: the adjusted wage gap
The adjusted wage gap is the gap which remains unexplained after we take into consid-
eration the above discussed differences in characteristics between employed women and 
employed men. The adjusted gap exists because of: i) labour market discrimination against 
women, in a sense that there are differences between the genders in returns to the same 
labour market characteristics, and ii) unobserved heterogeneity of workers’ characteristics, 
which we were not able to capture through variables such as education, work experience, 
occupation, etc. These could vary from characteristics such as, for example, women be-
ing less flexible in terms of working hours or business trips due to housework and care 
responsibilities, to other effort- and ability-related variables which we do not (or cannot) 
measure, as well as labour market frictions. 
In all three countries the adjusted gap is better explained by differences in unobservable 
characteristics, than by differences in returns to observable labour market characteristics.
In Serbia, the adjusted gender wage gap cannot at all be explained by differences in returns 
to observable characteristics, so the entire adjusted gap exists due to different returns 
between men and women on unobservable characteristics. 
In Macedonia, the largest share of the adjusted wage gap – 69% (12.5pp of 17.9%) stems 
from unobservable characteristics of workers. On the other hand, differences in returns to 
personal labour market characteristics and occupation account for 31% of the unexplained 
wage gap (5.4pp of 17.9%). Women in Macedonia, on average, have lower market re-
turns to education, occupation and sector of activity. 
In Montenegro, differences between the genders in returns to the same labour market 
characteristics account for 25% of the adjusted gap (4.1pp of 16.1%). On the other hand, 
75% of the adjusted gender wage gap (12pp of 16.1%) cannot be accounted for by differ-
ent returns. This means that there is some other unobservable heterogeneity between the 
genders, which leads to the wage gap. 
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7.3 Gender wage gap in the public vs. the private sector
In all three countries the gender wage gap is better explained when the sample of the 
analysis is split into public vs. private sector. This is due to strong labour market duality 
in the Western Balkans, where the public and the private sectors operate under differ-
ent “rules.” 
Before focusing on the wage gap, it is important to note that wages are higher in the 
public sector in all three countries. Furthermore, this public sector wage premium is 
higher for women than for men (Graph 7.2). The difference in wages between the sectors 
is lowest in Montenegro (17.0% for women and 1.9% for men). The differences are much 
higher in Serbia and Macedonia, where men have around one-third lower wages when 
working in the private sector then when working in the public (34.5% for Serbia, 32.6% 
for Macedonia), while the difference for women is even higher (42.2% in Serbia; 46% in 
Macedonia). 
Similarly to the results obtained from the analysis of the entire sample, the unadjusted 
wage gaps for both sectors are the highest in Montenegro (23.7% in the private and 
8.7% in the public), followed by Macedonia (17.7% in the private and 4% in the public), 
while they are the lowest in Serbia (9.4% in the private and 1.6% in the public). 
Additionally, unadjusted wage gaps are significantly higher in the private than in the 
public sector in all three countries (Graph 7.2, right panel). Differences in unadjusted 
gaps between the private and the public sector range from 15pp in Montenegro (23.7% in 
the private vs. 8.7% in the public), to 13.7pp in Macedonia (17.7% vs. 4%), and 7.8pp in 
Serbia (9.4% vs 1.6%).
Graph 7.2. Public sector wage premiuma (left panel) and unadjusted wage gap,
public vs. private sector (right panel)
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a Public sector wage premium is a percentage difference between wages in the public and private sector. 
Source: Own calculations from LFS data, 2008-2011.
Adjusted gaps in the public sector are larger than the unadjusted ones in all three countries, 
which means that the better female labour market characteristics in this sector hide the 
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true extent of the wage gap when we look at the simple difference in wage averages between 
the genders. Gender differences in labour market characteristics in the public sector are 
significant and in favour of women in all three coutries (Graph 7.3, left panel, blue bars), 
so they act to underestimate the adjusted wage gap. Therefore, our analysis suggests a 
lot higher extent of wage discrimination of women in the public sector than a simple 
comparison of average wages would suggest. 
Graph 7.3. Differences in characteristics (left panel, in pp) and the adjusted
wage gap in public and private sector, by country
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In the private sector, differences in labour market characteristics (Graph 7.3, left panel, red 
bars) are either very slightly in favour of women (in Serbia and Macedonia), or signficantly 
in favour of men (in Montenegro). Because of these differences in characteristics, the 
adjusted gap in Serbia and Macedonia is slightly higher than than the unadjusted gap. 
The opposite stands for Montenegro – the explained part of the gap is positive. The private 
sector in Montenegro (with tourism’s strong share) therefore follows much more closely 
Western trends, where women have worse labour market characteristics than men (due to 
historical disadvantages), which explain a part of their differences in earnings. 
In summary, within the public sector, better labour market characteristics of women 
substantially underestimate the wage gap in all three countries. On the other hand, in 
the private sector, female labour market characteristics are either only slightly better than 
male, so they have no substantial impact on the gap (in Serbia and Macedonia), or they 
are significantly worse, so they overestimate the gap (in Montenegro). In other words, 
after adjusting for differences in labour market characteristics, in all three countries 
the differences between the wage gaps in public and private sector become smaller. They 
now range from 7.4pp (18.5% vs 11.4%) in Macedonia, over 5.6pp in Montenegro (17.4% 
vs 11.8%,), to 3.5pp in Serbia (9.4% vs 1.6%).
Adjusting for labour characteristics shows that the effect of discrimination in the public 
sector is not as large as in the private sector, but that it is far from non-existent.
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The adjusted gender wage gap in the public sector
In the public sector, the adjusted gender wage gap in Serbia of 7.5%  is lower than in 
the other two countries. The adjusted public sector gender wage gaps in Macedonia and 
Montenegro stand at 11.4 and 11.7% respectively (Graph 7.3, right panel). 
There are some differences in the sources of public sector discrimination of women across 
the three countries. 
In Serbia women actually have higher returns to the same labour market characteristics than 
men when working in the public sector (by 4pp on average). However, male unobservable 
characteristics are better awarded than female and they seem to be the main culprit 
for the existence of the wage gap between the two genders in the public sector. What 
happens is that this negative effect of better male returns to unobservables is somewhat 
lessened by the fact that women have better returns to observables. If the differences in 
returns to characteristics were the same, the adjusted gender wage gap in the public sector 
in Serbia would be at the same level as in the private sector in Serbia, and at the same level 
as in the public sectors of Macedonia and Montenegro (11%). 
In Macedonia, women have almost equal returns to characteristics as men in the public 
sector, so the main source of discrimination is higher male returns to unobservable char-
acteristics (10.6pp of 11.4% gap is due to differences in unobservable characteristics). This 
effect is more dominant in Macedonia than in Serbia, especially because it is not even 
partially offset by better female returns to observables, like it is the case in Serbia. However, 
the effect of discrimination in Macedonia is a lot stronger in the private sector, so we can 
still say that women are less discriminated in the public than in the private sector. 
In Montenegro we observe a completely different trend. The adjusted wage gap is better 
explained by differences to returns. On average, returns are higher for men, and account 
for 68% of the adjusted gap (7pp out of 11.8%), while the differences in unobservable 
characteristics make 32% (3pp of 11.8%) of the gap. This suggests that women cannot 
access the best paid occupations and sectors of activity within the public sector, regardless 
of their better personal labour market characteristics such as the level of education.
Looking at the gender gap across the wage distribution in the public sector, different 
trends emerge. While in Serbia the adjusted gap seems to be equally pronounced at all 
levels of the wage distribution in the public sector (between 4 and 5%), in Macedonia there 
is a clear glass ceiling effect, where the most pronounced gender difference in wages comes 
at the top of the wage distribution (the gap is 7%), i.e. women are unable to access the top 
paid professions. Montenegro has the most pronounced adjusted gender wage gap at the 
top of the wage distribution in the public sector, at above 15%, implying a much stronger 
glass ceiling effect than in the other two countries. Furthermore, in Montenegro there is 
a pronounced wage gap also at the bottom of the distribution (and it is more moderate in 
the middle of the distribution), which implies that women with the lowest wages also earn 
substantially less than men with the lowest wages in the public sector. This wage floor effect 
does not seem to be very dominant in the public sector of the other two countries. 
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The adjusted gender wage gap in the private sector
In Serbia, differences in returns are on average higher for men in the private sector. While 
gender differences in returns to the same labour market characteristics can account for 
42% of the adjusted gap, the differences in unobservable characteristics can account for the 
remaining 58%. While the private sector in Serbia seems to be characterised by more 
explicit discrimination than the public sector, due to the presence of lower returns to 
characteristics for women, this could also be the case because there are more sectors of 
activity and occupations within the private than within the public sector, so the wage 
dispersion is wider. Therefore, these differences may reflect different values added of the 
different sectors to the economy, rather than be due to the fact that private employers 
discriminate more. However, this leads us to a question why women seem to be over-
represented in the less paid occupations and sectors of the economy, which also needs to be 
acknowledged as a form of discrimination. 
In Macedonia, the largest part of the adjusted gender wage gap in the private sector exists 
due to the unobservable characteristics between men and women, which account for 80% 
of the adjusted pay gap in the private sector (14.7pp out of 18.5%). The rest of the unex-
plained gap (20%) occurs because of different returns to observable personal characteristics 
of labour market participants. 
In Montenegro, the adjusted wage gap is better explained by differences in unobservable 
characteristics, which make 64% of the gap (11.2pp out of 17.4%), while the differences in 
returns (in favour of men) make around 36% of the gap (6.2pp out of 17.4%).  
In Serbia, looking at the wage distribution in the private sector, differences in characteristics 
affect the adjusted wage gap differently across the quintiles: while it is still the lowest at the 
bottom part of the distribution, it is the highest at the top of the distribution, suggesting a 
glass ceiling effect, which means that it is more difficult for women to access the best paid 
positions in the private sector.
In Macedonia, in the private sector, gender wage gaps are consistently large across the 
entire distribution, so the glass ceiling effect does not seem to particularly stand out, due 
to the generally much better rewards for men than for women at all levels of the wage 
distribution. 
In Montenegro, we observe a very pronounced glass ceiling effect, with the largest gender 
wage gap of 28% existing at the top of the wage distribution. Although the wage gap at the 
bottom of the wage distribution is almost half of the wage gap at the top, at 16.2% it is still 
almost as high as in Macedonia and much higher than in Serbia.  
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8. Policy Implications
Our findings on the composition of the gender wage gap in the Western Balkans have 
several important implications for government policies aiming to address economic in-
equalities between men and women.
1. Counter to widely held beliefs, separate analyses of the public and private sectors 
uncover that pay discrimination of women is not much higher in the private than in 
the public sector. However, gender pay disparities are more “hidden” in the public sector, 
because women who work in it have much better labour market characteristics than men 
who do. If there were no discrimination, women would have higher average wages than 
men in the public sector, because they are on average better qualified. In other words, 
women need to have better labour market characteristics than men to access the same 
positions in the public sector at all levels of responsibility, which can be considered a dis-
criminatory practice. This effect seems particularly pronounced at the top part of the wage 
distribution, meaning that women have the most difficult time accessing the best-paid 
positions in the public sector, although they may be better qualified for those jobs than 
their male counterparts.  
2. Women seem to be more “punished” in the public than in the private sector90 for their 
“worse” unobservable characteristics, e.g. for the fact that they may be less flexible in 
terms of working hours or business trips due to housework and care responsibilities or 
the fact that they may be perceived by employers as less able to perform certain jobs (e.g. 
due to prejudice/patriarchal beliefs that women are less suited for positions of author-
ity). This could be seen as a surprising finding, since the public sector is traditionally held 
to offer better non-pecuniary benefits and work-life balance than the private sector. On 
the other hand, in light of the hypothesis (proved empirically on a number of occasions) 
that increasing competition reduces the taste for discrimination by employers, we can also 
say that the public sector can “afford” to indulge in their taste for discrimination more than 
the private sector.
3. Although we see a wider true wage gap between the genders in the private sector, we 
need to consider the fact that the private sector consists of a wider range of activities and 
occupations. We also need to consider that women have traditionally been trained for the 
lower paid and undervalued occupations and treated as secondary workers. In that sense, 
since market competition does not exist in a vacuum, the wage gap observed in the private 
sector may reflect labour market rigidities such as horizontal occupational segregation 
and larger frictions in female job search than male. In that sense, interventions at the 
level of education and training may also influence future trends in gender wage gaps. 
4. Due to the fact that transition from socialist to capitalist economy has not been 
completed yet, especially in Serbia and Montenegro, it is not entirely clear what the 
new equilibrium in economic relations between the genders will be at the end of it (if 
90  Meaning that better male returns to unobservable characteristics play a larger role in explaining the gender pay gap in 
the public than in the private sector. 
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there is an end point at all). Both Serbia and Montenegro are still expected to conduct 
painful public sector reforms and it is not clear upfront which gender will be more hit by 
these reforms. Careful ex-ante gender analyses of envisaged reforms could answer some 
of these questions.
5. The economic crisis has resulted in the shrinking of the gender wage and employment 
gap in all three countries. However, this cannot be seen as good news, since it is a result 
of the more pronounced negative impact of the crisis on the masculinised sectors than the 
feminised ones. The question of permanence of these trends therefore remains pertinent. 
Once masculinised sectors of the economy recover and possibly become more produc-
tive as a result of the crisis (so that wages go up in these sectors), we may see the recovery 
of pre-crisis gaps, or potentially even their worsening.
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